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Viewing cable 07ADDISABABA2606, ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ADDISABABA2606 2007-08-22 05:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #2606/01 2340528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220528Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7529
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002606 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER ET
SUBJECT: ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) FALL 2007 
 
REF: STATE 110310 
 
NOTE: Responses are keyed to questions in reftel. 
 
----------------------- 
1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
A. Yes, there is a sizable Muslim population throughout 
Ethiopia as well as ethnic Somalis.  Generally, there is 
very little if any anti-American sentiment among the 
majority of the population in Ethiopia.  Only small 
segments of the general population within Ethiopia are 
prone to extremism.  There have not been any anti-American 
demonstrations in Ethiopia for the past several years. 
 
B. No; since June 2005, the GOE has not permitted public 
demonstrations. 
 
C. No. 
 
D. N/A. 
 
E. N/A; there have not been any anti-American 
demonstrations over the past year. 
 
F. In June and November 2005, there were 
demonstrations/riots throughout Addis Ababa protesting the 
results of national elections.  The Ethiopian police and 
security services responded with force to quell the 
situation.  Approximately 200 Ethiopian civilians were 
reported to be killed in Addis Ababa. 
 
G. No, the above demonstrations and riots primarily focused 
on GOE facilities.  Some passing USG vehicles were struck 
by projectiles and sustained minor damage. 
 
H. No. 
 
I. No. 
 
J. No.  The Embassy is located in close proximity (1/2 mile 
radius) to several educational institutions and GOE 
facilities.  The 2005 demonstrations/riots following 
national elections occurred within this radius.  In early 
2007, student demonstrations (not directed at the USG) at 
Addis Ababa University (located on the same road as the 
Embassy) hindered Embassy personnel coming/departing the 
compound.  No Embassy locations or personnel were directly 
involved or impacted by this situation. 
 
K. N/A.  No anti-American demonstrations within the past 
year. 
 
L. With the exception of the post-election demonstrations 
in June and November 2005, and Addis Ababa University 
student demonstrations in early 2007, demonstrations and 
large public gatherings in Addis Ababa tend to be peaceful 
and well controlled. 
 
M. No.  See Item G above. 
 
---------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
---------------------------------- 
 
A. Yes.  In response to threats to its security posed by 
extremist elements, in December 2006 the GOE intervened 
militarily in Somalia on behalf of the Somalia's 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in order to oust the 
Islamic fundamentalist Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). 
Ethiopia is also engaged in a border dispute with Eritrea; 
a United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNMEE) is stationed 
along their common border.  There are also allegations the 
Eritrean Government has planned or supported terrorist 
attacks within Ethiopia, as well as provided support to 
various anti-Ethiopian groups.  Internally, the GOE is 
currently engaged in an active counter-insurgency campaign 
in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region against the 
Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF).  Other internal 
opposition groups include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 
which has been accused, along with the ONLF, of conducting 
hostile attacks (bombings) within Ethiopia in the past. 
 
B. Intrastate conflict occurs in most regions of Ethiopia. 
In 2006, the GOE accused internal opposition groups of 
responsibility for a series of bombings (hand grenade 
attacks) within Addis Ababa, resulting in some property 
damage, injuries and loss of life. 
 
C. There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located outside 
of Addis Ababa.  The Embassy maintains 4 official locations 
(Embassy, USAID, CDC and GSO/Warehouse) and approximately 
115 residential locations spread out over a 7-mile radius 
within Addis Ababa.  Peace Corps Volunteers will establish 
facilities in Addis Ababa later this year.  Some of these 
locations are located in close proximity to the 2005 and 
2006 demonstration and bombing sites, although none were 
directly targeted or involved. 
 
D. No, although some groups associated with the conflict 
involving Somalia and Eritrea are not necessarily favorable 
toward Americans.  Anti-American sentiment rarely manifests 
itself in Ethiopia. 
 
---------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
---------------------------------- 
 
A. Although Ethiopian law enforcement and security services 
fall short of meeting Western standards in regards to 
professionalism and training, they are reasonably good in 
comparison to other countries in the region. 
 
B. GOE security services have received training from the 
USG, to include:  leadership development, major case 
management, travel documents, anti-counterfeiting, land 
border security, protective security detail operations, 
cyber-crimes, post-blast investigation, physical security 
of vital installations, preventing attacks on soft targets, 
and a variety of courses provided by the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana. 
 
Ethiopians tend to be enthusiastic students and eager to 
learn.  The training provided was appreciated and well 
received by the host country government and the individual 
students.  Future training opportunities provided to the 
GOE will be worthwhile and appreciated. 
 
C. As with most African nations, there is some corruption 
within the GOE's law enforcement and security services. 
Unlike many African countries, the level of corruption 
among GOE security and law enforcement services does not 
stymie efforts to enforce the law and ensure general 
security.  Corruption within Ethiopia can be characterized 
as petty and involving cronyism. 
 
D. Generally, GOE intelligence services are reasonably 
professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions 
within the limitations of their resources and abilities. 
The GOE claimed to foil a terrorist attack by Eritreans 
targeting the African Union Summit in December 2006. 
During 2007, the GOE claimed to foil at least two separate 
terrorist attacks within Addis Ababa by internal opposition 
groups. 
 
E. GOE intelligence and law enforcement services tend to be 
extremely cooperative and responsive to the Embassy's 
requests for information and support, within the 
limitations of their resources and abilities. 
 
F. Yes.  In response to threats to its internal security 
posed by extremist elements based in Somalia, in late 2006 
the GOE launched military operations into Somalia and 
diminished the capabilities of various individuals and 
organizations involved in terrorism.  During 2007, the GOE 
claimed to uncover and foil at least two terrorist 
operations targeting Addis Ababa by internal opposition and 
Eritrean groups. 
 
G. Yes, within the limitations of their abilities and 
resources. 
 
H. Relative to other countries on the continent, security 
at Ethiopia's major airports is generally good.  While 
access control and security screening to the civil aviation 
terminal is quite good, there are concerns regarding 
vulnerabilities of access control and security screening to 
the cargo terminals and service areas.  State-run Ethiopian 
Airlines is a government monopoly (the foreign minister is 
among its board of directors), and Ethiopia is one of the 
few African countries to receive a "Category I" rating from 
FAA for safety and security; TSA officials have provided 
training for airport personnel. 
 
I. Customs and immigration controls at Ethiopia's major 
airports and land border crossings are good.  Ethiopia 
lacks the resources to adequately ensure the security of 
its large land borders, especially in desolate/remote 
areas. 
 
 
In response to concerns to its security, the GOE has 
established and operates security checkpoints on all major 
roads leading to Addis Ababa.  Most commercial and some 
private vehicles are stopped and subject to inspection. 
While this effort is better than nothing and has yielded 
some success, it is impossible to reasonably inspect all 
vehicles, goods and individuals coming to Addis Ababa. 
 
The GOE has expressed concern to Embassy officials 
regarding the integrity of border security on its border 
with Somalia.  There are reports of trading routes that 
circumvent major roads and established checkpoints. 
 
The Embassy has encountered problems on a regular basis 
involving the integrity of Ethiopian passports and identity 
documents.  It is not difficult for individuals inclined to 
do so to obtain fraudulent passports and identity 
documents. 
 
J. Ethiopia has a vast border, neighboring five other 
African nations (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and 
Kenya).  Border patrol forces are reasonably effective at 
major/formal border crossing areas.  However, a significant 
portion of Ethiopia's land borders are assessed as open and 
porous. 
 
------------------------------- 
4. (SBU) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - 
ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
------------------------------- 
 
A. No.  However, after Ethiopia's December 2006 military 
intervention in Somalia, Al-Qaeda publicly declared 
Ethiopia to be a viable target. 
 
B. N/A. 
 
C. No. 
 
D. N/A. 
 
E. No. 
 
F. No. 
 
G. N/A. 
 
H. N/A. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
A. No.  The GOE considers several indigenous groups active 
in Ethiopia to be terrorist organizations (e.g., the 
Ogadeni National Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation 
Front); however, they have not been designated as terrorist 
organizations by the USG.  These groups have been reported 
to carry out attacks on Ethiopian government interests and 
are of concern to the GOE. 
 
B. See above. 
 
C. In 2007, the ONLF claimed responsibility for an attack 
against a Chinese oil drilling facility in the Ogaden 
region, resulting in the deaths of approximately 75 
individuals, including Ethiopian troops guarding the 
facility as well as Ethiopian and Chinese civilian workers. 
 
D. See above. 
 
E. No. 
 
F. No. 
 
G. The ONLF has primarily carried out attacks in the Ogaden 
(i.e., the Somali Region of eastern Ethiopia). 
 
H. N/A. 
 
-------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
-------------------------------- 
 
A. Yes, foreign terrorist groups present in Ethiopia 
include al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), also known as the 
United Western Somali Liberation Front.  In 1996, an 
Egyptian extremist group attempted to assassinate the 
visiting Egyptian president in Addis Ababa. 
 
 
B. Post assesses that AIAI's presence includes operational 
cells. 
 
C. No, the GOE is not sympathetic to AIAI, and its December 
2006 military intervention in Somalia on behalf of the TFG 
was aimed at ousting extremist elements.  In 1996, AIAI 
placed and detonated bombs at two large hotels and 
attempted to assassinate the GOE Minister of Transportation 
in Addis Ababa. 
 
D. Unknown 
 
E. Ethiopia hosts a large ethnic Somali population, some of 
whom are possibly inclined to support extremist groups 
affected by Ethiopian military operations in Somalia. 
Nearly half of Ethiopia's population is Muslim. 
 
F. There have not been any anti-American terrorist attacks 
in Ethiopia in recent history.  Iran, Syria, Sudan, Serbia, 
North Korea, and Cuba maintain diplomatic missions in Addis 
Ababa, and likely have accompanying security/intelligence 
officers among their diplomatic staff. 
 
G. Weapons and explosives are readily available in Somalia, 
and could be easily smuggled into Ethiopia through the 
vast, open, and porous land border.  There has been 
information Eritrea has provided weapons and explosives to 
various groups that do not view the Ethiopian government 
favorably. 
 
Weapons and explosives are available within Ethiopia 
through underground suppliers.  On a recent trip to a local 
market, Embassy personnel reported observing live hand 
grenades for sale at a market stall. 
 
Weapons and explosives are also available within Kenya, 
Sudan, and Djibouti through underground sources, and could 
be smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, open, and 
porous land borders. 
 
YAMAMOTO