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Viewing cable 07PHNOMPENH904, RUDDERLESS FUNCINPEC NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PHNOMPENH904 2007-07-03 10:24 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO2051
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0904/01 1841024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031024Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8666
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000904 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CB
SUBJECT: RUDDERLESS FUNCINPEC NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Jennifer Spande for reason 1.4 (b). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  FUNCINPEC's leaders appear to have no 
guiding vision for their party and are disjointedly 
discussing party independence, reunification with the Norodom 
Ranariddh Party (NRP), and a continued coalition with the 
ruling CPP.  At a June 28 lunch with the Ambassador and DCM, 
FUNCINPEC President Keo Puth Rasmey, Prince Sisowath 
Sirirath, and Minister of Education Kol Pheng found it easier 
to revel in the party's glory days and lampoon Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh than to put forward any definite strategy for the 
party's growth.  Instead, the leaders gave the impression of 
marking their time, that they are willing to cooperate with 
anyone, a strategy that is likely to ensure their survival 
for the moment but will continue to erode what little 
influence they may still have.  End Summary. 
 
FUNCINPEC's Survival:  Exceeding their Low Expectations 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2.  (SBU) FUNCINPEC had fared better since Ranariddh's 
departure than Rasmey had expected, the FUNCINPEC President 
said, admitting that at one point he feared the party would 
not survive.  He claimed that Ranariddh has been the real 
loser from the split, attracting fewer than half of the 
FUNCINPEC base.  (Comment:  This claim comes despite the NRP 
outperforming FUNCINPEC in the April 1, 2007 commune council 
election, and represents a significant lowering of 
aspirations from Rasmey's pre-election posture.  End 
Comment.)  Moreover, Rasmey rebutted speculation that 
Ranariddh's continued absence from Cambodia had hurt the 
NRP's performance in the election, instead asserting that it 
may have actually helped by generating sympathy for the 
embattled leader who faces an 18-month prison term at home. 
In the 2008 national elections, whenRanariddh has either 
returned from self-imposed exile or his absence is old news, 
the NRP will lose those sympathy votes and FUNCINPEC is 
likely to fare even better, Rasmey suggested. 
 
3.  (SBU) Rasmey said he was proud of FUNCINPEC's policy 
achievements over the years, but admitted that the party had 
failed to translate these accomplishments into voter support. 
 He noted that being in a coalition with the ruling CPP has 
put them in a difficult position, as FUNCINPEC can neither 
effectively claim credit for government successes (which the 
CPP publicizes as their own) nor criticize their partner 
party's shortcomings.  To address this dilemma, FUNCINPEC 
will strive to differentiate itself from the CPP without 
actually publicly opposing the party.  FUNCINPEC's 2008 
political platform will be based on the notion of 
"progressive monarchy", Rasmey said, explaining that this 
would mean support for democracy and human rights as well as 
maintaining the monarchy.  The party will concentrate its 
political efforts in 15 of Cambodia's most populous provinces. 
 
Rapprochement with Ranariddh Possible 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Rasmey and his FUNCINPEC colleagues appeared to 
have mixed feelings about Ranariddh, delighting in 
disparaging his self-importance and recounting unflattering 
stories about the prince while simultaneously admiring his 
charisma and emotional appeal to voters.  The FUNCINPEC 
leaders expressed confidence that their party could survive 
without Ranariddh and claimed unconvincingly that they, not 
the NRP, had momentum among royalist supporters.  Rasmey also 
said that lower-profile royals like Prince Thomico and 
Ranariddh advisors Ok Socheat and Noranarith Anandyath had 
indicated their willingness to re-join FUNCINPEC.  (Note: 
Prince Thomico publicly announced his move to FUNCINPEC on 
July 2.  End Note.) 
 
5.  (SBU) "Sometimes one plus one equals three or four," 
Rasmey observed, indicating that if the NRP and FUNCINPEC 
were to re-join forces, they might attract a new group of 
supporters disenchanted with other parties.  Rasmey gave 
contradictory messages about how eager the party was to 
reunite with Ranariddh, at one point claiming that he was "in 
no rush to talk to Ranariddh" but would be open to discussing 
reunification if Ranariddh approached them first. 
 
6.  (SBU) However, Rasmey later allowed that he had traveled 
to Kuala Lumpur to meet with the prince after the April 1 
elections, a trip for which he had secured the Prime 
Minister's blessing in advance.  Ultimately, Rasmey and 
Ranariddh failed to meet because they could not establish in 
advance the circumstances under which Ranariddh might return 
to the party.  Ranariddh insisted that FUNCINPEC must agree 
to three conditions:  convincing the government to drop its 
arrest warrant against him so that he could return to 
Cambodia, the reunited FUNCINPEC operating without internal 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000904  002 OF 002 
 
 
divisions, and reinstating Ranariddh as party leader.  Rasmey 
stated he had no problem with the first two conditions, but 
that the last condition was hard to accept as FUNCINPEC was 
not comfortable with Ranariddh in any role more visible or 
powerful than the "historical president" position they had 
offered him several months ago.  (Comment:  It seemed to us 
that their insistence that Ranariddh return to the symbolic 
but powerless post of "historical president" all but 
guarantees he will not return to the fold.  However, the 
FUNCINPEC representatives insisted Ranariddh had not 
discounted this possibility.  End Comment.) 
 
7.  (SBU) In a separate conversation with Poloff on July 3, 
Ky Lum Ang, FUNCINPEC Deputy Undersecretary for Political 
Affairs, said that the deal with Prince Thomico and Ok 
Socheat had been approved but that FUNCINPEC's Steering 
Committee was still reviewing what exact positions to offer 
the two NRP defectors.  She held out no hope that Thomico 
would be able to act as a bridge to Ranariddh and likened 
FUNCINPEC to a dysfunctional family after the parents had 
divorced.  Her personal assessment was that FUNCINPEC was now 
"falling" and that all of its accomplishments over the years 
will have been for nought unless a reunion with Ranariddh can 
be fashioned.  That, she said, depended on the proud 
Ranariddh coming back to the table in negotiations she 
labeled as "ongoing." 
 
FUNCINPEC Open to Coalition with CPP 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (SBU) When asked to comment on speculation that FUNCINPEC 
exists because the Prime Minister allows it to exist, Rasmey 
seemed to suggest that he realized his party could not 
function without some sort of tacit blessing from the PM. 
Rasmey confided that he was open to continuing FUNCINPEC's 
coalition with the CPP after the next election, noting that a 
reunited FUNCINPEC could be an effective coalition partner 
for the CPP.  Rasmey had in fact already discussed the 
possibility of a new coalition with Hun Sen, he said, and the 
Prime Minister reportedly said he would be willing to partner 
again with FUNCINPEC as long as the party did not exacerbate 
divisions within the CPP. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) FUNCINPEC's leaders articulate no clear sense of 
how to guide their party and seem to hope that FUNCINPEC's 
former glory and their willingness to form alliances with 
anyone will ensure their survival.  The party seems least 
interested in joining a grand coalition of opposition forces. 
 FUNCINPEC's purported platform of "progressive monarchy" 
fails to distinguish it from any of the other opposition 
parties, who all support greater political freedoms and 
maintaining the monarchy.  Moreover, in Cambodia's 
personality-driven politics, FUNCINPEC's bland leaders have 
nothing to offer voters.  Given the party's lack of 
ideological backbone and apparent willingness to partner with 
anyone who asks, the party is likely to survive for a while 
longer, fading slowly, but never gaining any real influence 
or power.  End Comment. 
MUSSOMELI