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Viewing cable 07BRASILIA1664, BRAZIL,S FOREIGN MINISTRY DISSES AND DISMISSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BRASILIA1664 2007-08-31 11:47 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO5614
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1664/01 2431147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311147Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9855
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 6262
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4975
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 7086
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 5024
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 0693
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
WHA FOR CHRIS MCMULLEN, DEBORAH MCCARTHY, CAROLINE CROFT, 
BRUCE FRIEDMAN, AND BEN CHIANG 
S/CT FOR VIRGINIA PALMER AND ARNOLD SIERRA 
FBI FOR COUNTERRORISM DIVISION AND OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
OPERATIONS 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FOR ICE/OIA H 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017 
TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL PGOV SNAR KTFN PA BR AR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S FOREIGN MINISTRY DISSES AND DISMISSES 
THREE PLUS ONE MECHANISM 
 
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1685 
     B. BUENOS AIRES 1709 
     C. ASUNCION 688 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Phil Chicola. 
E.O. 12958, Reasons: 1.5 (B) & (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The director of the Brazilian Ministry of 
External Relations (Itamaraty) Office of Transnational 
Crimes, Virginia Toniatti, told PolCouns in a meeting August 
27 that Brazil does not see the Brazil/Argentina/Paraguay 
tri-border cooperation mechanism and the 3 1 mechanism that 
includes the United States as the best way to address 
terrorism concerns.  Brazil participates in these mechanisms 
"only out of solidarity" with countries that have been 
victims of terrorists attacks.  She categorically ruled out 
expansion of the 3 1 mechanism to discuss other transnational 
crime issues, saying that bilateral issues should be 
discussed bilaterally.  Toniatti is a key working-level 
contact on these issues, and her views mirror closely those 
of Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimaraes.  Toniatti,s comments suggest that expansion of 
cooperation via the 3 1 mechanism, as proposed in reftels, 
will require laying the groundwork carefully at more senior 
levels of the GOB, including Foreign Minister Amorim, 
National Security Advisor Garcia, and perhaps even President 
Lula.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) In light of reftels, PolCouns took advantage of his 
courtesy call with Virginia Toniatti, head of Itamaraty,s 
office in charge of fighting transnational crime, to ask for 
her views on tri-border cooperation.  Toniatti responded that 
there are 14 tri-border areas in South America, and that the 
one between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay is not 
particularly problematic or deserving of greater attention 
than the others.  She asserted that Brazil only participates 
in the coordination mechanism with Brazil and Paraguay, and 
in the 3 1 mechanism that includes the United States, out of 
&solidarity8 with the Argentina and United States because 
they have suffered terrorist attacks.  Brazil does not see 
the 3 1 mechanism as a particularly useful way to do real 
business, she said. &Bilateral issues should be handled 
bilaterally,8 she stated, and border issues should be 
addressed between the neighboring countries.  In particular, 
Toniatti said, it is unfortunate when it appears that the 
other three countries have consulted prior to the 3 1 
meetings and are seeking to present Brazil with a fait 
accompli.  She also criticized the U.S. release of a list of 
terrorist suspects just before the last meeting, for which, 
she said, USG officials were unwilling to offer any solid 
evidence. 
 
3. (C) PolCouns stressed how useful the 3 1 mechanism is to 
U.S. agencies and asked about cooperation on other 
transnational crime issues in the tri-border region. 
Toniatti said that Brazil is more than willing to discuss 
trafficking in persons (TIP), counternarcotics efforts, 
counterfeiting and money laundering with USG agencies on a 
bilateral basis.  However, she ruled out categorically any 
expansion of the 3 1 mechanism into other areas, stressing 
adamantly that she would not accept or tolerate further 
"attacks" on Foz do Iguacu.  Foz is not deserving of the 
negative attention it is already getting, she said. 
Hollywood,s fictitious characterizations of the region as a 
home base for terrorists and other criminals combined with 
uncalled for statements by U.S. law enforcement officials 
(she referred specifically to comments by State and Treasury 
officials in a May 9 MSNBC piece on the tri-border area) have 
given Foz an undeserved reputation that is having a negative 
impact on tourism. 
 
4. (C) Toniatti did offer that Brazil is seeing a problem 
with falsified passports, and that it would be useful for the 
U.S. to help fund a modernization of Paraguay,s passport 
system.  Brazil has the expertise and training to spot the 
fraud, she said, but does not have funds to help the 
Paraguayans modernize their passports. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  Toniatti, one of our principal working-level 
contacts on tri-border and other transnational crime issues, 
 
BRASILIA 00001664  002 OF 002 
 
 
is generally dogmatic in her views and aggressive in 
expressing them.  Her comments are not the final word on 
these issues, but her chain of command on counterterrorism 
and transnational crime issues runs through the office of 
Secretary-General (Vice Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, 
 
SIPDIS 
who has been publicly critical of increased GOB cooperation 
with the U.S. in a number of areas, and specifically of 
increased U.S. presence in Brazil and the region.  Toniatti's 
views likely mirror those of Guimaraes with regard to the 
usefulness of the current process and interest in expanding 
it.  Her unhesitating expression of disinterest in any 
expanded cooperation through the 3 1 mechanism, as proposed 
in reftels, suggests that gaining Brazil,s agreement will 
require laying the groundwork carefully at more senior levels 
of the GOB, including Foreign Minister Amorim, National 
Security Advisor Garcia, and perhaps even President Lula. 
 
CHICOLA