Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2003, BRAZIL AND NICARAGUA: I SAY ETHANOL, YOU SAY HYDRO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA2003.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA2003 2007-08-30 16:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO4676
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #2003/01 2421604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301604Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1121
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1155
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0092
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0012
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0025
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, AND EEB 
TREASURY FOR SARA GRAY 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/MSIEGELMAN 
3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/WH/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID ECON PGOV NU IR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL AND NICARAGUA: I SAY ETHANOL, YOU SAY HYDRO 
 
REF: A) MANAGUA 1978, B) MANAGUA 1944, C) MANAGUA 1783 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: President Luiz Ignacio "Lula" da Silva's August 
7-8 visit to Nicaragua was the first by a Brazilian head of state in 
over 100 years.  While Lula's focus for the visit was ethanol and 
business opportunities that take advantage of CAFTA, Ortega tried to 
interest the Brazilians in projects in agriculture, electricity 
generation, and tourism.  Although Lula tried valiantly to convince 
Ortega of the benefits of ethanol, Ortega showed little interest. 
Instead, Ortega tried to shift the focus of Lula's visit toward the 
same portfolio of hydroelectric, geothermal, and infrastructure 
projects he has been peddling to the Iranians and others (Ref A). 
Bilateral talks also included Brazilian technical assistance to 
Nicaragua's Hambre Cero program, a possible debt for development 
swap, and support for Nicaragua's Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission.  Lula's visit made clear that while rhetorically Ortega, 
Lula, and Chavez appear to be at least in the same populist 
ballpark, in reality, the opportunities that the Brazilians seek in 
Nicaragua would require that Ortega step back from Chavez and ALBA, 
a move Ortega seems unwilling to make.  End Summary. 
 
Second Visit in a Week 
---------------------- 
2. (U) Nicaraguan authorities characterized Brazilian President Luiz 
Ignacio "Lula" da Silva's August 7-8 visit to Nicaragua as a 
"historic event," a precursor to an increase in bilateral 
cooperation and investment.  The visit marked the first visit by a 
Brazilian head of state in more than 100 years, although Lula 
visited Managua as a union leader in 1980 to celebrate the first 
anniversary of the Sandinista revolution.  During this visit, a few 
days after a technical delegation from Iran toured Nicaragua (Ref 
A), Lula stated that he had maintained a close relationship with 
Ortega throughout the 1990s and that he was delighted that the FSLN 
leader had returned to power.  Brazilian officials declared they 
wanted to establish a relationship of "permanent cooperation" and 
"integration" with Nicaragua, particularly in the areas of 
agriculture, reforestation, fisheries, health, and education.  The 
two leaders signed twelve cooperation agreements covering 
agriculture, forestry, education, foreign relations, tourism, 
health, trade, investment and energy. 
 
3. (U) Lula traveled to Nicaragua from Honduras, the second stop on 
his Latin American tour that included Mexico, Jamaica, and Panama. 
He was accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Relations Celso 
Amorim; Minister of Development, Industry, and Foreign Commerce 
Miguel Jorge; Special Secretary of Aquaculture and Fisheries Altemir 
Gregolin; and a delegation of 50 businessmen, who participated in a 
trade and investment forum in Managua geared toward creating 
investments in infrastructure, energy (mostly biofuels), and 
agro-industry. 
 
Biofuels - Is Ethanol an Option? 
-------------------------------- 
4. (U) One of the first areas for cooperation discussed was 
biofuels, primarily ethanol, as a potential way to solve Nicaragua's 
energy crisis.  Brazilian Marcos Saways Yank, President of the Sugar 
Agro-Industry Union of Sao Paulo, tried to convince GON officials 
and private sector representatives of the merits of ethanol 
production.  In an editorial published during the visit, Lula stated 
that he considers Nicaragua to be "a strong candidate to lead a 
pioneer initiative in Central America" in ethanol development. 
 
5. (U) President Ortega, however, has been vocal about the danger of 
Nicaragua becoming dependent on ethanol production.  He has stated 
several times that reliance on ethanol will put Nicaragua on "the 
dangerous path to monoculture."  Outside of criticizing the United 
States' corn-based biofuel program, Ortega showed little interest in 
the subject throughout Lula's visit.  When pressed, Ortega stated 
that ethanol from African palm was acceptable, but avoided making 
any direct comments on sugar-based ethanol.  He added that he would 
leave the issue of biofuels to the private sector.  Later, 
Nicaraguan Minister of Energy and Mines Emilio Rappaccioli said that 
while the production of ethanol was justified for other countries, 
Nicaragua would prefer to use its farmland for the cultivation of 
food products such as basic grains. 
 
Electricity Instead of Biofuels 
------------------------------- 
 
MANAGUA 00002003  002 OF 003 
 
 
6. (U) In an effort to shift the focus of Lula's visit from ethanol 
and biofuels, the GON presented several hydroelectric and geothermal 
projects to the Brazilians, the same ones they hawked to the Iranian 
delegation a week earlier (Ref A).  Nicaraguan ENEL Director Ernesto 
Martinez Tiffer added two additional projects, which could generate 
up to 120 megawatts of electricity for an investment of USD 250 
million.  In the end, Lula agreed to look into financing 
hydroelectric and geothermal projects, but only after he lauded the 
potential for biofuels, based on soy, sunflowers, and Africa palm, 
as viable alternatives for Nicaragua. 
 
Infrastructure and Agro-Industry 
-------------------------------- 
7. (U) As they had done with the Iranian delegation, the Nicaraguans 
flooded the Brazilians with infrastructure project proposals.  The 
President's advisors presented proposals to improve the ports and 
airports on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast to increase tourism.  The 
Nicaraguan Port Authority requested USD 9 million to dredge 42 kms 
of the San Juan River.  Agriculture and Forestry Minister Ariel 
Bucardo wanted to work with the Brazilians on importing equipment 
for Nicaragua's coffee and beef sectors.  Lula promised to ask 
Brazilian bus manufacturers to sell their buses to Nicaraguans at 
discounted prices. 
 
The Private Sector had specific objectives 
------------------------------------------ 
8. (U) While Ortega used the visit as an opportunity to criticize 
CAFTA and praise ALBA as "free trade versus fair trade," it was 
clear that the Brazilian business representatives who accompanied 
Lula view Nicaragua as a platform from which they could export to 
the United States, taking advantage of CAFTA.  At the 
Nicaragua-Brazil trade fair, the main areas of interest were 
infrastructure, energy, textiles and ethanol.  Nicaragua's largest 
sugar producer (and only ethanol producer) agreed to explore 
dehydrating Brazilian ethanol here for export to the U.S. under 
CAFTA terms. 
 
Food Assistance 
--------------- 
9. (U) The GOB team paid particular attention to Nicaragua's "Hambre 
Cero" program--a food security initiative loosely based on Brazil's 
"Fome Zero" (Ref C).  Brazilian officials offered technical and 
scientific cooperation to Nicaragua to improve the program's 
effectiveness.  Currently, Hambre Cero is focused exclusively on 
distributing farm animals and seed to pre-selected families 
throughout Nicaragua.  In contrast, Fome Zero involves a variety of 
different initiatives, ranging from direct and conditional cash 
transfers to the poorest families ("Bolsa Familia"), distributing 
vitamins and iron supplements, and micro-credit.  Brazilian 
officials expressed support for the GON's plan to hand control of 
the Hambre Cero program to the controversial FSLN-controlled Citizen 
Power Councils (Ref B), as Brazil's program is run through a similar 
system of councils controlled by Lula's Workers' Party. 
 
Debt for Social Development Swap 
-------------------------------- 
10. (U) The most unexpected request to the GOB was Ortega's proposal 
to swap Nicaragua's debt with Brazil (USD 5.9 million) with projects 
in the social and development sectors.  Given that this was the 
first mention of such an idea, no specifics on the exact nature of 
the swap or the social programs were unveiled.  In his editorial 
during this visit, Lula argued that Brazil's forgiveness of 
Nicaragua's bilateral debt should be seen as "an expression of 
solidarity and also as a credit of confidence." (Note: Under the 
terms of the HIPC program, Nicaragua does not service any of its 
pre-HIPC foreign debt. End Note.) 
 
Helping Peace and Reconciliation 
-------------------------------- 
11. (U) President Lula also met with retired cardinal Miguel Obando 
y Bravo, who now heads up the GON's Commission of Verification, 
Peace, Reconciliation and Justice.  Lula promised technical 
assistance to the Commission which seeks to resolve the demands of 
150,000 ex-combatants.  Lula promised he would send a delegation 
headed by the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture and a team of 
Brazilian labor leaders to Nicaragua to discuss possible areas of 
cooperation.  Lula also committed to make contacts with other world 
leaders to gather resources for the Commission. 
 
MANAGUA 00002003  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Common Positions on Foreign Affairs 
----------------------------------- 
12. (U) The final joint communique spelled out several common 
positions on foreign affairs: 
 
-- Both countries "manifested their will and firm commitment to 
fight transnational organized crime." 
 
-- Both "reaffirmed that terrorism, in all its forms and 
manifestations, has no justification." 
 
-- Both presidents "Expressed their feelings of solidarity with the 
Government and fraternal people of Cuba." 
 
-- Both presidents emphasized the dialogue and negotiations, 
according to the principles of the UN Charter, are the basis for 
finding peace in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Comment 
------- 
13. (SBU) Lula's visit demonstrated that while rhetorically Ortega, 
Lula, and Chavez may be in the same populist ballpark, in reality, 
the Brazilians are positioned away from Chavez and ALBA.  In many 
ways, Lula presented Ortega with an alternative leftist approach to 
populist, Chavista policies.  For Brazil, sugar-based ethanol, not 
oil, is the wave of the future.  Brazilian investors are attracted 
to Nicaragua because of CAFTA, as opposed to wanting to compete with 
CAFTA.  The concrete, business focused nature of Lula's visit stands 
in clear contrast to the promises made by Chavez and Ahmadinejad. 
Ortega came across as not particularly interested in what Lula had 
to offer, as it often challenged the basis of his alliance with 
Chavez and all things ALBA. 
 
TRIVELLI