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Viewing cable 07MEXICO4390, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BLUNT'S AUGUST 20-21 VISIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MEXICO4390 2007-08-16 18:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO2368
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #4390/01 2281831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161831Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8449
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 004390 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR CODEL BLUNT FROM AMBASSADOR GARZA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP ECON PGOV PREL MX OVIP BLUNT ROY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BLUNT'S AUGUST 20-21 VISIT 
TO MEXICO CITY 
 
Sensitive but unclassified, entire text. 
 
1. (SBU) My staff and and I warmly welcome you to Mexico 
City.  President Calderon recognizes the broad-ranging 
challenges his country faces and has the vision and political 
will to address them strategically.  Having completed his 
first 9 months in office, he has demonstrated resolve in 
implementing his key policy objectives: improving security 
and the rule of law, attacking poverty, and creating jobs. 
The U.S. and Mexico have developed a solid set of 
institutional relationships that allow us to work 
productively on most of our priorities, including fundamental 
issues of homeland security and North American prosperity. 
Those links are set to expand.  Your visit is a sign of U.S. 
support for the Calderon government and dedication to this 
complex, interdependent relationship. 
 
2. (SBU) Mexico's democratic institutions weathered a 
contentious presidential election, and Calderon has been 
quick to emerge as an activist president with a strong and 
respected cabinet, particularly in the security and economic 
areas.  His security efforts are designed to reassure foreign 
investors and Mexicans worried about drug-related crime and 
lawlessness that organized criminals will no longer act with 
impunity.  He knows that attracting investment, particularly 
from the U.S., is pivotal to curbing migration and narrowing 
the social and economic inequalities that undercut Mexican 
society and result in bitter political divisions.  Calderon 
also recognizes that his vision of Mexico becoming a more 
prosperous country and a regional leader depends first on 
security and the rule of law. 
 
Bilateral Relations 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Calderon has demonstrated pragmatism in his posture 
toward the United States and is building on an already modern 
and mature U.S.-Mexico relationship.  The President's message 
is that Mexico will seek what it needs from us on the basis 
of equality, respect, and the close cooperation expected of 
neighbors that share wide-ranging interests and challenges. 
Our common border, responsible for extensive commercial, 
community, and family ties, is transforming our societies 
into two of the most deeply and broadly connected on earth. 
 
4. (SBU) Far more than his predecessor, President Calderon 
recognizes that immigration reform is a U.S. domestic matter 
that is dependent upon U.S. congressional action.  He will 
seek progress in a low-key effort that avoids making 
migration the dominant bilateral issue.  He places great 
emphasis on creating opportunities and jobs for Mexicans 
inside Mexico.  In a February 2007 speech before the American 
Chamber of Commerce, President Calderon said the solution to 
the immigration problem is the responsibility of the Mexican 
government, and must be done by bringing capital to the 
workers in Mexico, rather than having Mexican labor flow to 
the U.S.  Nevertheless, the Mexican public draws little 
distinction between documented and undocumented migrants, 
seeing both as hard-working countrymen who have been driven 
to the U.S. by domestic economic adversity and U.S. economic 
demands.  As such, domestic political considerations require 
that he and his cabinet raise the issue with USG officials 
and that he publicly criticize measures that most Mexicans 
find offensive.  In your meetings with your Mexican 
interlocutors, we encourage you to explain U.S. domestic 
political factors affecting the issue of migration and help 
your Mexican interlocutors maintain realistic expectations. 
 
5.  (SBU) Similarly, the proposed border fence is an 
extremely sensitive issue, and in public settings, Mexican 
government officials frequently posture on it.  Likewise, 
minor incidents on the border, associated with infrastructure 
development, can quickly become public disputes.  The 
occasional cases in which Border Patrol agents (often acting 
in self-defense) injure or kill undocumented aliens 
inevitably provoke a sharp reaction here.  Your visit can 
reinforce our message that we are concerned by the violence 
that is an unfortunate bi-product of illegal migration and 
that we need to work together to ensure safe, orderly and 
legal border crossings, while stemming the flow of illegal 
migrants.  Should the issue arise, we believe it is useful to 
emphasize that given the rampant violence in the border 
region -- as well as the threat of international terrorism -- 
the USG has the responsibility to take all available measures 
to protect its citizens and enforce its laws. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
 
MEXICO 00004390  002 OF 004 
 
 
6. (SBU) The new administration has moved forcefully to 
improve public security, significantly increasing the 
security budget; launching surge operations against drug 
traffickers in six of the most conflictive states; working to 
overhaul Mexico's national police organization; advancing 
justice reform; and authorizing the extradition to the United 
States of 15 wanted criminals, including 4 drug king-pins. 
The president's initial actions reflect his commitment to 
intensify security-related cooperation with the U.S., and his 
willingness to incur political risk in doing so. 
 
7. (SBU) The president fully understands the depth of U.S. 
concerns about international terrorism and the 
transformational effect of the 9/11 attacks on USG policy, 
and he has signaled his strong commitment to work with us to 
preempt terrorist activity or entry through our shared 
border.  While a solid foundation for joint counter-terrorism 
cooperation has been established, and the Mexican 
government's efforts should be recognized, we also need to 
press for further progress on information sharing.  With 
respect to weapons of mass destruction, the Mexican 
government -- on its own initiative -- has requested our 
assistance in strengthening its detection capabilities. 
 
8. (SBU) Mexico is a central partner in USG efforts to combat 
drug trafficking and other trans-border threats.  While 
taking aggressive measures to tackle organized crime at home, 
Calderon has also publicly urged the U.S. to boost our own 
efforts to drive down demand for narcotics and improve 
controls on arms, cash, and precursor chemicals smuggled into 
Mexico.  He acknowledges that Mexico cannot effectively 
confront narco-trafficking without our cooperation and is 
eager for expanded assistance, including help with combating 
money laundering.  During his February 2007 trip to Mexico, 
Secretary Chertoff heard from Mexican Attorney General Medina 
 
SIPDIS 
Mora that Mexico's most critical law enforcement challenges 
are: improving the institutional strength of local, state, 
and federal police forces; dismantling the sophisticated 
business operations run by the drug cartels; and crafting a 
regional strategy encompassing the U.S., Mexico, and Central 
America.  In recent days, there has been media speculation 
regarding a possible expansion of USG counter-narcotics 
assistance to Mexico.  President Bush has made clear that he 
supports President Calderon in his fight against narcotics 
traffickers. He also understands that this is a shared 
problem for which there must be shared responsibility.  The 
USG is engaged with the Mexican government to determine how 
we can strengthen our cooperation in this area. 
 
The Southern Border 
------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Mexico's southern border remains extremely 
vulnerable to illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, 
and the smuggling of all manner of contraband, including 
drugs/precursors.  It is an issue of great concern to the 
Mexican government, which attributes its lack of success in 
dealing with the problem to the difficult local terrain; the 
lack of enforcement infrastructure; the historically 
informal nature of the border, particularly among local 
residents; and the inadequate border security efforts of its 
southern neighbors, Guatemala and Belize.  Mexican law 
enforcement agencies have begun factoring southern border 
security considerations into ongoing programs and are seeking 
to expand/improve operations in southern Mexico. 
Nevertheless, progress in securing Mexico's southern border 
is of vital importance in achieving our own security 
objectives.  In your meetings, you may wish to inquire about 
current the status of Mexican efforts to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to secure the southern frontier. 
 
Strong Leader in a Conflictive Environment 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU) President Felipe Calderon is off to a strong 
start, demonstrating leadership at home and abroad in a 
manner much appreciated by Mexicans: although he won election 
with a bare 36% plurality in a three-way race, a recent 
opinion poll showed that 64% of Mexicans approve of his 
performance to date.  Nevertheless, the political climate 
overall remains conflictive, with a congress closely divided 
between the president's right-of-center National Action Party 
(PAN), the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), and 
the left-of-center Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
Calderon faces significant domestic challenges in pursuing 
his security, economic and social reform agendas.  At the 
same time, he must chip away at the historic Mexican 
ambivalence toward the U.S. that has slowed progress on many 
common fronts, including security. 
 
MEXICO 00004390  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
Stable but Vulnerable Economy 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) President Calderon inherited a stable, growing 
economy tightly linked to U.S. economic cycles.  Mexico 
chalked up an estimated 4.7% growth rate in 2006, rebounding 
from near zero growth in the first years of the decade.  Real 
GDP growth is expected to slow to around 3.3% this year. 
Inflation has risen in recent months to around 4%, but is 
under control.  Many here are growing concerned, however, 
about Mexico's ability to compete in an increasingly 
globalized world, as it loses market share to India, China 
and other emerging economies. We agree with Finance Minister 
Carstens that Mexico needs broad reform to improve tax 
collection, reduce reliance on oil income, confront growing 
pension liabilities and payments on government borrowing 
outside the federal budget, and provide needed spending on 
poverty alleviation, education, health and infrastructure to 
compete internationally and develop the poorest parts of 
Mexico.  The Mexican government has begun the process with a 
National Infrastructure Plan, pension reform and a fiscal 
reform proposal currently before Congress. 
 
12. (SBU) Our official U.S. assistance budget for FY07 is US 
$50.6 million, a 24.4 percent cut from FY06, and funds much 
of our efforts to help the Calderon government fight crime, 
secure borders, reform the justice system, increase economic 
opportunity, and protect the environment.  Just as the 
President has demonstrated commitment to work collaboratively 
with the U.S. on a broad agenda, an increasing number of 
Mexican state governors are working constructively with both 
U.S. federal agencies and border states to achieve common 
goals.  Of our total US $50.6 million in official assistance, 
USAID manages $19 million in projects that support overall 
U.S. efforts to address two key causes of immigration 
pressure: lack of economic opportunity and weak public 
safety.  USAID projects work directly with Mexican 
institutions (including NGOs) at the federal, state, and 
local levels to: increase economic opportunities at home; 
strengthen security; raise Mexican competitiveness via policy 
reform; improve the judicial system; expand access to credit; 
and link marginalized producers in poorer areas to national 
and international markets.  Education and health programs 
also build the capacity of Mexico's work force. 
 
Facilitating Legitimate Trade 
----------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Numerous studies and trade groups, including the 
private sector North American Competitiveness Council, have 
stressed that border facilities and procedures must be 
improved significantly to accommodate current trade flows and 
expected future growth.  In 2006, U.S. Mexico trade in goods 
and services grew to over USD 367 billion (more than one 
billion dollars a day).  We can accomplish this by, inter 
alia: extending and/or synchronizing operating hours at U.S. 
and Mexican facilities at the same border crossing; sharing 
best practices among ports of entry; cutting back on 
redundant inspections; employing new technologies to track 
and speed the secure movement of cargo; identifying critical 
infrastructure investments needed on both sides of the 
border; and involving the private sector to make the North 
American supply chain more secure and efficient.  At the 
March 2007 summit between President Bush and Calderon, both 
governments agreed to increase efforts to facilitate 
legitimate trade across the border.  In response, the U.S. 
and Mexican governments have each formed a senior-level 
working group and plan to announce progress made toward trade 
facilitation during the August 2007 SPP Leader's Meeting. 
 
Energy 
------ 
 
14. (SBU) After Canada, Mexico is the largest source of U.S. 
oil imports.  We therefore have a strong strategic interest 
in continued stable supplies of Mexican oil.  Within Mexico, 
energy is an extremely sensitive topic tied to national 
sovereignty, but the energy sector requires difficult reforms 
urgently.  Because the Constitution prohibits private 
investment in many areas of the energy sector, the government 
must provide the tens of billions of investment dollars that 
the state oil monopoly Pemex needs. The current system will 
not withstand the expected steep drop in Mexican oil 
production, or a fall in oil prices.  President Calderon, a 
former Energy Secretary, is looking at how to head off the 
ongoing drop in oil production. 
 
Consular Issues 
 
MEXICO 00004390  004 OF 004 
 
 
--------------- 
 
15. (SBU) One of the clearest indicators of the deep links 
between our two societies is our consular workload in Mexico. 
 About one third of all USG employees stationed in Mexico are 
dedicated to providing consular services.  An estimated one 
million American citizens reside in Mexico and about 12 
million visit every year.  Most Americans rarely encounter 
problems here, but each year hundreds are arrested, 
assaulted, die, fall ill, or become destitute, and seek 
assistance from consular employees.  More abductions of U.S. 
citizen children take place (in both directions) between the 
U.S. and Mexico than anywhere else in the world.  The 
migration of U.S. citizen retirees to Mexico has provided 
impetus to improving property rights protections in Mexico, 
including the introduction of title insurance offered by U.S. 
insurance companies.  The air phase of the Western Hemisphere 
Travel Initiative went into effect January 23 with few 
problems and 99 percent of U.S. citizen passengers bound for 
the U.S. carried passports.  The land and sea phase, which 
will go into effect before June 2009, will present a greater 
challenge due to the fact that there may be as many as 
700,000 U.S. citizens residing in Mexico without 
documentation who will need passports. 
 
16. (SBU) U.S. Consular Sections in Mexico processed about 
1.3 million nonimmigrant visa applications in fiscal year 
2006, including 114,000 temporary worker (H2) visas (71 
percent of the world total), of which almost 35,000 were 
temporary agricultural workers (92 percent of the world 
total).  There are no numerical limits on temporary 
agricultural worker visas and Mission Mexico stands ready to 
process much greater numbers of these visas if U.S. 
agribusiness chooses to make greater use of this program. 
All immigrant visas in Mexico are issued in Ciudad Juarez, 
where we processed about 86,000 immigrant visa applications 
in 2006, of which 54,000 were issued.  This is the greatest 
number of immigrant visas issued to any one nationality in 
the world.  This fluid legal movement of Mexicans northward, 
along with long-standing documented and undocumented 
communities in the U.S., make the USD 23 billion in 
remittances that Mexicans send home Mexico's second largest 
source of foreign exchange revenues, behind petroleum and now 
ahead of tourism. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
BASSETT