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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK568, UNSC: BRIEFING ON WESTERN SAHARA NEGOTIATIONS;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK568 2007-07-12 20:41 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0568/01 1932041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 122041Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2241
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1314
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6238
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0070
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0943
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0486
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WI
SUBJECT: UNSC: BRIEFING ON WESTERN SAHARA NEGOTIATIONS; 
U.S. BELIEVES MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY IS A REALISTIC WAY FORWARD 
 
REF: STATE 96096 
 
1.  Summary: In a July 11 closed briefing to the Security 
Council, the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Western 
Sahara Peter van Walsum explained that he had included 
recommendations in his report that were eventually deleted in 
order to suggest a way for the parties to move beyond 
"atmospherics" and begin to address substantive issues during 
the August negotiations.  Responding to van Walsum's remarks, 
several delegations stressed the importance of the strict UN 
neutrality in dealing with the Moroccan and Polisario 
proposals.  Van Walsum's comment that delegations should 
consider whether their support for either Morocco or the 
Polisario was "useful" or merely a "feel good" measure 
brought sharp responses from South Africa and Russia. 
Ambassador Sanders delivered the U.S. statement expressing 
its belief that meaningful autonomy is a promising and 
realistic way forward.  The Council approved a Press 
Statement welcoming the report and expressing hope for 
progress during the next round of talks in August.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  In his July 11 closed consultations briefing to the 
Security Council on the "Report of the Secretary-General on 
the status and progress of the negotiations on Western 
Sahara" (S/2007/385), the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy 
for Western Sahara Peter van Walsum said that he had included 
recommendations that were eventually deleted (following 
objections by Morocco, the Polisario and other parties) in 
order to provide an impetus for the parties to move beyond 
"atmospherics" and begin to address substantive issues during 
the August negotiations.  (Note: the deleted sections had 
included, inter alia, a recommendation that the parties focus 
on the Moroccan autonomy proposal (objectionable to the 
Polisario) and had suggested that sovereignty was a issue 
(objectionable to Morocco.  End Note).  Van Walsum said that 
the parties have thus far persisted in maintaining their 
incompatible positions, particularly on issues of 
self-determination and sovereignty that it was necessary to 
find a way for them to move on to substance. 
 
3.  Council members generally expressed satisfaction with the 
progress of the negotiations.  But van Walsum's comments on 
three issues -- expectations for the August round of talks; 
the role of the UN; and the role of "friends" of the parties 
-- stimulated some lively commentary from Council members. 
Van Walsum told the Council that he had not yet developed an 
agenda for the August 10-11 talks, but planned to do so after 
meeting with the parties in early August.  He confessed that 
he was concerned that he would have nothing of substance to 
report to the Council after the August meeting.  But several 
delegations, reacting to van Walsum's strong preference for 
the parties to begin substantive discussions, said that they 
had no expectation that the parties would necessarily engage 
substantively at such an early stage.  Belgium, supported by 
Russia, suggested that at this point in the negotiations 
process was equivalent to substance and that the role of the 
UN should be to act as a neutral facilitator and as the 
guardian of the process.  Italy added that the time had not 
yet come for the UN to step into an end game.  Rather it was 
important to refrain from applying unbalanced pressure on one 
side or the other that would psychologically disadvantage one 
party or the other and thereby contribute to inflexibility. 
 
4.  During the discussion, responding to a question, Van 
Walsum said that while he advocated the concept of 
"responsible support" for one side or the other by parties 
not directly involved in the talks, he wanted such supporting 
parties to look within themselves and ask whether such 
support for either the Moroccans or the Polisario was 
"useful" or merely made them "feel good."  To be specific, 
van Walsum continued, some entities had supported the 
Polisario to such an extent that they are now not inclined to 
concede on the issue of a referendum with independence as an 
option, but these same entities had not leant support 
sufficient to really change the situation on the ground.  Van 
Walsum said he felt such support produced retrenchment and a 
perpetuation of the status quo that should be avoided in 
future. 
 
5.  In a sharp rebuke, South Africa PR Kumalo said South 
Africa supported the Polisario cause unabashedly and 
unashamedly, that he himself was sitting in the Council 
because of support provided by other nations during the 
Apartheid era, that the Western Sahara issue remained the 
last decolonization issue on the African Union agenda, and 
that the ultimate disposition of the situation had to involve 
self-determination.  Russia emphasized the need for absolute 
and strict neutrality by the UN in dealing with the Moroccan 
and Polisario proposals.  In response to van Walsum's 
interpretation that the intent of UNSCR 1754 was to provide 
more weight to the Moroccan plan, Russia said that UNSCR 1754 
had provided no basis which to favor one proposal over the 
other and that it was important to avoid interpretation to 
more important to emphasize implementation. 
 
6.  Ambassador Sanders delivered the U.S. statement (reftel) 
expressing the U.S. belief that meaningful autonomy is a 
promising and realistic way forward and that the serious and 
credible Moroccan initiative could provide a realistic 
framework for negotiations.  Because she was the next-to-last 
speaker, no other Council members commented on her remarks. 
Following closed consultations, Ambassador Sanders also read 
the U.S. statement to the Press at the Press Stakeout. 
 
7.  The Security Council approved a Press Statement (below) 
offered by "Friends of Western Sahara" and based on a U.S. 
draft.  Text follows: 
 
Press Statement on Western Sahara 
 
The members of the Security Council welcome the report of the 
Secretary-General of 29 June (S/2007/385) on the status and 
 
SIPDIS 
progress of the negotiations on Western Sahara. 
 
The members of the Security Council are very pleased that the 
parties and States of the region agreed to meet on June 18 
and 19 in accordance with resolution 1754 (2007). 
 
The members of the Security Council support the agreement by 
the parties that negotiations will continue in the second 
week of August under UN auspices and express their hope the 
parties will use the next round of negotiations to engage in 
good faith in substantial negotiations on the way forward in 
accordance with resolution 1754 (2007). 
 
The members of the Security Council reaffirm their strong 
support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his 
Personal Envoy to implement resolution 1754 (2007). 
End Text. 
KHALILZAD