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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA1922, NICARAGUA: FINANCIAL SECTOR UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA1922 2007-08-15 20:47 2011-06-21 08:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO1370
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1922/01 2272047
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 152047Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1025
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, AND EEB 
TREASURY FOR SARA GRAY 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/MSIEGELMAN 
3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/WH/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: FINANCIAL SECTOR UPDATE 
 
REF: A) MANAGUA 1771, B) MANAGUA 1719, C) MANAGUA 1672, D) MANAGUA 
464, E) 06 MANAGUA 2463 
 
1. (U) Summary: Despite President Ortega's increasingly 
anti-capitalist rhetoric, the GON has not significantly changed 
economic policy vis a vis the previous administration.  As a result, 
the financial sector has remained stable.  The exchange rate 
continues on its 5% crawling peg and foreign reserves keep growing 
to record levels.  Interest rates for deposits and loans have risen, 
but are still comparable to other Central American countries. 
Yields for GON debt have been lower than expected.  The recently 
negotiated PRGF with the IMF should go a long way toward ensuring 
continued stability for the sector. End summary. 
 
Exchange Rate 
------------- 

2. (U) Nicaragua has managed its exchange rates with a crawling peg 
against the U.S. dollar since January 1993.  The peg began with a 5% 
annual devaluation and quickly reached a high of 12% by November 
1993.  In 2004, the rate was reduced to its current rate of 5%.  The 
recently concluded Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
negotiations with the IMF left the exchange rate at 5% annual 
devaluation for the next three years (Ref A).  Some economists argue 
that given Nicaragua's ambitiously low inflation targets, the crawl 
should be cut to 3%.  GON and IMF analysts believe, however, that 
such a reduction would inflate the cordoba and predjudice the 
growing export sector.  (Note: The IMF also feels that the lower 
inflation target of 7% for 2007 will not be met. End note.)  The GON 
cites the less than 1% difference between the official rate of 18.5 
cordobas to the dollar and the current parallel market rate as 
evidence that the 5% devaluation is correct and sustainable. 
 
Reserves 
-------- 

3. (U) Nicaragua continues to pile up record high reserves.  At the 
end of 2006, Nicaragua had $472.2 million in adjusted net reserves, 
a record which was easily bested by the July 31 level of $586.8 
million.  Consistency in fiscal and monetary policy, assistance from 
donors, and increased trade and tourism has contributed to this 
result.  Indeed, the GON has already achieved the 2007 PRGF reserves 
target of a $60 million increase.  Under the agreement, the GON 
promised to increase adjusted net reserves by an additional $70 
million in 2008, $80 million in 2009, and $90 million in 2010.  As 
of June, adjusted net reserves cover about two months of imports. 
(Note: Ref D cites net international reserves of $859 million for 
2006.  The IMF tracks adjusted net reserves, which subtracts legally 
required foreign currency bank deposits from net reserves. End 
note.) 
 
Interest Rates 
-------------- 

4. (U) Nicaraguan interest rates, while high compared to U.S. 
levels, are comparable to those in neighboring countries. 
 
-- Deposits: For cordoba deposits, the weighted average interest 
rate in June was 7.22%, a 33.7% increase since June 2006.  For 
dollar deposits, the rate was 5.67%, a 23.7% increase since the same 
time last year. 
 
-- Loans: The weighted average rate for cordoba loans in June was 
16.33%, a 23% increase from the June 2006 rate of 13.27%.  Dollar 
denominated loans (about 83% of the formal loan market), have 
carried more stable interest rates.  In June, the weighted average 
interest rate was 11.46%, a 7.7% increase from the June 2006 rate of 
10.64%.  Personal consumer loans are the priciest, followed by home 
loans and commercial loans. 
 
-- Government bonds: Interest rates for Nicaraguan Central Bank 
(BCN) short-term bonds (3 and 6 months) now range around 9%, a small 
decrease since last year.  Recent issuances of 12-month paper by the 
GON (Ministry of Finance) sold for a yield of 9.8% (Ref B).  Because 
this is the first GON debt issuance in two years, there is little 
basis for historical comparison.  Our U.S. Treasury Advisor 
indicates, however, that the rates received were slightly below what 
was expected, i.e. 10-11%. 
 
Notes: 
-- Cordoba loan rates reached a high of 17.85% in September 2006, 
right before the elections. 
-- While at least 5% of the increase in cordoba loans and deposits 
reflects the yearly currency devaluation, some of the increases 
reflect the rise in international interest rates. 
-- About 300 registered microfinance institutions manage USD 400 
million in small loans, which carry average interest rates between 
20-40%.  We did not include those rates in the calculations above. 
 
The Banks 
--------- 

5. (U) The Nicaraguan banking system continues to post strong 
numbers after having recovered from its pre-election dip in deposits 
(Ref E).  In February 2007, deposits surpassed the 2006 peak of USD 
2.1 billion, and have continued to grow.  Savings in dollars 
accounts for around 60% of bank deposits, a percentage that has 
remained stable for the past 10 years.  BCN raised legal reserves 
for deposits in June 2006 from 16.25% to 19.25% to help cover any 
possible drop in deposits during the election period.  Banks expect 
the BCN to return this rate to 16.25% by the end of 2007. 
 
6. (U) Bank representatives do note that deposits continue to be 
predominantly short-term (2-3 month Certificates of Deposit) with 
only GON institutions investing in longer term CDs.  A concomitant 
drop in borrowing has resulted in an increase in liquidity for 
banks.  The GON hopes to take advantage of this excess liquidity by 
offering banks the opportunity to purchase one- and three-year bonds 
during fall auctions. 
 
Comment 
------- 

7. (U) In spite of the mixed signals from the GON (Ortega's 
socialist rhetoric vs. IMF agreement) and the lack of any coherent 
economic policy or message, the country's financial sector remains 
stable.  The lack of a gap between the rate on the street and the 
official rate indicates that the crawl is about right. 
International reserves are adequate, covering more than three months 
of imports, and bankers are not expressing serious concerns.  The 
recently negotiated PRGF with the IMF should go a long way toward 
ensuring continued stability for the sector. End comment. 
 
TRIVELLI