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Viewing cable 07BUJUMBURA559, BURUNDI'S MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES DESPERATE FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BUJUMBURA559 2007-08-07 14:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bujumbura
VZCZCXRO3546
PP RUEHGI RUEHRN
DE RUEHJB #0559/01 2191411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071411Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0472
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BY
SUBJECT: BURUNDI'S MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES DESPERATE FOR 
DIALOGUE WITH NKURUNZIZA 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The leaders of Burundi's major opposition 
parties, Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), Leonce 
Ngendakumana, and Union for National Progress (UPRONA), Aloys 
Rubuka, both insisted that dialogue between Burundi President 
Pierre Nkurunziza's government and the two largest opposition 
parties as well as pressure from the international community, 
with possible facilitation by a third party, is imminently 
critical to maintaining Burundi's peace and progress. 
FRODEBU's Ngendakumana spoke frankly and forcefully about the 
government of Burundi's (GOB) stymied negotiations withthe 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL, FRODEBU's participation inthe government, and 
the need for Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza to initiate 
a dialogue among the major political entities.  Ngendakumana 
refuted the rumors of a direct link of his party to the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL, and justified FRODEBU's recent departure from 
the government as their only constitutional option as an 
opposition party.  In contrasting styles, UPRONA's Rubuka 
quietly expressed his party's desire for Nkurunziza and the 
ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces 
for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party to demonstrate 
goodwill by engaging UPRONA and allowing them to be active 
contributors to Burundi's political future.  He suggested 
that the ruling party overcome their pride and take the 
responsibility for creating a framework for dialogue. 
Claiming UPRONA to have never taken action to sabotage the 
government's policies, he shared the party's disappointment 
at being ignored.   End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Leonce Ngendakumana, leader of Burundi's second 
largest political party, met with Ambassador Moller early in 
the afternoon of August 2.  In assessing the current 
atmosphere in Burundi, Ngendakumana characterized the 
nation's social, economic, and political climates as reasons 
to worry for the future.  He stated that although the country 
is enjoying relative peace and the support of the 
international community, the struggle to adopt dialogue as a 
tool for progress in the political arena is still illusory. 
As a party, Ngendakumana stated that FRODEBU is asking the 
government to act in three areas: to govern responsibly by 
abiding by the constitution; continue the negotiations for 
peace with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL; and to fight corruption within 
their ranks. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Ngendakumana accused the ruling CNDD-FDD party of 
having no intention of negotiating with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. 
As proof, he outlined President Nkurunziza's initial weak 
attempts to attract the rebel group to the negotiating table 
and Nkurunziza ultimately becoming complacent as the he 
allowed his police forces to harass, mistreat, and prosecute 
FRODEBU members and others as being part of the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL, an assumption FRODEBU has denied in the past 
and continues to deny today.  Having been forced to 
participate in the ceasefire talks in Dar es Salaam in 
September 2006, according to NGendakumana, the GOB signed a 
'false agreement'; an agreement that cannot be genuine if it 
does not adequately define the role of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in 
the government or the military.  When asked to speculate the 
reasons for Nkurunziza's inability to move the peace process 
forward, Ngendakumana suggested that the military wing of the 
CNDD-FDD is sympathetic to the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and pressuring 
the Burundi president not to continue the negotiations.  When 
pressed to elaborate, the FRODEBU party leader described 
those influencing the president as being inexperienced, 
having their own logic, and wary of FRODEBU's numbers (those 
thought to be friendly to the PALIPEHUTU-FNL) in influential 
positions as reasons behind their behavior. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Ngendakumana spoke at length concerning FRODEBU's 
participation in Nkurunziza's government.  Foremost, he 
accused the Nkurunziza of ignoring Burundi's constitution by 
excluding FRODEBU and other minority parties from key 
positions in his government and disregarding other voices in 
formulating policy.  Ngendakumana explained that after the 
2005 elections, FRODEBU and UPRONA, as the second and third 
largest political forces, expected to be invited to 
discussions with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL aimed at sustaining the 
peace.  They were not.  More recently, the FRODEBU leader 
stated that the GOB sacked a number of FRODEBU members, 
including those who had been legitimately elected to serve. 
When FRODEBU asked the ruling party the reasons for these 
dismissals, Ngendakumana alleged that the CNDD-FDD simply 
said that FRODEBU does 'not accepted that we (CNDD-FDD) are 
the winners'. 
 
5.  (SBU)  In clarifying FRODEBU's recent decision not to 
actively participate in Nkurunziza's government, Ngendakumana 
 
BUJUMBURA 00000559  002 OF 003 
 
 
explained that his party had decided to be a member of the 
opposition and, according to Burundi's constitution, party 
members cannot be in opposition and participate in the 
government at the same time.  Ambassador Moller pressed 
Ngendakumana for elaboration to this rule, supporting her 
question by explaining that democracies require minority 
voices and self-exclusion invites blame for any future 
problems that may arise in the affairs of state. 
Ngendakumana recognized the need to be a part of the 
democratic process but specifically pointed to provisions 
within the constitution limiting FRODEBU's role as an 
opposition party.  Ngendakumana conceded that the political 
situation has only worsened since FRODEBU's exodus from the 
government.  Although FRODEBU has reluctantly returned to the 
business of government, primarily due to a threat from the 
World Bank to suspend disbursement of 40 million USD of 
developmental funds, Ngendakumana feared that FRODEBU's 
participation legitimizes the corruption of Nkurunziza's 
administration, acts for which he believes Nkurunziza needs 
to be prosecuted and punished. 
 
6.  (SBU) Ngendakumana claimed a recent rise in executive 
corruption as being the result of the blockage of progress at 
all levels of government.  He opined that the outlook for 
improvement is not good primarily because the ruling CNDD-FDD 
party no longer holds a majority in Parliament and is thus 
unable to pass laws.  Ngendakumana alleged that, in response, 
Nkurunziza is appointing people, whom Ngendakumana 
characterized as corrupt, into new positions and Ngendukamana 
also insinuated that the ruling government may be tempted to 
use force in loosening the legislative logjam. 
Alternatively, in Ngendakumana's opinion, the government has 
three options for skirting the current political stalemate: 
Nkurunziza can call a state of emergency; Nkurunziza can 
dissolve the National Assembly (which may be prohibited by 
law); or, the government can try to change the constitution 
(which would be difficult without a majority voice). 
Moreover, Ngendakumana pondered why the Burundi president has 
never spoken directly to the public concerning the 
allegations of corruption and the political impasse. 
 
7.  (SBU) In a later meeting with Ambassador Moller, UPRONA 
party leader, Aloys Rubuka, characterized the current 
political malaise as predictable.  He claimed that arrogance 
and pride have prevented President Nkurunziza and the ruling 
CNDD-FDD party from working in good faith and effectively 
with the opposition parties.  Rubuka alleged that there is a 
great deal of scandal within the political, economic and 
human rights arenas, and mused as to whether the scandals are 
deliberately organized by the government.  In Rubuka's words, 
unlike FRODEBU and despite the political deadlock at all 
levels, UPRONA has decided to continue to participate in the 
government and is merely asking for a gesture of goodwill 
from Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD ruling party.  In 
conjunction with their participation, the UPRONA party asked 
the First Vice President and UPRONA member, Dr. Martin 
Nduwimana, not to sign any governmental proposals without 
consulting the party.  Rubuka reasoned that the UPRONA party 
is not ready to accompany a regime that does not respect the 
constitution and warned Nduwimana that non-compliance with 
their demand would lead to internal party strife. 
 
8.  (SBU) Rubuka lamented that the political situation was 
heading 'nowhere'.  The party leader accused the government 
of corruption by offering jobs only to political allies, 
threatening the loss of jobs to others who are less 
compliant, and using the threat of violence to prevent UPRONA 
from attending party meetings.  In Rubuka's view, these are 
efforts to divide allegiances within the other political 
factions.  He complained that Nkurunziza is spending more 
time out of the office rather than working in good faith to 
resolve the impending political crisis.  As a result, feared 
Rubuka, the Burundi leader is fomenting a bad impression of 
the minority parties with the public.  Furthermore, he added, 
the continuing tensions between the parties are weakening the 
parties, Burundi is wasting valuable time and energy, and the 
confidence of the international community could diminish. 
 
9.  (SBU) Party head Rubuka emphasized that the UPRONA party 
is more than ready for dialogue between the principal 
politucal players.  He noted that UPRONA has never taken any 
action to sabotage the government's policies and has always 
made known to Nkurunziza UPRONA's availability and 
willingness to contribute to the government's efforts at 
improving the political and economic environment.  Rubuka 
nonetheless expressed disappointed that their offer is 
 
BUJUMBURA 00000559  003 OF 003 
 
 
essentially being ignored and he questioned why Nkurunziza 
has chosen the path of moving froward without UPRONA.  Rubuka 
asserted that the major responsibility for developing a 
framework for dialogue lies with the Nkurunziza and his 
ruling party.  He believed that the CNDD-FDD party, after 
coming to power following a divisive civil war, should be a 
party of modesty and refuse to let pride prevent it from 
reaching concessions with minority voices. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment:  Although their styles of delivery and the 
desires of their respective parties may be different, 
Ngendakumana and Rubuka expressed a common goal: to begin a 
dialogue with Nkurunziza's government to prevent a total 
collapse in the political and economic structures of Burundi. 
The government's apparent reluctance, thus far, to engage in 
a meaningful, constructive dialogue with opposition leaders, 
particularly these two influential minority parties, has 
raised widespread concerns for the future of the democratic 
process in Burundi and the welfare of its people.  The 
perception that the President has sought to distance himself 
from the debate has exacerbated these concerns.  At the very 
least, Nkurunziza should get ahead of the issues FRODEBU and 
UPRONA raise and publicly communicate to the Burundi people 
that he is working honestly and in good faith to resolve the 
political differences between his government and the 
opposition parties as well as the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.  With this 
end in mind, meetings between the embassy and key opposition 
members are continuing in an effort to grasp the various 
perceptions of the political environment.  At the conclusion 
of these informational sessions, the embassy intends to find 
an opportunity to facilitate discussion between these 
disparate political factions in reaching common ground for 
moving Burundi's political process forward.  End Comment. 
MOLLER