Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07MOSCOW3379, RUSSIAN LAB MOVES AHEAD TO BECOME REGIONAL AND WHO FLU

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW3379.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW3379 2007-07-11 02:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO8752
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3379/01 1920252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110252Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1965
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 4920
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0115
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0788
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4257
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1513
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0397
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0270
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHEFAFM/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//MA-1//
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//CT//
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G/AIG 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/RUS, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC 
USDA FOR OSEC/DAN CAINE, FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE, 
-  WRIGHT, LEIER, ROSENBLUM; OCRA/THOMAS, 
-  FLEMINGS; OA/PATRICK CLERKIN 
HHS FOR SAWYER, STEIGER 
FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS 
SECDEF FOR OSD 
VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS 
- APHIS/FERNANDEZ 
USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR 
GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE 
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG 
CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU KSTH KPAO SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LAB MOVES AHEAD TO BECOME REGIONAL AND WHO FLU 
CENTER 
 
REFS:  A. 06 Moscow 12876 (G8 Infectious Diseases) 
        B. Moscow 1318 (Russian AI Preparedness) 
        C. 06 Moscow 10955 (Human AI Vaccine) 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Russia pledged to transform the Vector State 
Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology near Novosibirsk into 
a regional influenza center and ultimately a WHO Collaborating 
Center for avian influenza as part of its 2006 G8 Presidential focus 
on infectious diseases.  Although Vector has formally applied to 
become a WHO reference laboratory and collaborating center and has 
hosted a WHO assessment team, the process could take as long as two 
years to complete.  Vector has been actively developing its 
diagnostic and surveillance capacity in the meantime, and training 
flu specialists from the CIS and Central Asia.  The question of how 
willingly Vector will share avian influenza samples with institutes 
outside Russia is still unresolved.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHO Begins Assessing Vector as an AI Center 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During the Soviet era, Vector was part of Biopreparat, 
which produced biological compounds for both civilian and military 
applications.  Although Russia has consistently denied that the 
Soviet Union had an offensive biological weapons program, it is 
widely believed that Vector was specifically established in the 
1970s to develop viral agents for military uses. In 2004, 
jurisdiction over Vector was transferred to the Health and Social 
Development Ministry, and it is now a leading virology and biotech 
research center.  Vector was involved in virus isolation and 
characterization and AI surveillance during a 2005 AI outbreak which 
occurred in the Novosibirsk region (a crossroads for migratory 
birds). 
 
3. (SBU) As pledged during its 2006 G8 Presidency (Ref A), Russia is 
spending $45 million to establish Vector as a regional collaborating 
center for Avian Influenza and to equip a network of 26 other labs. 
Vector falls under the jurisdiction of Gennadiy Onishchenko, 
Russia's Chief Medical Officer and the head of the Federal Service 
for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being 
(Rospotrebnadzor).  Media savvy and probably Russia's most vocal and 
influential public health figure, Onishchenko effectively used 
Russia's G8 presidency to garner additional funding for Vector to 
conduct research on both HIV/AIDS and AI (Ref A). 
 
4. (SBU) Vector submitted an application to the WHO to become a 
collaborating center for avian influenza in 2006, and a WHO 
assessment team visited the institute in April 2007.  The WHO team 
found that Vector had a strong background in AI virus isolation and 
research, but no expertise in handling human cases of AI or 
conducting human influenza surveillance.  There is currently no 
laboratory for human influenza at Vector, and Vector is in the 
process of remodeling one of its Biosafety Level Three facilities to 
turn it into the AI lab.  The WHO team concluded that Vector could 
eventually become a WHO collaborating center for AI research, but 
that this process could take as long as two years.  Another WHO 
inspection team will visit Vector within that period to make a final 
 
MOSCOW 00003379  002 OF 003 
 
 
designation. 
 
Vector Takes Regional Lead on AI Conferences and Training 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5. (SBU) Vector has begun a robust program to enhance the AI skills 
of its own experts, and to train other specialists from CIS 
countries and Central Asia.  Four leading Russian influenza experts 
visited the WHO collaborating Center at CDC Atlanta in January 2007, 
and six flu scientists will visit the WHO Collaborating Center in 
London this month.  Vector has conducted training sessions for 
specialists from Mongolia and Kazakhstan, and some 157 experts from 
Russian regional offices of Rospotrebnadzor will be trained at 
Vector in the coming months.  Vector's training programs have 
covered the issues of AI biosafety precautions and diagnostic 
practices. 
 
6. (SBU) Rospotrebnadzor and Vector have also been working to 
establish formal cooperative agreements on AI with other CIS 
countries.  In addition to framework bilateral agreements on AI 
cooperation between Rospotrebnadzor and several of the CIS 
countries' health ministries, Vector itself has recently inked 
collaboration agreements with influenza institutes in Ukraine, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan on material and information 
exchange, joint expeditions and field epidemiology work, and joint 
training.  Rospotrebnadzor and Vector are also working to sign 
similar agreements with flu centers in the other CIS countries. 
 
7. (SBU) Vector hosted a two-day Conference on Joint AI Prevention 
for senior health officials from CIS countries in November 2006. 
All of the CIS countries except Georgia attended and adopted a joint 
action plan on pandemic preparedness for 2006-2009.  The delegates 
endorsed establishing Vector as a WHO influenza collaborating 
center, noting that it would increase efficiency and reduce the cost 
of regional anti-epidemic activities.  Vector hosted a second 
conference in May 2007 for working-level heads of CIS diagnostic 
labs which over 50 experts attended. 
 
Full Sample Sharing Still a Touchy Question 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Sharing of flu virus samples with the outside world remains 
a thorny issue for Vector in particular and for Russia in general. 
While Russia accepts samples from abroad and even developed a human 
AI vaccine at the Research Institute of Influenza (RII) in St. 
Petersburg using samples from the WHO Collaborating Center in Great 
Britain (Ref C), it is less eager to share samples from Russia 
outside its borders.  For routine human influenza cases, Russia has 
historically exchanged information and provided virus samples to the 
CDC and other WHO Collaborating Centers.  For AI samples, Vector 
recently provided the CDC with some DNA material and sera from 
humans who had contact with sick birds during the 2005 AI outbreak 
in the Novosibirsk region.  Vector is also now considering whether 
to share virus isolates with St. Jude Children's Research Hospital 
in Memphis, Tennessee, but this would require special government 
permission.  In 2006, Russia dropped its legal objections to sharing 
AI samples, but we are not aware of any cases in which AI samples 
have actually been shared outside of Russia since then.  Health 
 
MOSCOW 00003379  003 OF 003 
 
 
officials had maintained from 2004-2006 that Russian law absolutely 
prohibited the sharing of AI samples, because they were included in 
a list of dangerous pathogens that cannot be exported. 
 
Vector's Relations With Other Russian Institutes 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9. (SBU) The spending of lavish amounts of money (by Russian 
standards) on Vector's AI capacity has created tensions with the 
Research Institute of Influenza (RII) in St. Petersburg, one of 
Russia's other two existing WHO national influenza centers.  RII 
Director Oleg Kiselyov was offended and took umbrage with 
Onishchenko's initial desire to embrace all influenza research at 
Vector, not just AI, which would have clearly usurped the St. 
Petersburg Institute's traditional role as Russia's leading human 
influenza center.  This has spoiled somewhat the relationship 
between the two institutes. 
 
10. (SBU) Vector also has a spotty reputation for cooperating with 
Russia's premier veterinary diagnostic and testing lab, the Federal 
Center for Animal Health (ARRIAH) in Vladimir.  Although ARRIAH is 
supposed to take the lead role in AI outbreaks among birds, Vector 
has in some cases conducted preliminary testing of specimens from 
birds and then not shared those samples with ARRIAH. 
 
11. (SBU) COMMENT: There is no doubt that Chief Medical Officer 
Onishchenko has the political backing and sufficient funding to see 
the WHO collaborating project through over the next two years at 
Vector.  However, Vector, Rospotrebnadzor, and the Health and Social 
Development Ministry, will ultimately have to overcome the secretive 
culture at Vector and the historical reluctance to share virus 
samples with the outside world. 
 
BURNS