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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI639, FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI639 2007-08-20 11:25 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0639/01 2321125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201125Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3682
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0056
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0946
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR EAID PGOV NATO AF FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL CHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D 
) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Budgetary realities and political 
discomfort amongst a few at the highest levels have 
currently put the brakes on the GOF's plan to increase 
its military commitments to NATO/ISAF in 2008. 
Meaningful increases in Finnish development and 
counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan are probable 
-- and the idea of PRT leadership in 2009 remains very 
much on the table.  However, the 2008 national budget 
contains no funds for new or stepped-up peacekeeping 
operations (PKO).  The Ambassador has made the case to 
senior leadership that Finland ought to send more troops 
to Afghanistan sooner rather than later -- culminating 
in several additional senior-level meetings the week of 
Aug. 13.  However, it appears that Conservative 
politicians who committed early to contributing more 
troops to ISAF underestimated how strongly their own 
coalition partner, the Center Party -- as well as 
President Halonen -- would not support increases in 
2008.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EARLY MOMENTUM FADES 
-------------------- 
2. (C) A mere two months ago, enthusiasm in the 
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs was high 
regarding an increased Finnish role in Afghanistan.  In 
the wake of FM Ilkka Kanerva's June meeting with the 
Secretary and MOD Jyri Hakamies's trip to Afghanistan, 
 
SIPDIS 
both signaled their intentions to seek more Finnish 
troops for NATO/ISAF as well as increased funding for 
development, counternarcotics and rule of law programs. 
The MFA was instructed to prepare a wide ranging report 
to Parliament examining Finland's role in Afghanistan 
and the best ways to apply any additional resources. 
The report will be delivered to Parliament members in 
mid-September and publicly discussed in parliamentary 
session.  Contacts responsible for drafting it have told 
us privately that increases for 2008 appeared likely 
(Reftel A). 
 
3. (C) Since then, however, significant political 
opposition has emerged.  Much of the most vociferous 
opposition came in response to Hakamies's public 
suggestion that the GOF should re-open the previous 
government's decision to deny a US/Afghan request that 
sought a donation of excess Finnish weapons to the 
Afghan National Police (ANP).  (Comment: The lethal 
equipment issue has been politically sensitive all along 
(Ref A), having been characterized both as legally 
permissible and legally prohibited.  End Comment.)  In 
addition, more measured opposition also came from those 
who argued that Finland's current level of participation 
in NATO/ISAF (about 104 troops at two Nordic-led PRTs) 
was sufficient.  Some Parliamentarians have argued that 
2008 budget realities do not permit troop increases, 
given Finland's numerous other ongoing PKO obligations 
and its very generous contribution of 240 troops to the 
UN's Southern Lebanon mission.  (NOTE: No other Nordic 
country sent ground troops to Lebanon following the 
Hezbollah-Israeli war last summer, and the GOF needed to 
pass a special budgetary supplemental in order to fund 
its 240-troop contribution.)  Leading Conservative 
politicians (led by Hakamies and Kanerva) and ministry 
officials expressed confidence that the report to 
Parliament would satisfy the nay-sayers.  However, in 
early August leading figures from the Center Party -- 
the Conservatives' major coalition partner -- also began 
to voice misgivings. 
 
MONEY BUT NO NEW TROOPS 
----------------------- 
4. (C) Senior officials and working level contacts in 
the MOD, MFA and Ministry of Finance now say that at the 
moment troop increases in Afghanistan appear unlikely in 
2008, although other forms of assistance are likely.  In 
an Aug. 14 meeting, a disappointed Kanerva told the 
Ambassador that he expected to win approval for Finnish 
contributions to a new EU-funded police training/rule of 
law mission, and quite probably additional development 
assistance.  However, he added, "I do not exclude the 
military side, but getting increases to our military 
contribution in Afghanistan will be very hard."  He 
noted that while many in government truly believed that 
sending more troops to Afghanistan was in Finland's 
national security interest, the Prime Minister and the 
President saw things differently.  In an Aug. 16 
meeting, PM Vanhanen confirmed this.  "Discussions 
within government are ongoing; nothing is final," he 
told us.  "But overall the atmosphere is such that we 
want to help (in Afghanistan), but changes in our 
military posture will not be significant." 
 
5. (C) Separately, a Finance Ministry contact told 
PolChief that there simply is no money programmed into 
the 2008 budget for troop increases anywhere.  (NOTE: 
Finland currently supports Afghanistan with 10 million 
euros annually.)  The four parties in government are 
divided in their thinking about budgetary priorities, 
she said; in fact, political pressure within the cabinet 
to send troops to Darfur might currently outweigh the 
sentiment in favor of more forces for Afghanistan.  In 
either case, there is no budget supplemental in the 
works; without one ISAF commitments would have to remain 
level, and there can be no major contributions to 
Darfur. 
 
PLANS FOR PRT LEADERSHIP IN 2009 CONTINUE APACE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
6. (U) Echoing what we had heard privately, Admiral 
Juhani Koskeala, the armed forces chief of staff, told 
the press Aug. 14 that budgetary constraints would 
prevent significant crisis management increases in 2008. 
However, he emphasized that taking leadership of a PRT 
in 2009 -- which would require troop increases -- 
remains very much on the table.  In his view, the 
current level of Finnish participation at Meymenah and 
Mazar was sufficient until the 2009 ramp-up for PRT 
leadership began. 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador spent the week of Aug. 13 
emphasizing to a range of senior officials that 
Afghanistan is a top priority.  In separate meetings, 
she underscored to the PM, to the FM, and to 
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman how 
important it is for Finland to make new ISAF 
contributions sooner, rather than later.  Each 
interlocutor understood that the USG would be 
disappointed if the GOF could not do more in 2008. 
However, they also assured us that development and other 
assistance increases would be forthcoming and that 
planning for PRT leadership in 2009 would continue 
apace.  Kanerva, in particular, noted that plans for a 
"rotation" of leadership with the Swedes at the Mazar- 
al-Shariff PRT in 2009 remained quite active. 
 
COMMENT: CONSERVATIVES UNDERESTIMATE THEIR OPPONENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
8. (C) It may be that the Conservatives' ambitious plans 
were a classic case of early over-exuberance, which has 
been tempered over time in the face of political 
realities.  Indeed, Conservative politicians rode the 
wave of their election landslide holding two beliefs on 
Afghanistan:  first, that increasing the GOF's already 
significant PKO contributions was truly important for 
Finland's own national security; and second, that they 
could convince a skeptical PM and even more skeptical 
President of this fact.  However, President Halonen 
simply feels that Finland is currently doing enough in 
Afghanistan.  PM Vanhanen, meanwhile, keenly values his 
working relationship with Halonen, and faces staunch 
opposition within his own Center Party to increasing 
Finland's PKO profile; he therefore has absolutely no 
domestic political incentive to tangle with Halonen on 
the ISAF issue. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
9. (C) Finland's overall role in Afghanistan is still 
being hammered out.  The GOF's current troop commitment 
to ISAF remains solid, and we can continue to count on 
the Finns to do good work at the Meymenah and Mazar 
PRTs.  We also expect other significant assistance, 
including more development aid; counterdrug efforts; and 
Finnish police and judicial trainers as part of the EU's 
rule of law mission.  And as noted, PRT leadership 
remains very much in the planning cards for 2009; we 
will continue to work hard with the Finns to make this a 
reality. 
HYATT