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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2001, BOLANOS-DAVIS CASE: SILENCING CRITICS MADE EASY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA2001 2007-08-30 14:43 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO4569
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #2001/01 2421443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301443Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1117
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5 PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
USOAS FOR ASTEVENSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: BOLANOS-DAVIS CASE:  SILENCING CRITICS MADE EASY 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1663 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
- - - - 
 
1.  (C) National Assembly Deputy Alejandro Bolanos-Davis met 
with us on August 24 to give us his reaction to his seemingly 
permanent expulsion from the National Assembly, the next 
moves in his case, and his overview of Nicaraguan politics. 
Bolanos-Davis is convinced that the Ortega regime will not be 
satisfied with removing him from the Assembly, but will 
continue to pursue bogus claims against him, in order to 
incarcerate him.  No critic of the current regime is safe, he 
believes.  End Summary. 
 
If you can't shut their mouths, just decapitate them 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) According to Bolanos-Davis, he is the victim of a 
political witch-hunt.  He believes that he is the object of 
Sandinista ire because he specifically attacked the 
money-making racketeering of Lenin Cerna, the evil heavy-hand 
of the Sandinista (FSLN) machine.  According to 
Bolanos-Davis, thanks to his efforts to highlight Cerna's 
activities, the FSLN can no longer use its control of the 
country's judiciary to extort money from citizens.  The 
timeline of the accusations against Bolanos-Davis tend to 
corroborate this assertion (reftel). 
 
3.  (U) On June 13, after a surprisingly rapid 5-day process, 
Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) stripped 
Bolanos-Davis of his seat in the National Assembly on the 
basis that he had failed to renounce his foreign (U.S.) 
citizenship at least four years previous to running for the 
National Assembly, as stipulated under Nicaraguan law 
(reftel).  The matter was then deferred until the National 
Assembly reconvened after their July break.  On August 2, the 
Executive Committee of the National Assembly decided not to 
bring the question of Bolanos-Davis's seat to the Assembly 
floor, but instead to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. 
 
4.  (U) On August 13, the Supreme Court responded that it had 
no jurisdiction over the case and that the decision by the 
CSE was final.  Bolanos-Davis's supporters in the Nicaragua's 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) party circulated a petition the week 
of August 20 that called for the Bolanos-Davis case to be 
discussed by the Assembly in a plenary session, but only 
managed to garner a handful of signatures from other party 
groups.  Apart from providing political theater of almost 
comic theatrical proportions -- with all the ALN deputies 
sporting black gags to represent their frustration at not 
being allowed to debate the case -- this last ditch effort by 
the ALN to force an Assembly discussion on the Bolanos-Davis 
accomplished little.  Bolanos-Davis has lost his seat in the 
Assembly, and his party-named replacement Stanford Cash-Dash 
assumed the job on August 28. 
 
"No One is Safe" Without a Fair Process 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (C) Bolanos-Davis complained to us that the process used 
to effect his removal was completely outside normal, legal 
judicial procedures.  He was never properly accused in a 
court; never given the right to hear the accusations; never 
given the opportunity to defend himself.  The CSE used an 
administrative order to remove him, which was an action that 
Bolanos-Davis believes exceeded the CSE's mandate.  According 
to Bolanos-Davis, the CSE's purview is limited to the conduct 
and administration of elections during the election season, 
so the CSE's prerogative to question the validity of his 
candidacy ended when he was sworn in as a National Assembly 
Deputy.  Therefore, Bolanos-Davis maintains that his rights 
to access to the judiciary have been denied, and he plans to 
file a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. 
 
6.  (C) Bolanos-Davis is certain that the combined weight of 
the FSLN-Aleman Pacto will continue to pursue him.  "They 
want me in jail," he told us, expecting that the FSLN's first 
line of attack will be that he falsified documents in order 
to show that he was born in Nicaragua.  After that, 
Bolanos-Davis expects that they will start fabricating 
evidence against him.  "But I'm clean," Bolanos-Davis assures 
us, free from any personal or financial indiscretions that 
his enemies can use. 
 
7.  (C) Bolanos-Davis further insists that the fact that he 
was never able to defend himself, and denied all access to 
any normal judicial process, is proof that no one is safe in 
Nicaragua if they cross the FSLN-Aleman Pacto.  Bolanos-Davis 
maintains that if it is so easy to get rid of him, once he 
attacked one of the Sandinista's power bases, the FSLN-Aleman 
Pacto can similarly silence any other critics.  Bolanos-Davis 
also holds no expectation that the Pacto-controlled judicial 
system will afford him any relief; he expects to lose any 
legal case brought against him.  His only hope, he says, is 
to maintain public and international support. 
 
A Victory for Ortega and Aleman 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) The means by which Bolanos-Davis was removed from the 
Assembly represent a victory both for the Sandinista regime, 
and for Liberal Constitution Party (PLC) President Arnoldo 
Aleman.  Ortega has gotten rid of a vocal and bold critic. 
By making sure that the Bolanos-Davis case never came to the 
floor of the Assembly, Aleman ensured that rumbles of dissent 
within the PLC remained under wraps. 
 
9.  (C) Some members of the PLC, who are unhappy with 
Aleman's continued alliance with Ortega, would have risked 
upsetting their anti-Aleman PLC constituents if they did not 
stand up to defend Bolanos-Davis  In short, a vote on the 
Assembly floor could have been embarrassing for Aleman by 
exposing a possible PLC rift.  As it was, faced with only the 
prospect of whether or not to sign the ALN's petition, the 
majority of PLC Deputies could safely tow Aleman's line 
without fear of offending hard-core anti-Sandinista 
supporters, and only five PLC Deputies signed. 
 
10.  (C) Beyond complaining about not being able to debate 
the Bolanos-Davis case, however, many Assembly Deputies -- 
outside of the FSLN -- are worried about Ortega's 
encroachment on the Assembly's independence.  On August 22, 
Bolanos-Davis pushed his way into the Assembly chamber and 
took his seat, even though the National Assembly's Executive 
Committee had already accepted the CSE's decision to strip 
him of his status.  The response from the Sandinista 
President of the Assembly Rene Nunez was sharp, and according 
to many Deputies disproportionate.  On Thursday morning the 
Assembly was surrounded by a police cordon, who aggressively 
questioned all entering Deputies, simply to keep 
Bolanos-Davis out.  Opposition ALN whip Maria Eugenia 
Sequeira and PLC heavy-weight Enrique Quinonez denounced this 
"militarization" of the Assembly as "sending a message of 
terror." 
 
Disappointment with the ALN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (C) Bolanos-Davis expressed to us his deep 
disappointment that so few Deputies had stood up to defend 
him.  The support of his own Conservative Party was 
unfailing, he told us, but the overall response from the ALN 
had been tepid.  "Eduardo (Montealegre) is not a fighter," he 
opined.  "He would be a great peace-time leader, but we are 
in the middle of a war."  The ALN needs bold leadership and 
the time for Montealegre to step aside had come, he stated. 
That would create space for a stronger leader, perhaps for 
one of the more disaffected PLC members to jump ship and join 
forces with the ALN.  When we asked who that could be, he 
named Enrique Quinonez.  "Quinonez has the guts to jump the 
PLC ship, but he won't do so until there is someplace to 
land." 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
12.  (C) Bolanos-Davis appeared to us to be surprisingly 
resilient, even feisty, in the face of removal from his 
Assembly seat and the likelihood of sustained attacks in 
future.  By his own admission he is buoyed by the belief that 
he has been unfairly targeted, and that he is in the right. 
We agree that he has been the victim of a sustained attack 
because he was outspoken and dared to take on Lenin Cerna 
directly.  Unfortunately, we also agree with Bolanos-Davis 
that the cards are stacked against him here in Nicaragua, and 
we think that he is probably not exaggerating when he guesses 
that the FSLN leadership will continue to pursue him, 
including possibly putting him in jail, with or without 
adequate cause. 
 
13.  (C) Bolanos-Davis's  disappointment with the leadership 
of the ALN is not surprising, given what he's been through in 
the past few weeks.  While we have severe reservations 
whether Quinonez would be an ideal leader for the ALN or a 
Liberal coalition, if at some point Montealegre decides to 
stand down, Bolanos-Davis is probably correct in his 
assessment that the pro-democracy forces in Nicaragua are 
particularly fragile right now.  If his case proves nothing 
else, it demonstrates that the combined power of 
Ortega-Aleman is hard to assault and personally risky for 
those who try it.  Despite the interesting political 
theatrics around the Bolanos-Davis case in the National 
Assembly in the first few weeks of August, the weakness of 
the Assembly is clearly manifest.  It seemed all too easy for 
the FSLN-Aleman Pacto to get rid of this critic. 
TRIVELLI