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Viewing cable 07SEOUL2189, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CHUNG DONG-YOUNG REACHES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL2189 2007-07-22 22:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2189/01 2032224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 222224Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5636
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2860
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2972
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2086
RHMFIUU/LCC SEOUL SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
UNCLAS SEOUL 002189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
COMM CENTER PLEASE PASS TO COMUSKOREA SCJS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CHUNG DONG-YOUNG REACHES 
FOR THE MOON 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Former Unification Minister and Uri Party 
chair Chung Dong-young was the guest of honor on July 11 at 
the 170th Symposium on Korea's Foreign and Security Policy 
hosted by the Asia-Pacific Policy Research Institute (APPRI). 
 Chung began his speech by criticizing not only his 
competition in the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) but 
also in the liberal camp.  He claimed his experience in the 
media and abroad gave him enough leverage to win in a 
one-on-one standoff with any of the presidential candidates. 
Chung then gave a lengthy speech highlighting his policy 
agenda and answered questions posed by a panel of prominent 
members in South Korean academia and media.  The most popular 
subject of the night was Chung's proposal to go "beyond the 
peninsula and stretch out to the universe" by expanding South 
Korea's aerospace industry and putting a South Korean on the 
moon by 2025.  This policy purportedly doubles as a way for 
the ROK to strengthen its economy by providing much-needed 
jobs, and to craft a reputation as a leader in science and 
technology.  The real meat of his policy agenda, however, is 
firmly centered around his continuation of the "Sunshine 
Policy" of engaging North Korea through dialogue and aid. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
FIGHTING STEEP COMPETITION 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Chung opened his address to a diverse audience of 
media, academic, business, and foreign embassy officials by 
unabashedly criticizing his competition in the upcoming 
presidential election, focusing primarily on current overall 
front-runner former Seoul mayor Lee Myung-bak, who holds 
about 35.2-40 percent popular support, and current liberal 
front-runner former Gyeonggi Province governor Sohn Hak-kyu, 
with 7.3-7.6 percent (Chung himself has 2.8-3.3 percent 
support, according to Donga Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo polls 
conducted on July 14).  Chung claimed that the 21st century 
does not require leaders who dig canals or make underhanded 
political maneuvers, referring to Lee's Pan-Korea Grand 
Waterway pledge and Sohn's jump from the GNP to the liberal 
camp, respectively.  He also expressed his displeasure with 
the GNP candidates' current popularity ratings of roughly 70 
percent combined, towering over the liberals', which stand 
collectively at around 20 percent.  Chung blames what he 
dubbed "this unnatural phenomenon" to the current 
administration's failure to unite the party and embrace 
market-opening measures, surmising that the public is so 
frustrated it had no choice but to support the opposition. 
He was confident, however, that in a one-on-one stand-off 
with any GNP candidate, he would win. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
POLITICS OF MODERATION FAIL TO IMPRESS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Chung asserted that the 21st century requires a 
leader who can accomplish three goals: (1) solidify a strong 
middle class; (2) foster the growth of small to medium-sized 
companies and; (3) exhibit the capability to unify its 
constituency through the "politics of moderation," or in 
other words, establishing a moderate policy platform.  Chung 
explained that the average Korean's dream is to be in the 
middle-class, and pledged to increase South Korea's middle 
clas to 70 percent of the population (from 50 percent).  One 
of the ways to do this, he said, was to establish an order of 
mutual growth and fair trade between the large companies and 
small to medium-sized companies, with the government playing 
an active role in the process.  The expansion of small to 
medium-sized companies, he said, would create "quality" jobs 
as well, guaranteeing a decrease in unemployment and 
generally aiding the country's welfare. 
 
4. (SBU) In response to a question regarding his view on free 
trade agreements (FTA), Chung claimed the ROK could only 
expect to survive in the future by internally strengthening 
the welfare system and externally expanding  FTAs.  He 
commented further that it was essential for the ROK to 
complete an FTA with the U.S. and Japan within the next four 
 
to five years, and that the expansion of the ROK's free 
market economy would work towards all three of his 
aforementioned goals.  The panelists, a collection of 
academics and media representatives, however, criticized 
these goals after Chung's speech for being replicas of 
President Roh Moo-hyun and former president Kim Dae-jung's 
own campaign pledges. 
 
-------------------- 
TARGET: THE UNIVERSE 
-------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Chung, probably in a move to counter Lee Myung-bak 
and Park Geun-hye's canal and ferry initiatives, introduced 
his own plan to "catch up with Japan while keeping China at a 
distance," by expanding South Korea's aerospace industry.  He 
claimed that in the 21st century, the country that controls 
the air will be the one with power, and specifically pointed 
to China and Japan's own space programs as opportunities for 
the ROK to escape what he called its "sandwich mentality." 
Chung's proposed plan, the "2025 Dream-Space Project," aims 
to put a Korean on the moon by 2025, which he claims will 
enable the ROK to be a formidable leader in a science and 
technology society.  Chung stated that the plan would also 
help to revitalize the South Korean economy by creating 
much-needed jobs.  While the plan generally received a 
favorable reception from the audience and panelists, one 
panelist, after conceding that the plan was "better" than the 
other candidates' initiatives, expressed skepticism at 
Chung's ability to 
 convince the public of its necessity. 
 
--------------------- 
NORTH KOREA POINT-MAN 
--------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) During his speech, Chung highlighted his academic 
and work history abroad as proof that he was the most 
qualified presidential candidate when it came to foreign 
policy issues.  His main focus was on his experience in 
dealing with North Korea during his tenure as Unification 
Minister from 2004-2005.  He expressed his hope that everyone 
would visit one of ROK's "most important inter-Korean 
projects," the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a project that he 
facilitated as Unification Minister.  Chung underscored his 
experience with North Korea by attributing the September 2005 
Joint Statement as a direct result of his own meeting with 
Kim Jong-Il several months prior for which Chung traveled to 
Pyongyang and engaged in a 5-hour meeting with North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-Il.  Despite the current prevailing sentiment 
that North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test rendered the 
agreement a failure, Chung claimed that history would 
"vindicate" his agreement as a "Little Magna Carta" from 
which all future inter-Korean policies would stem. 
 
7. (SBU) Chung was a harsh critic of both the current 
administration's and opposition candidates' North Korea 
policies; he claimed it was a mistake of the Roh 
administration to link North-South relations to progress in 
the Six Party Talks, and an even bigger mistake for the GNP 
to take a hard-line stance against the North.  At several 
junctures in his speech, Chung said that he welcomed the 
GNP's recent change in attitude towards North Korea--a much 
softer policy announced on July 4 that focuses on economic 
support for the North with a long-term goal of 
unification--but immediately questioned the party's motives, 
denouncing the GNP as too "short-term" in its vision for the 
future, and as politically motivated.  Chung then discounted 
the possibility of a GNP president being capable of making 
significant headway in inter-Korean relations or North Korean 
denuclearization. 
 
8. (SBU) Chung put himself forth as the candidate most 
capable of handling inter-Korean relations and keeping 
hard-liners--not just in the opposition party but also, he 
claimed, those in Japan, China, U.S., and the South Korean 
public--at a distance.  Chung's strongest policy agenda has 
always been his North Korea policy, in which he advocated an 
 
engagement-first approach towards the North, claiming that it 
is only through dialogue and strengthened relations that 
North Korean denuclearization can occur.  Chung made an 
appeal for reunification by asserting that Korea's only hope 
for future energy security is through integration on the 
peninsula.  Dismissing skeptics in the audience who feared he 
was supporting a "hasty" reunification, Chung emphasized that 
as President he would make sure North Korea established 
formal diplomatic ties with the U.S. and built a 
fully-functioning inter-Korean economy by 2020 in order to 
ensure a successful unification of the peninsula. 
 
5. (SBU) During the question and answer session, an audience 
member posed the question, "While a peace regime would of 
course be welcome, how could you handle a regional or global 
arms race?"  Chung asserted that he believed close and 
continued dialogue in this case would be the most effective 
method, and supported the use of either a four-party or 
six-party approach as a regional security system, even in the 
case of complete North Korean denuclearization. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Chung's 2025 Dream-Space Project is likely to be a 
well-publicized fixture in his campaign, but does not appear 
to be more than a publicity stunt to challenge his 
competition. Chung's real ambition is to become the president 
who spearheads unification on the Korean peninsula.  His 
other campaign promises, however, may sound too similar to 
those of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to an increasingly 
jaded public.  Thus, unable to distinguish himself from the 
current administration, nor able to get much help from them, 
Chung is likely to flounder in the polls and unlikely to beat 
out his competition in the liberal camp in securing a win on 
its ticket.  It is probable, however, that he could remain 
politically active by throwing his support behind the chosen 
center-left candidate, and in the case of a liberal victory 
could become an influential player on future North Korean 
policy.  END COMMENT. 
STANTON