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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3311, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/19/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3311 2007-07-19 08:12 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6858
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3311/01 2000812
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190812Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5657
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 4563
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2142
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 5731
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1221
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 2928
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7968
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4026
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5093
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 003311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/19/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) Kashiwazaki City orders suspension of nuclear power plant due to 
growing distrust 
 
(2) A study of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a "spoiled rich kid" (Part 
2): Strong sense of obligation and friendship 
 
(3) "Next-phase action" coming into focus at resumed six-party 
talks 
 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Kashiwazaki City orders suspension of nuclear power plant due to 
growing distrust 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 19, 2007 
 
The order for an emergency suspension of the Kashiwazaki nuclear 
power plant issued by Hiroshi Aida, mayor of Kashiwazaki City, 
Niigata Prefecture, is creating a stir. The castle town that houses 
the nuclear power plant that has been dependent on subsidies for 
hosting that plant has finally taken a strong stance of lodging a 
protest. After receiving that shockwave, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) has had to ask other utility companies to supply 
power. However, there is unabated concern about whether the company 
can get by this summer, when the usual heat waves are expected to 
come. There is no outlook for resuming plant operations, since there 
are many barriers to clear before that can be done. 
 
Mayor makes decision, following successive glitches 
 
Mayor Aida, who has issued the emergency order to suspend at 11:00 
a.m. on July 18 the use of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power 
plant based on the Fire Defense Law called in TEPCO President 
Katsumata to the Kashiwazaki City Office and told him in a harsh 
tone: "A tremor exceeding the intensity anticipated when designing 
the plant has occurred. Discussing the safety of a nuclear power 
plant and ground is an issue that cannot be slighted." 
 
Behind the mayor's decision are the irregularities that TEPCO was 
responsible for five years ago. In February 2002, when TEPCO found 
glitches at three nuclear power plants, including Kashiwazaki, it 
carried out illicit practices, such as fabricating inspection 
results and repair records, and recording false information. 
 
In Kashiwazaki City and Kariwa Village, which host the nuclear 
plant, residents' concern has grown over its pluthermal energy 
program for recycling spent nuclear fuel. Then Kashiwazaki Mayor 
Masazumi Nishikawa, Kariwa Village Mayor Hiroo Shinada, and the 
Niigata Governor Ikuo Hirayama agreed to cancel a prior approval 
given to TEPCO and withdrew the plan. 
 
A mayoral election took place in Nov. 2004. Nishikawa sought a 
fourth election, obtaining recommendation from the LDP and the New 
Komeito. Pro-citizen Aida, former environment department chief of 
Nagaoka City, also ran in the election a contender. Aida won a close 
contest, backed by votes from those who were against the 
construction of a nuclear power plant and votes from labor unions. 
During the election campaign, he insisted on the need to seek 
 
TOKYO 00003311  002 OF 006 
 
 
further information disclosure, premised on the securing of the 
safety of a nuclear power plant. 
 
When it was found this May that TEPCO hid troubles that had occurred 
at the Kashiwazaki nuclear power plant, he was furious, saying, "The 
corporate structure that has given priority not to safety but to 
operations is a problem." For that reason alone, the series of 
troubles following the quake were impermissible for him. 
 
When Aida ordered the suspension of the operation of the plant, 
President Katsumata admitted that fire extinction equipment was 
insufficient. However, regarding the structure of the nuclear power 
plant, he said, "We were comparatively able to secure safety. I feel 
there is no problem." 
 
Aida brushed aside his comment with an unpleasant look, "The city 
will confer on the nuclear power plant's fire extinction system as a 
business establishment." Meeting the press in the evening, Mayor 
Aida, after citing a major benefit of hosting a nuclear power in 
terms of local district development, noted, "The major premise is 
safety. It could not be helped that the operations automatically 
stopped due to the quake intensity stronger than anticipated. 
However, I as the mayor of the city cannot grant approval for the 
operation of facilities." He hinted that his order for suspension 
included a disciplinary meaning with importance given to the series 
of mismanagement. 
 
Many barriers to clear before resuming operations 
 
TEPCO said that there are no prospects for resuming the operations 
of seven reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant. 
There are many barriers to clear before resuming operations, 
including a revision of earthquake resistance evaluation gauged at 
the time when the plant was designed, consideration to the need for 
reinforcement work, government inspection and approval from local 
governments hosting the facility. 
 
The Onagawa nuclear power plant was jolted by a stronger earthquake 
than anticipated as was the case this time when the Miyagi 
Earthquake occurred in Aug. 2005. There was no need for reinforcing 
earthquake resistance there. Nevertheless, even in the fastest case 
of no. 2 reactor, it took five months to resume operation. It took a 
year and nine months for the no. 1 reactor to resume operation. The 
delay is largely attributable to the fact that it was necessary to 
ensure that nuclear reactors can endure the maximum earthquake that 
could occur. 
 
It will take time to analyze what impact key equipment, such as 
reactor pressure vessels, received in the quake this time. If 
problems are found, the intensity assumption has to be revised. 
Hokuriku Electric Power Company, which is investigating into the 
impact of the Noto Peninsular Earthquake occurred this March on the 
Shiga nuclear power plant, has not yet submitted a final report to 
the government. 
 
The safety determination process involves the government determining 
whether there is any problem about inspections carried out by 
utility companies and reaching a decision on each nuclear reactor, 
based on discussions pursued by an advisory council consisting of 
experts. It would take even longer time for a utility company to 
resume operation of reactors, if they are identified as requiring 
earthquake resistance reinforcement. Even if the company obtains 
 
TOKYO 00003311  003 OF 006 
 
 
government approval for reinforcement work and the reactors in 
question undergo the work, it still needs to receive certification 
proving that the work was conducted correctly. Approval of local 
governments hosting the nuclear power plant in question is also 
necessary. The local governments will independently determine 
safety. 
 
There were only 9 kilometers from the nuclear power station to the 
point right above the epicenter. TEPCO carried out a geological 
survey around the nuclear power plant until this April, based on the 
new quake resistance guidelines, which the government set last 
September. However, the survey did not cover the sea floor. It did 
not consider the existence of the active fault, which is assumed to 
have caused the quake this time. 
 
Following the quake, TEPCO decided to conduct an additional 
geological survey. If the survey confirms the existence of an active 
fault, it is bound to affect safety evaluation and approval by local 
governments hosting the nuclear power plant. 
 
(2) A study of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a "spoiled rich kid" (Part 
2): Strong sense of obligation and friendship 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 24) (Abridged) 
July 15, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dined with a dozen or so Liberal 
Democratic Party lawmakers on the night of May 29, the day after 
Agriculture Minister Toshikatsu Matsuoka committed suicide. At the 
dinner table, an unusually eloquent Abe affectionately described 
Matsuoka this way: "Mr. Matsuoka played a central role in making 
arrangements for everything from beef imports from the United States 
to rice exports to China to my meeting with Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao. He was always highly committed to his job." 
 
One of the participants took Abe's words as an act to defend himself 
as the person who had appointed Matsuoka. Lawmaker Katsuei Hirasawa, 
61, who once tutored Abe when he was a primary school student, took 
it differently. He said: "The prime minister is a gentle person. I 
believe he couldn't help but make such a comment for the sake of Mr. 
Matsuoka's honor" 
 
Abe has a tendency to remain loyal to his sympathizers, whether they 
be friend or foe. 
 
Former House of Representatives lawmaker Kiyoshi Ueda, 59, left the 
Democratic Party of Japan in August 2003 to run in the Saitama 
gubernatorial race, which he won. Days before the election, Ueda 
unexpectedly received an encouraging message from Abe, his friend, 
which read: "I had been asked by the LDP Saitama chapter to stump 
for your rival at four locations, but I have decided to do so only 
at one place." 
 
"I keenly felt his consideration," Ueda said, looking back at the 
incident. 
 
Abe also allowed Seiichi Eto, 59, a postal rebel and another close 
friend, to rejoin the LDP in the face of strong objections from 
within the party. 
 
Three key players in the Abe cabinet resigned in succession soon 
after Abe took office. The first was Masaaki Honma, who resigned as 
 
TOKYO 00003311  004 OF 006 
 
 
the government's tax commission chief last December due to his use 
of a government apartment to house his mistress. Then came the 
resignation of Regulatory Reform Minister Genichiro Sata over his 
shady office expenses. Abe at first staunchly defended Honma and 
Sata. Sata's resignation was followed by the case of Defense 
Minister Fumio Kyuma, 66, who stepped down in late June over his 
atomic-bombings-couldn't-be-helped remarks. Abe again defended Kyuma 
until he tendered his resignation. 
 
Eiji Oshita, 63, the author of Abe-ke Sandai: Abe Shinzo 
(Third-Generation Politician, Shinzo Abe) explained Abe's 
indecisiveness about sacking cabinet ministers this way: "The gentle 
DNA Abe inherited from his father, Shintaro Abe, crops up whenever 
he is faced with a difficult personnel decision. Becoming a great 
commander takes the guts to ax people as necessary." 
 
As Matsuoka's successor, Abe picked Norihiko Akagi, 48, deputy head 
of a group of junior lawmakers who support visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine. Akagi is ideologically close to Abe, and his grandfather 
once served as defense chief in the cabinet of Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi, Abe's grandfather. Abe defended Akagi when an office 
expense scandal broke out, saying, "His political organization 
declared 800 yen as monthly utility expenses, but I won't let him go 
just because of that." This visibly disappointed Oshita. 
 
Oshita noted: 
 
"There was no need for the prime minister to bring up the 800 yen 
example to defend Akagi, who is in the hot seat. It reminded me of 
Abe's words that ruled out any investigation after Matsuoka's 
suicide. Mr. Abe is honest, or rather immature." 
 
In his debate with DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa on July 1, Abe 
fervently said: "I would like to see children grow up to be 
courageous enough to protect friends from bullying and stand up for 
them." 
 
Abe's junior high school classmate, Yojiro Tanii, 52, still vividly 
remembers Abe who stood up for friends against bullies. "He was not 
good at fighting, but he never left friends behind," Tanii said. 
 
Shinzo Abe's mettle is being tested as prime minister instead of as 
a person with a strong sense of obligation and friendship. 
 
(3) "Next-phase action" coming into focus at resumed six-party 
talks 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) 
July 19, 2007 
 
Hajime Izumi, professor of politics on the Korean Peninsula at 
University of Shizuoka 
 
The chief delegates to the six-party talks resumed discussion in 
Beijing after a hiatus of four months. One major purpose of the 
meeting is to deal with the question of how specifically to 
facilitate the "next-phase action" toward denuclearization, now that 
North Korea shut down its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. 
 
The US top envoy to the six-party talks, Christopher Hill, assistant 
secretary of state, has come up with an immediate timetable aimed at 
 
SIPDIS 
completing the "next-phase action" by the end of the year, 
 
TOKYO 00003311  005 OF 006 
 
 
suggesting first creating a "road map" for the completion of the 
next-phase steps, next holding a working group meeting that will be 
followed by a plenary session of the six-party member nations, and 
then holding a six-party foreign ministerial by the first week of 
September. 
 
I think it is possible to translate all those plans into action. The 
US allowed the North Korean money that had been frozen at a Macao 
bank to be transferred to North Korea, and that in exchange for 
that, the North shut down its nuclear facilities. Since then, a kind 
of relationship of mutual trust has been emerging between the two 
countries. Given this, it would not be much difficult to confirm a 
"road map" and arrange a timeframe for discussions. 
 
However, actually implementing the "next-phase action" is not an 
easy task. The six-party agreement made on February 13 has put North 
Korea under obligation to implement two things: submission of a full 
declaration of all of its nuclear programs and disablement of all of 
its nuclear facilities. It is, however, too optimistic to expect 
North Korea to implement them strictly. Obviously, it is well 
imagined how difficult it is for the North to do, given measures the 
North must undertake in that regard. 
 
As for a full declaration, the North Koreans need to admit the 
existence of their uranium enrichment activity. Regarding the 
disablement, the North Koreans must undertake steps to disable the 
operations of the five-megawatt nuclear reactor as well as the 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Also, they need to make it 
impossible to reprocess 8,000 fuel rods used to operate the 
five-megawatt nuclear reactor. 
 
All these are deemed Washington's "minimum demands" on Pyongyang, 
but it is unthinkable for the North to accept them without any 
objection. North Korea is likely to contend strongly that 
"disablement" does not mean indefinitely sealing nuclear 
facilities. 
 
In short, it is unlikely that the US and North Korea will easily 
come to a compromise over the "next-phase action." 
 
Should Pyongyang deem Washington's "returns" as attractive, the 
North could implement the "minimum action" demanded by Washington. 
 
The Bush administration turned around its previous policy and now 
appears willing to advance talks on building a peace mechanism for 
the Korean Peninsula even before the North becomes nuclear-free. 
This policy switch reflects the Bush administration's strong 
interest in putting an end to the Cold-War structure left on the 
Korean Peninsula. This is certain to give a strong incentive to the 
North, too. 
 
Once a six-party foreign ministerial session takes place, four-party 
talks among North and South Korea, the US, and China aimed at 
creating a peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula will be set in 
motion. I cannot rule out the possibility that in that process, 
North Korea will move to fulfill the obligations set forth in the 
"next-phase action." 
 
Should Japan continue to give the highest priority to progress on 
the abduction issue as it has in the past and remain unwilling to 
play a part in building a peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula, 
the role Japan will play for the peace, stability, and security of 
 
TOKYO 00003311  006 OF 006 
 
 
East Asia will be severely limited. 
 
It is high time for Japan to restudy its previous North Korea 
policy. 
 
SCHIEFFER