Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD2687, BAGHDAD'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM -- OVERTAXED AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BAGHDAD2687.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BAGHDAD2687 2007-08-13 07:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO8455
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2687/01 2250737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130737Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2759
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KJUS PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM -- OVERTAXED AND 
GETTING WORSE 
 
REF: 06 BAGHDAD 4572 
 
1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary: Judicial investigators and investigative 
judges, and personnel at the Iraqi Bar Association (IBA), the 
Iraqi Jurists Union (IJU), local police stations, and 
provincial courthouses consistently tell the PRT Baghdad Rule 
(ROL) of Law Team that they are over-worked and under-paid, 
and lack protection, training and support.  In addition, 
judges and police officials assert that current GOI training 
and support is inadequate to handle the volume of criminal 
activity and detainees.  The lack of due process and 
procedural transparency further degrade security, detainee 
management, and legal adherence.  This failure by an 
overwhelmed criminal justice system is undermining efforts to 
establish credible rule of law in Baghdad.  End summary. 
 
3. (SBU) Background: The Iraqi Bar Association (IBA) and the 
Iraqi Jurists Union (IJU) are key non-governmental and 
governmental actors in Iraqi rule of law.  Founded in 1933, 
the IBA is a standout Iraqi legal association with its 
inclusive approach to ethnicity and Islamic sect.  Similarly, 
the IJU claims more than 504,000 members throughout Iraq, 
including Jews, Christians, Arabs, and Kurdish lawyers. 
Unlike the IBA, which is wholly comprised of lawyers in 
private practice, IJU membership has included governmental 
lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and judicial investigators 
since its founding in 1962.  The IJU is a member of the 
larger Arab Jurist Union, whose current President is an Iraqi 
citizen.  With offices and membership across Iraq, the IJU 
has access to resources nationwide resources, and sponsors 
two law schools in Basra and Balad.  The IBA and the IJU 
expressed admiration for the US judicial system and welcomed 
USG assistance in building the Iraqi legal system into a 
modern, transparent, and functional entity.  Leadership in 
both organizations, however, expressed ongoing frustration 
that such support is at best sporadic.  End background. 
 
Curriculum-Based Training Critical for Investigative Judges 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Iraqi ROL stakeholders reported that inadequately 
trained  investigative judges are not processing cases in 
accordance with Iraqi criminal law, or in a manner 
appropriate to the major crimes and terrorism-related 
offenses impacting Baghdad today.  The IJU claimed that 
inadequate training and experience--based largely on pre-2003 
models and compounded by de-Baathification and an antiquated 
court structure--has limited the mentorship of 
newly-appointed investigative judges from more experienced 
colleagues.  As a result, inexperienced investigative judges 
often defer decisions to release or move detainees to trial 
for fear of making the wrong choice.  Baghdad investigative 
judges and judicial investigators, alongside other ROL 
stakeholders, agreed that curriculum-based instruction, 
rather than ad hoc, on-the-job training, is critical to 
addressing the deficit in professional confidence and 
competence. 
 
Poor Logistical Support 
----------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Judicial investigators across Baghdad reported that 
logistical constraints, overwhelming case loads, and poor 
security have dramatically reduced the number of 
investigations closed or moved forward for trial.  They lack 
basic investigative tools such as cameras and plastic 
evidence bags as well as other equipment necessary to support 
investigations.  For example, the four judicial investigators 
at Baghdad,s Bab al-Muatham police station in the al-Rusafa 
district carry an extraordinary caseload (approximately 500 
cases each) as compared to their colleagues in neighboring 
police stations.  The Iraqi Judicial Branch, known as the 
Higher Juridical Council (HJC), does not provide vehicles, 
fuel, phones or other basic operating tools, nor does the HJC 
fund job-related expenses.  As a result, judicial 
investigators often pay for work-related expenses out of 
their own pocket in order to do their job.  (Note: Judicial 
Investigators earn approximately 350,000 dinars (USD 235) per 
month.  End note.)  For example, some judicial investigators 
must personally pay for juveniles to undergo the Age 
Determination Process.  Iraqi Police no longer provide an 
escort to judicial investigators to crime scenes or to locate 
witnesses.  Judicial investigators asserted that these 
constraints preclude them from leaving their local police 
stations altogether. 
 
Inconsistent Backing from Iraqi Security Forces 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
BAGHDAD 00002687  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Further complicating the efficacy of the criminal 
justice system is a widely demonstrated lack of respect for 
the judiciary by Iraqi Security Forces.  At Bab al Muatham, 
co-located with a Joint Security Station (JSS), Iraqi Army 
units recently took over the judicial investigators, offices 
in the station without sufficient notice or cause.  Judicial 
investigators and investigative judges reported feeling 
marginalized at their police stations, blaming a lack of 
respect and understanding for their role.  Consistently, 
judicial investigators reported little direct contact with 
investigative judges located at other stations.  (Note: 
judicial investigators report to investigative judges.  End 
note.) 
 
7. (SBU) The experience at Bab al Muatham LPS stands in 
contrast to al-Sa,adoun LPS, also located in Baghdad,s 
al-Rusafa district, where judicial investigators reported a 
good working relationship with police investigators, 
investigative judges, and local prosecutors.  As a result, 
al- Sa,adoun,s judicial investigators, who labor under the 
same equipment and technical support deficits, only carry an 
average 75 cases each and generally complete their 
investigations within three months.  Such localized 
disparity, particularly within the same district, appears 
driven by the local police,s opinion of the Judiciary,s 
professional competence and enforcement capabilities, rather 
than sectarian differences. 
 
Overcrowding at Detention Facilities 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) Inadequate training, logistical obstacles and a poor 
relationship with police has degraded the ability of 
investigative judges to issue orders for release or trial, 
which is adding to serious overcrowding in detention 
facilities across Baghdad.  (Note: this is helping to 
perpetuate a juvenile detention crisis reported SEPTEL.  End 
note.)  Baghdad ROL stakeholders claim that the myriad of 
problems facing judicial investigators and investigative 
judges is resulting in detainees being held without any 
action or disposition for time periods in excess of the 
limits of Iraqi law.  Both judges and police assessed that 
fair and timely case processing will greatly reduce the need 
for more detention facilities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Implementing effective training programs and 
facilitating professional mentorship for Baghdad judicial 
investigators and investigative judges is essential to case 
quality and management.  While approximately 1,000 judges 
across Iraq receive Coalition training, nearly 
40,000--including judicial investigators and investigative 
judges--do not benefit from such programs.  Increased support 
from the HJC to district level investigative judges and 
judicial investigators can also increase broader 
understanding of their role among Iraqi security forces. 
These steps will work to provide relief to overcrowded 
detention facilities, and renew professional and popular 
confidence in the Baghdad criminal justice system.  End 
comment. 
CROCKER