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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3265, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3265 2007-07-17 21:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO5260
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3265/01 1982113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 172113Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5574
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 4518
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2099
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 5687
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1178
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 2884
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7926
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3985
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5052
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) Prime minister instructs cabinet ministers to cooperate in 
investigation in move to designate Niigata earthquake as a serious 
disaster 
 
(2) Taking a look at normalizing US-DPRK relations (1) 
 
(3) Taking a look at normalizing US-DPRK relations (2) 
 
(4) Upper House election in 2007 -- Japan's option: Future course of 
state on foreign policy, security not shown 
 
(5) Editorial: Collective self-defense must be discussed before the 
public 
 
(6) Kasumigaseki Confidential column: Appointments of senior Foreign 
Ministry officials 
 
(7) Kasumigaseki Confidential column: Repercussions from comments on 
future course of Prime Minister Abe 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Prime minister instructs cabinet ministers to cooperate in 
investigation in move to designate Niigata earthquake as a serious 
disaster 
 
July 17, 2007 
 
In a cabinet ministerial meeting this morning, Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe instructed relevant cabinet ministers to quickly secure the 
outlays necessary to finance reconstruction work in the area 
seriously damaged in the earthquake off Chuetsu District, Niigata 
Prefecture. Securing disaster-restoration expenses is premised on 
the government to designate the earthquake yesterday as a serious 
disaster to enable the state to provide additional subsidies for 
reconstruction projects. Abe said: "Government officials should take 
measures with a sense of urgency, such as offering full cooperation 
for on-the-spot investigations." 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki referred in a press 
conference this morning to the fact that the shock of the quake 
recorded at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear 
power station was over the level of "the maximum probable 
earthquake" -- the standard that requires earthquake-resistance 
designs -- and he indicated that the standard should be reviewed. 
Shiozaki said: "Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Amari 
asked the Federation of Electric Power Companies to confirm the 
safety of all its power plants across the nation. We must analyze 
the earthquake in detail and ensure the safety of the power plants 
for the sake of the residents' safety." 
 
It was also announced last night that water containing a tiny amount 
of radioactive materials had flowed out of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 
Nuclear Power Plant. On this problem, Shiozaki explained: "It was at 
8:28 p.m. when we confirmed that water containing radioactive 
materials overflowed. There is no inconsistency between this 
explanation and what I said in a press conference yesterday morning 
(he said that any radiation leak was not confirmed). 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) Secretary General Yukio 
 
TOKYO 00003265  002 OF 007 
 
 
Hatoyama, now visiting Niigata to have a first-hand look at the 
damage in the devastated area from the quake, said in a Nippon Hoso 
radio program this morning: "We were engaged in the Upper House 
election campaign in Niigata. Suspending the campaign for a while, 
we will engage in volunteer activities." 
 
(2) Taking a look at normalizing US-DPRK relations (1) 
 
MAINICHI (Page 6) (Full) 
July 16, 2007 
 
Masao Okonogi, professor at Keio University Law School (North Korean 
politics) 
 
I believe that North Korea intends to begin implementation of the 
"February 13th agreement" reached at six-party talks.  This is 
because they want to return to the stage before the breakdown in 
2002 of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK and 
renew efforts to normalize relations between the two countries. 
 
I would suggest that both the US and North Korea are looking not 
just towards the suspension of the activity of nuclear stations, but 
the complete shutdown of nuclear facilities.  If the Bush 
administration does not succeed in achieving denuclearization, it 
will not have surpassed the achievements of the Clinton 
administration.  Meanwhile, North Korea has already obtained about 
50 kilos of plutonium in these past 4 and a half years. 
Furthermore, the February agreement set no limits on nuclear 
materials and weapons that the DPRK already possesses. 
Consequently, North Korea may view a declaration of their nuclear 
plans and eventual denuclearization as an appropriate price to pay 
for a move towards normalized relations with the US and other 
results. 
 
After all, their nuclear facilities are aging, and it can be said 
that they met their goals when they were able to extract plutonium. 
 
Moving into the final stage - getting North Korea to dispose of 
plutonium and other nuclear materials - will not be an easy task.  I 
do not think it will happen unless the survival of Kim Jong-Il's 
regime is guaranteed.  The building of light-water reactors, 
succession disputes and other problems will span at least another 5 
or 10 years. 
 
As for Japan, we must press forward on the abduction issue during 
this second stage, which revolves around denuclearization.  I 
believe that "calm diplomacy" will become essential. 
 
(3) Taking a look at normalizing US-DPRK relations (2) 
 
MAINICHI (Page 6) (Full) 
July 16, 2007 
 
Kiyoshi Sakurai, technology critic 
 
The suspension of the activity of nuclear reactors itself carries no 
meaning.  It is only until we deprive North Korea of their nuclear 
reactors which produce high quality plutonium and their nuclear 
reprocessing plants that there is any effect.  In order to prevent 
North Korea from reopening their nuclear operations in the future, 
it is important that starting now, they perform specific measures 
under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
TOKYO 00003265  003 OF 007 
 
 
(IAEA). 
 
Simply placing a control rod in the reactor core and halting 
operations means that if the rod is removed, the nuclear reactor 
will function just as it did before.  Up until now, North Korea has 
halted and restarted their nuclear operations several times.  In 
order to stop their operations once and for all, IAEA personnel must 
enter the central control room of the nuclear reactor, make sure 
that actions to restart operations do not occur, and seal the 
control rod in place.  Furthermore, used fuel must be completely 
extracted from the reactor and sealed in a precise, predetermined 
location.  IAEA personnel must keep watch over the fuel everyday to 
ensure that it is not reprocessed and plutonium is not extracted 
from it.  Until these actions are taken, we cannot say that "they 
stopped operations, so everything is fine." 
 
A cooling period is necessary prior to extracting used fuel from the 
nuclear reactors.  It will probably take about a month to enact all 
these measures.  However, even if all these measures take place, we 
cannot be sure that North Korea's nuclear production capacity will 
disappear because they may still have nuclear facilities of which 
the international community is unaware. 
 
(4) Upper House election in 2007 -- Japan's option: Future course of 
state on foreign policy, security not shown 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Almost full) 
July 16, 2007 
 
The alliance between Japan and the US is facing a test. US Under 
Secretary of Defense Shinn during a meeting with Liberal Democratic 
 
SIPDIS 
Party (LDP) Security Research Council Chairman Taku Yamasaki held in 
Tokyo on June 29 sought Japan's expanded assistance for the war 
against terrorism in Afghanistan. He noted, "We would appreciate if 
Japan extends its personnel contribution and transportation 
cooperation as well as maritime refueling activities in the Indian 
Ocean." Shinn also sounded out Administrative Vice Defense Minister 
Takemasa Moriya about the possibility of the Ground Self-Defense 
Force dispatching helicopters. 
 
Both Yamasaki and Moriya turned down his requests, saying, "It is 
difficult to address such a request." However, one senior Foreign 
Ministry official said, "It will be necessary for Japan to consider 
personnel contribution in some form or other next year." 
 
Drawn into a quagmire in Iraq, the US is 99% preoccupied with Middle 
East policy. It has now begun distancing itself from Japan's 
hard-line stance over the issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. 
Suspicions are arising in Japan that the US might approve North 
Korea's possession of nuclear arms, making nuclear proliferation by 
it its last nonnegotiable line. 
 
Regarding this situation, Kiichi Fujiwara, Tokyo University 
professor, pointed out, "The priority of the US strategy in Asia has 
changed." He said, "If Japan, nevertheless, wants the US to defend 
it, it will have to make more contributions." Japan is urged to 
decide whether to further promote cooperation toward the US in areas 
outside the Far East, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to 
maintain the relationship of alliance with it. 
 
The perception gap between Japan ad the US on North Korea's nuclear 
ambitions is fraught with the danger of posing a more serious 
 
TOKYO 00003265  004 OF 007 
 
 
problem. Former Ambassador to the US Takakazu Kuriyama, who has 
called the bilateral relationship that has lost a common strategic 
target a drifting alliance, made this comment: "As a result of China 
and Europe gaining strength in the wake of the US having failed in 
Iraq, the US' capability of forming an international order has 
weakened. Managing the Japan-US alliance has become more difficult 
than in the age of the Cold War or the post-Cold-War era. I feel a 
sense of drift has become even stronger." 
 
When the Upper House election was officially announced, the 
following moves were observed on July 12 in Britain and the US. 
British Secretary of State for International Development Alexander, 
a close aide to British Prime Minister Brown, in a speech given in 
the US said, "The power to destroy was an index of national power in 
the 20th century. Such an index in the 21st century should be power 
to construct in concert." Unlike the Blair administration, the new 
British administration is constraining the use of power. Its stance 
was said to be a sign of Britain moving away from the US. 
 
The US House of Representatives has adopted a bill including 
completion of a pullout of US forces from Iraq by next April. Though 
the bill has no prospect for being enacted as President Bush is 
expected to exercise his veto, if a Democrat candidate wins the 
presidential election next year, a call for reviewing Bush's Iraq 
policy will pick up steam in one sweep. 
 
Keio University Associate Professor Yuichi Hosoya noted: "War 
against terrorism is expected to drag on. We are at a key turning 
point. The US and Britain now are tending to correct their previous 
policies. It is important how Japan will become engaged in 
international security. However, both the ruling and opposition 
parties are avoiding discussing the issue." 
 
Only Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and DPJ head Ichiro Ozawa properly 
touched on the security and foreign policy in their first speeches 
made since the official announcement of the election on the 12th. 
However, they only briefly talked about the issue, compared with the 
length of the time they spared for other issues. An election without 
a debate on foreign policy will deprive voters of an opportunity to 
think about the future course of the state. 
 
(Hiroshi Komatsu) 
 
(5) Editorial: Collective self-defense must be discussed before the 
public 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
July 16, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should prevent his view on the right to 
collective self-defense and actively discuss the matter with all 
parties. 
 
Successive governments have strictly limited activities by the 
Self-Defense Forces, taking the position that exercising the right 
to collective self-defense is unconstitutional. The prime minister, 
deeming it as the postwar regime, has established his advisory panel 
called the Council for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation of National 
Defense. 
 
The panel plans to produce its report this fall. The prime minister 
has indicated that he would make a policy decision after the panel 
 
TOKYO 00003265  005 OF 007 
 
 
produced its report. 
 
Reflecting Abe's strong wishes, the panel consists of opinion 
leaders eager to change the government's interpretation. We have 
warned against the panel reaching a predetermined conclusion. 
 
The panel composed of like-minded members has already finished 
discussing the following two scenarios of the four situations 
presented by Abe: (1) whether the Self-Defense Force can defend a US 
warship on the high seas, (2) whether Japan can intercept a 
ballistic missile headed for the United States. 
 
As expected, the panel is likely to urge the government to change 
its interpretation of the Constitution to allow the SDF to use the 
right so that they can sufficiently deal with the two situations. 
 
Abe's stock argument is that Japan can exercise the right even under 
the current Constitution. This strongly suggests that he will make a 
policy decision based on the panel's report. 
 
Abe refused to reveal his view in a party-head debate held on July 
11 at the Japan National Press Club, saying, "If I present my view, 
the (panel) discussion would lose its significance." 
 
Producing a conclusion opening the door to collective defense after 
the upcoming House of Councillors election without openly discussing 
it in the ongoing election campaigning is tantamount to ignoring 
public opinion. The matter must be discussed before the public. 
 
One of the LDP election pledges is to sort out the relationship with 
the Constitution, including the right to collective self-defense, 
and rebuild the legal foundation of national defense in accordance 
with specific cases. Although "rebuilding the legal foundation" can 
be taken to mean a review, the LDP's public pledge is void of 
concreteness and is therefore hard to understand. 
 
Many in the LDP are calling for proposing constitutional revision 
rather than altering the interpretation. The LDP must clearly 
explain the relationship with constitutional revision, as well. 
 
The LDP's coalition partner, the New Komeito, is adamantly opposed 
to changing the government's interpretation. If the LDP and New 
Komeito are playing dumb about the issue of the right to collective 
defense just in the ongoing election campaigning for the sake of 
their campaign cooperation, people will not be fooled. 
 
Meanwhile, the main opposition Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) 
released its platform last December noting, "We will not adhere to 
past developments in the conceptual discussion on the right to 
collective self-defense, individual or collective." Some Minshuto 
lawmakers think it is too ambiguous and conceptual. The party's 
manifesto for the upcoming election does not touch on collective 
defense either apparently to avoid controversy. 
 
Altering the government's interpretation concerns the foundation of 
the country's security policy. The matter must not be overshadowed 
by the pension issue. 
 
(6) Kasumigaseki Confidential column: Appointments of senior Foreign 
Ministry officials 
 
BUNGEI SHUNJU (Page 234 & 235) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00003265  006 OF 007 
 
 
August 2007 
 
The post of chief of secretariat in the proposed Japanese version of 
the US National Security Council will be an important office for 
Japan to strengthen relations with the United States. 
 
There was a rumor that Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro 
Yachi would be picked to serve in that post after retiring the 
ministry next January. It has now become certain, however, that he 
will become a professor of the law faculty of Keio University. 
It is regarded as more likely that former Ambassador to the US 
Shunji Yanai, who now chairs a government panel tasked with 
discussing the right of collective self-defense, will become the 
first chief of secretariat of Japan's NSC, which will be launched 
next April. However, there still remains a possibility that Yachi 
might serve in the post in the not-so-distant future. 
 
It is regarded as more certain that Ambassador to Indonesia Shin 
Ebihara will be appointed to be Yachi's replacement. The lineup of 
senior officials supporting Ebihara includes Asian and Oceanian 
Affairs Bureau Director General Kenichiro Sasae, who will be 
promoted to the post of deputy foreign minister (for political 
affairs), Deputy Foreign Minister (for economic affairs) Masaharu 
Kono, who will remain in his current post, Foreign Policy Bureau 
Director General Chikao Kawai, who will become deputy vice minister 
of the Minister's Secretariat, International Cooperation Bureau 
Director General Koro Bessho, who will become Foreign Policy Bureau 
chief, Akitaka Saiki, minister at the Japanese Embassy in the United 
States, Global Issues Cooperation Division Director Koji Tsuruoka, 
who will be promoted to be director general of the International 
Legal Affairs Bureau, and Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau 
Deputy Director General Shinsuke Sugiyama, who will be appointed as 
director general of the International Cooperation Bureau. 
 
The lineup of these personnel appointments is dependent on 
appointing Policy Bureau Director General Kawai as deputy vice 
minister. 
 
Political observers see two aims for appointing Kawai as deputy vice 
minister: One aim of having Kawai vacate his present post is to give 
a chance to Bessho, who joined the ministry the same year with 
Kawai, by having Kawai, who was regarded as future vice minister, 
serve in a low-profile post, such as deputy vice minister, since he 
has been too aggressive. The other aim is to have Ebihara establish 
leadership by having Kawai build up the minister's secretariat. 
 
Deputy Vice Minister Kojiro Shiojiri will serve as ambassador to 
Indonesia, replacing Ebihara. 
 
Regarding the appointment of ambassadors, some news reports stated 
that it had been decided that Ichiro Fujisaki, ambassador to the 
International Organization in Geneva, would succeed Ambassador to 
the United Nations Kenzo Oshima this summer, but Yukio Takasu, a 
minister at the Japanese Embassy in the US, has been picked as 
Oshima's replacement. Fujisaki will become ambassador to Britain, 
his long-waited dream, replacing Yoshiji Nogami, who will leave the 
ministry next January. 
 
(7) Kasumigaseki Confidential column: Repercussions from comments on 
future course of Prime Minister Abe 
 
BUNGEI SHUNJU (Page 235 & 236) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00003265  007 OF 007 
 
 
August 2007 
 
With the extension of the regular Diet session, the House of 
Councilors election will be conducted on July 29. There is a rumor 
that the outcome of the election might affect the future course of 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
alone remains in a calm and collected manner, even though other 
ministries have been thrown into confusion. 
 
Administrative Vice Minister Shotaro Yachi has close ties also with 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who is regarded as successor to Abe. 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Kenichi Sasae, 
meanwhile, is close to former Chief cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda. 
It means that the ministry has been ready to a situation after the 
Upper House race although there would be a great change in the 
political situation. 
 
The worst case for MOFA is Junichiro Koizumi's taking the 
premiership after Abe. The reason is because Ambassador to Indonesia 
Shin Ebihara, who is regarded as most likely candidate for the 
future vice minister, has severed relations with Isao Iijima, 
Koizumi's personal secretary. 
 
It is said that Ebihara stated during his tenure as deputy chief 
cabinet secretary in the Koizumi government that he would become 
administrative vice minister in the future. His remark provoked 
Iijima's anger, being dismissed the post in just one year. If 
Koizumi reassumed the premiership and Iijima returned to government, 
Ebihara's assuming the vice minister's post would be uncertain. 
However, there is little possibility of Koizumi retaking the 
premiership, however. 
 
The Abe administration intended to have the issue of North Korea's 
abductions of Japanese nationals the final resort in the Upper House 
race. As a result of a series of Sasae's failures in forecasting the 
development of the abduction issue, it is equivalent to the 
ministry's having lost the last resort. Persons around Abe were 
calling for replacing Sasae, but they have now determined that 
pursuing Sasae's responsibility would backfire all the more because 
the political situation is very alarming. As it stands, the outcome 
of the Upper House election will not affect MOFA. 
 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance is trembling with fear at 
the result of the Upper House race. The mission of new Finance 
Minister Koki Tsuda is to raise the consumption tax as financial 
resources following the increase in state contribution to the basic 
pension in April 2009. Tsuda is regarded as the last disciple of 
former Vice Minister Jiro Saito, who played the role of the leading 
actor in the shadows along with Ichiro Ozawa under the cabinet of 
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. He has picked National Tax Agency 
Deputy Commissioner Haruhiko Kato, a tax expert, as director general 
of the Tax Bureau. It would be politically difficult, however, to 
hike the consumption tax, which forces the public to bear the 
financial burden if the political situation becomes fluid. Tsuda, 
who is talked behind his back that doing nothing is his greatest 
weapon, will be put to the test of his ability. 
 
SCHIEFFER