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Viewing cable 07PARIS2888, CODEL WEXLER STAFFERS DISCUSS EU-TURKEY AT MFA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARIS2888 2007-07-03 17:08 2011-04-15 16:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO2664
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #2888/01 1841708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031708Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8722
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0213
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN TU CY AR UNO
SUBJECT: CODEL WEXLER STAFFERS DISCUSS EU-TURKEY AT MFA 
 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a July 7 meeting with Representative 
Wexler's Staff Director, MFA officials offered a broad 
overview of French reasoning behind Sarkozy's opposition to 
Turkish EU membership; his proposal for an EU discussion 
before the end of the year on fixing the EU's final borders; 
his commitment nonetheless to allow accession negotiations 
with Turkey to proceed on those chapters not judged 
incompatible with a status short of membership; the 
calculation that Turkey has few options other than to remain 
linked to the West irrespective of whether it accedes to the 
EU; measures Turkey could take to improve its image among the 
French electorate, including on Cyprus; and Sarkozy's 
admittedly vague Mediterranean Union proposal.  There was a 
brief discussion of SAA process with Serbia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) In the framework of Representative Robert Wexler's 
(D-FL) July 2-3 meetings in Paris (septels), Staff Director 
Jonathan Katz and staffer Beverly Razon met July 3 with FM 
Kouchner cabinet advisor for EU affairs Jean-Louis Falconi, 
DAS-equivalent for EU external relations Caroline Ferrari, 
and DAS-equivalent for Southern Europe Marine de Carne to 
discuss the status of French views on Turkey-EU relations. 
POL Deputy and Poloff also attended. 
 
No to Turkish EU Membership 
--------------------------- 
3.  (C) Katz gave a brief presentation on the importance of 
Turkey for U.S. interests, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
noted Sarkozy's and Kouchner's apparently differing views on 
Turkish accession (see septels), and asked for a status 
report on Turkey's EU accession negotiations.  In response, 
Ferrari noted that Sarkozy had been elected with a clear 
mandate to refuse Turkish EU membership and reviewed French 
intentions to schedule a discussion within the EU, before the 
end of the year, on the EU's geographic limits.  She insisted 
that Turkey understood and respected Sarkozy's position on 
Turkish membership, and vice versa, adding that, 
paradoxically, French-Turkish relations were actually on the 
mend. 
 
Accession Negotiations May Continue 
----------------------------------- 
4.  (C) Ferrari stated that France did not intend to 
interrupt the accession negotiation process, as demonstrated 
by the recent EU decision to open two more chapters, and 
stated French willingness to open an additional two in the 
near future.  However, Ferrari also made clear that France 
would agree to open only those chapters judged to be 
compatible with a final status falling short of EU 
membership.  (NOTE:  Ferrari and Falconi were unable to 
specify precisely which 5 chapters of the 35 total France 
does not wish to open, despite their long familiarity with 
the subject matter.  Ferrari said deliberations were ongoing 
within the GOF.  Falconi speculated that the chapters would 
have to be those dealing with institutions, economic and 
monetary union (blocked in the last two weeks), financial 
contributions, and privileges and rights of members.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
Time to Debate EU Borders 
------------------------- 
5.  (C) Asked which other EU members supported the French 
approach on Turkey, Ferrari explained that the GOF plan was 
merely to initiate a debate on the EU's borders by the end of 
the year, not to bring it to conclusion.  Domestically, this 
was necessary as a means to demonstrate to French electors 
that their concerns about EU enlargement generally and Turkey 
more specifically, which were at the root of French rejection 
of the EU constitutional treaty, were being taken seriously. 
Sarkozy understood that this was a divisive question, but he 
also believed that an open debate would be beneficial to all. 
 France did not want a crisis with Turkey, and in fact 
Sarkozy strongly believed in the necessity of a strong 
EU-Turkey relationship: on political, economic, and strategic 
grounds.  It was just that he also believed it should take 
the form of something other than EU membership.  Katz 
cautioned that a sense of humiliation and being considered as 
"not good enough" for the EU risked alienating Turkey from 
Europe. 
 
Door Not Closed Irrevocably 
--------------------------- 
6.  (C) Falconi (who arrived late to the meeting) added that 
France viewed Turkey as "a special situation."  He insisted 
that Sarkozy's rejection of EU membership for Turkey was 
based not on fear of Turkey or Erdogan, but on broader 
questions of EU identity.  He said France understood that 
Turkey would have slightly different policies, with Carne 
adding that there was no "third way" for Turkey somewhere 
between the Middle East and the West.  Aligning itself with 
 
PARIS 00002888  002 OF 003 
 
 
Hamas or Syria or Iran was not an answer.  Echoing Ferrari's 
earlier remarks, Falconi said it was important never to 
forget that the EU was a political project; Turkish 
membership had the potential to call that into question, 
notwithstanding the promises that might have been made, and 
questions that were never asked, in the past.  He remarked 
that the EU had a history of proceeding by "non-decisions" 
rather than by "decisions," and Sarkozy was determined to put 
all questions on the table.  He insisted that the planned 
working group to discuss the EU's borders did not close the 
door to Turkish membership completely, since France was still 
willing to talk. 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
7.  (C) Katz asked if France had taken an active role in 
pushing the EU to fulfill its promises to northern Cyprus in 
the wake of Cypriot rejection of the UN plan, noting the 
importance for Turkey of easing the economic isolation of 
northern Cypriot community.  Ferrari commented that the best 
efforts of various EU presidencies had resulted in failure, 
although it was not clear who was to blame.  She indicated 
that France had attempted to encourage the Cypriot government 
to be flexible.  Carne defended the EU record, saying it had 
followed through on 2 of its 3 commitments.  She added that 
it was difficult for the Turks and Cypriots alike to show 
flexibility during election periods, but this could change if 
current Cypriot President Papadopoulos were not re-elected, 
as now appeared possible.  She also noted that northern 
Cypriot leader Talat had rejected additional assistance. 
Katz interjected that he wanted direct trade, not assistance. 
 (COMMENT:  At no time did Carne suggest that the EU was in 
the least responsible for creating the current impasse by 
allowing Cypriot membership in the absence of a UN solution. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
What Turkey Can Do 
------------------ 
8.  (C) Carne suggested that Turkish PM Erdogan consider 
reducing the Turkish troop presence on Cyprus, commenting 
that Europe's citizens had difficulty imagining how any 
European country could have troops on its territory.  She 
suggested that the Turks could also do more to improve their 
relations with Armenia and with the Kurds.  During a brief 
discussion of the status of U.S. and French parliamentary 
consideration of Armenian "genocide" resolutions, Carne 
suggested that Turkish actions to recognize its role and/or 
to improve relations with Armenia could eventually help 
change Turkey's image among the French people.  She gave a 
brief review of Turkish retaliatory measures (contracts and 
military overflight clearances) in response to the National 
Assembly's passage of legislation criminalizing the denial of 
the "genocide," concluding that relations were now returning 
to normal.  In a brief discussion of the Turkish elections, 
Carne indicated that the GOF favored the AKP party because it 
viewed Erdogan's government as perhaps more religious, but 
ultimately also "less dogmatic." 
 
Mediterranean Union 
------------------- 
9.  (C) Katz asked Sarkozy's proposal for a Mediterranean 
Union was intended primarily to deal with the Turkish 
question.  Falconi was insistent that Sarkozy's proposal for 
a Med Union was not intended as a means to avoid the Turkish 
question.  Sarkozy was a direct man who did not need devious 
machinations.  That said, France's thinking on the 
Mediterranean Union remained to be fleshed out.  The GOF was 
not sure whether it should be open to all countries on the 
Mediterranean or a subset; whether it might be advisable to 
begin with a subset and expand; or what its policy objectives 
should be.  Calling it "an enormous political project" but 
also a complicated one, he described the overarching goal of 
the Med Union as one of promoting more unity and common 
values and of overcoming the division of the Med into north 
and south. 
 
Serbia 
------ 
10.  (C) In a brief discussion of Serbia/Kosovo, Ferrari 
assured Katz that Serbia was on the path to EU membership; it 
was a question of "when" rather than "whether," unlike 
Turkey.  The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
process had been relaunched and could technically be 
completed in 2-3 months, but concluding would depend on 
whether Serbia decided to cooperate with the ICTY and hand 
over war criminals. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
 
PARIS 00002888  003 OF 003 
 
 
STAPLETON