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Viewing cable 07ASHGABAT895, AHMEDINEJAD'S VISIT TO ASHGABAT YIELDS MOSTLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASHGABAT895 2007-08-28 13:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO2063
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0895/01 2401330
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281330Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9261
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0214
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0526
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0548
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2236
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0980
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1032
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/HSE/CCJ5// PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/REA/NMJIC-J2// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/RUE// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1304
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000895 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ENRG EPET ETRD IR TX
SUBJECT: AHMEDINEJAD'S VISIT TO ASHGABAT YIELDS MOSTLY 
BORDER AGREEMENTS 
 
REF: A. ASHGABAT 609 
     B. 06 ASHGABAT 804 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Following on the heels of President 
Berdimuhamedov's official visit to Tehran two months ago, 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad made an official visit to 
Ashgabat August 14-15 on his way to the Shanghai Organization 
Summit in Bishkek.  Although Iranian ministers arriving in 
Turkmenistan ahead of Ahmadinejad suggested that the two main 
topics of discussion would be oil and gas, and creation of a 
north-south transportation corridor, the resulting agreements 
did not reflect a meeting of the minds on these topics.  The 
two heads of state signed several agreements and memoranda on 
border-area water management, trade and media cooperation, 
and agreed to meet further in Bishkek -- 
a meeting which did not take place.  Notwithstanding 
Ahmadinejad's assiduous courting, Berdimuhamedov 
still seems to be determined to keep the expanding 
relationship focused on improving economic, trade and 
cultural ties, rather than throwing political support behind 
his problematic neighbor to the south.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Two months after President Berdimuhamedov,s visit to 
Tehran (ref a), Iranian President Ahmadinejad paid an 
official visit to Ashgabat on August 14 and 15 on his way to 
the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Summit in Bishkek.  The media had 
been playing up the meeting a week before it took place.  A 
bevy of Iranian officials, who hinted the main topics would 
be oil and 
gas and the creation of a north-south transportation 
corridor, descended on Ashgabat several days in advance to 
negotiate the various documents.  Yet, even the day before 
Ahmadinejad's visit, 
local media coverage of the talks was noticeably lukewarm. 
 
3.  (U) Actual contacts between the two leaders consisted of 
two meetings, a state dinner, a signing ceremony for the five 
documents emerging from the visit, and a joint press 
conference.  The five documents included: 
 
-- A joint statement that was largely a recap of the joint 
statement from Berdimuhamedov's June 15-16 visit to Tehran, 
although it underlined the importance of continuing gas, oil 
and electricity exports from Turkmenistan to Iran and 
implementation of bilateral energy agreements. 
 
-- A memorandum on bilateral cooperation in radio and 
television broadcasting.  Among other things, this document 
envisages joint productions; 
 
-- A memorandum of cooperation in trade and economic 
relations; 
 
-- An agreement on cooperation in construction and operation 
of a water distribution system and diversion dam of the 
Tejen/Harirud River at Shirdepe settlement; and 
 
-- An agreement on completion and joint operation of Dostluk 
dam at the Murghab River. 
 
Ahmedinejad also invited Berdimuhamedov to make a second 
visit to Tehran, and the two announced that they would have 
an additional bilateral meeting during the SCO summit in 
Bishkek.  (NOTE:  The meeting in Bishkek never materialized; 
Berdimuhamedov met there only with the presidents of 
Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, and with UN General Deputy Secretary 
Lynn Pascoe.  END NOTE.) 
 
4.  (SBU) Substantive developments included: 
 
-- Caspian Energy.  The two leaders discussed Caspian energy 
issues, but the discussions resulted only in promises to form 
a joint working group to consider the question of joint 
development of hydrocarbon resources on the Caspian shelf. 
One media source reported that, during a recent meeting with 
 
ASHGABAT 00000895  002 OF 002 
 
 
Turkish officials regarding the potential transit of Central 
Asian gas to the West, Iranian representatives had offered to 
facilitate the transit of gas to Europe and South Asia. 
Turkmen officials had agreed 
to consider the offer.  (COMMENT:  While in Abu Dhabi on 
August 27, President Berdimuhamedov noted in passing that 
Turkmenistan was working on expanding the Korpeje-Kurt-Kui 
pipeline to Iran.  END COMMENT.)  Ahmedinejad commented that 
the two countries have common views on the future of the 
Caspian, and invited President Berdimuhamedov to discuss it 
further during the Caspian states summit 
scheduled for later this year in Tehran. 
 
-- Cross-border Trade.  The two parties signed a memorandum 
that will ease border-crossing restrictions for border-region 
residents in Turkmenistan's Ahal and Balkan provinces for the 
purpose of trade, and facilitate the establishment of 
border-area markets.  The two countries will establish a 
joint working group with the goal of promoting mutual trade. 
 
-- Joint Water Management.  The parties also signed 
agreements that will advance the construction and joint 
operation of two dams that will facilitate management of 
limited water resources on the border south of Sarakhs.  The 
first project is the construction of a water distribution 
system and dam near Shirdepe on the Tejen (Harirud) River. 
Its completion would facilitate more efficient water 
management near Tejen, to include better managing an 
increased flow of water during the rainy season, 
according to News Central Asia reports.  The second project 
regards the formation of a working group to address the 
approaching completion and joint operation of the Dostluk Dam 
on the Murghab River, also near Sarakhs.  The dam is designed 
to irrigate 25,000 hectares of land on each side of the 
river. 
-- Transportation.  Early press reports suggested that the 
Iranian leader supported Berdimuhamedov's recently noted goal 
of creating a "North-South" transportation corridor, and 
Ahmedinejad publicly stated that fostering transportation 
links was one of the most important and promising areas of 
cooperation for the two countries. 
 
-- Repayment of Debt.  Turkmenistan agreed to pay an 
outstanding debt of $5 million that it owed Iran for doing 
road construction in Turkmenistan back in the early 2000's. 
 
COMMENT 
 
5.  (SBU) The belief here is that it is Ahmadinejad, seeking 
to shore up support among his 
neighbors, rather than Berdimuhamedov, who is really driving 
the relationship.  While Turkmenistan wants and needs to have 
a normal relationship with its southern neighbor -- with whom 
it shares its longest border -- most here also agree that 
Turkmenistan is well aware that getting out in front of the 
international community will endanger both Turkmenistan's 
policy of neutrality and its political standing.  For this 
reason, Berdimuhamedov seems to be focusing primarily on 
developing economic and 
cultural ties, rather than being pulled into expressing 
political support.  And, although the two are seeking to ease 
tensions along their common border, the Government of 
Turkmenistan still has not agreed to ease its extraordinarily 
tough visa regime for Iranian citizens.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND