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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1167, DARFUR - USAID AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1167 2007-07-26 11:09 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2976
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1167/01 2071109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261109Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8006
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - USAID AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001167  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary:  Current USAID emergency agriculture interventions in 
Darfur have successfully improved the livelihoods and food security 
of small farming and agro-pastoralist households in many rural 
areas.  However, ongoing conflict and insecurity make sustained 
agriculture and livestock interventions unfeasible.  Barring a 
dramatic improvement in the security environment, the need for 
emergency agricultural inputs is not likely to decrease in the near 
future.  As a result, programs that increase access to water, seeds, 
and farming tools, in addition to animal vaccination campaigns, are 
recommended to support rural communities throughout Darfur.  End 
summary. 
 
---------------- 
CURRENT PROGRAMS 
---------------- 
 
2.  From June 4 to 14, a USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) Agriculture and Food Security Advisor 
traveled to Nyala, El Geneina, and El Fasher to meet with current 
partners, assess the status of ongoing agricultural interventions, 
and provide strategic input regarding agriculture and livestock 
interventions for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. 
 
3. Current USAID agriculture programs in the region provide seeds 
and tools to small farming and agro-pastoralist households through 
direct distributions or through community seed fairs.  Direct 
distributions bring in seeds from outside an area to address a lack 
of seed availability, whereas seed fairs boost access to locally 
available seed by providing potential buyers with vouchers for the 
seeds. 
 
4. USAID-funded seed fairs have been particularly successful in 
South Darfur this planting season, owing to the collaboration of 
several organizations.  Three USAID partners hired a technical 
consultant with strong expertise in preparing and hosting seed 
fairs.  Together the relief agencies held seven seed fairs targeting 
2,750 households across South Darfur.  In addition to facilitating 
access to seeds and tools for local farmers, by sourcing seeds 
locally the fairs also inject income into rural economies and help 
re-establish traditional market activities. 
 
5. Direct seed distributions were delayed following the late arrival 
of some seeds shipments by the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization.  However, the seeds arrived in mid-June, in time for 
planting before the start of the rainy season.  Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) officials agreed that seed availability is 
unlikely to be a serious problem for most farmers this year.  Based 
on the strong availability of seeds this season, the most important 
determinants of productivity are likely to be the distribution and 
duration of rains, and security at time of harvest. 
 
---------------------------- 
CHALLENGES AND ONGOING NEEDS 
---------------------------- 
 
6. Identifying target beneficiaries for agriculture programs is 
challenging, particularly since insecurity and limited access 
restrict monitoring efforts in many of the rural areas receiving 
assistance.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rely on community 
leaders and committees to identify program recipients, allowing 
local political dynamics and corruption to negatively affect 
targeting.  Where possible, NGO staff are involved in targeting, but 
without improved access this issue is likely to persist. 
 
7. Animal vaccinations and corresponding reliable cold-chain storage 
and transportation networks are needed, particularly in North 
Darfur.  Access to water remains a critical need in all regions. 
MOA staff also noted the need for emergency interventions to take 
into account environmental impacts of various approaches.  For 
example, most seeds provided through direct distributions are 
intended for farming in sandy soil, which is less productive and 
less environmentally sound than clay soil.  MOA officials also noted 
that population displacement and related shelter programs contribute 
to deforestation and use local resources at a rapid rate.  A 
USAID/OFDA agriculture advisor notes that farmers do not currently 
have the tools or knowledge to cultivate in clay soil. 
 
8. Many villages across Darfur may be ready for more 
development-oriented agriculture programs, but the ongoing conflict 
and resulting insecurity preclude such programs.  Providing inputs 
beyond seeds and tools is a difficult venture for NGOs, who face 
 
KHARTOUM 00001167  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
targeted attacks and carjackings at an increasing rate.  In 
addition, more substantial programs may make villages more 
vulnerable to attacks.  Many NGOs are discussing establishing seed 
banks, but these would likely be an even greater target than fields 
at harvest time.  Agricultural training programs are difficult to 
provide with any regularity, with certain areas off-limits to NGO 
staff and others dangerous to government MOA staff. 
 
--------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
9. Security permitting, provision of agricultural inputs should 
continue, as needs are likely to persist in many regions.  A harvest 
compromised by insecurity or lack of sufficient rain, or the arrival 
of returnees without assets, would lead to continued need for seed 
and tool inputs. 
 
10. Interventions to address access to agriculture inputs, including 
cash-for-work, and seed fair or voucher programs, may be more 
suitable than interventions that address availability, such as 
direct distributions.  Despite security problems confronting NGO 
staff and vehicles, many rural villages are fairly secure, with 
farmers moving regularly to and from markets.  Farmers stated a 
preference to trade seeds locally in order to obtain the desired 
varieties, indicating that access is more of an issue than 
availability in many areas. 
 
11. Collaboration should be encouraged among NGOs engaged in 
agriculture programs, particularly given the potential for 
interventions in this sector to harm the environment and lead to 
conflict between various stakeholders.  The level of agriculture and 
livestock expertise and on-the-ground experience varies greatly 
among NGOs in Darfur.  The NGO consortium in South Darfur can serve 
as a positive example for additional cooperation to benefit program 
recipients. 
 
12. Ongoing monitoring of the impacts of seed distributions on food 
security in the region would be instrumental in planning for future 
programming.  It will be particularly important to follow up on the 
seed varieties planted by farmers, availability of preferred 
varieties in local markets, and harvest success related to both 
rainfall and security. 
 
13. Livestock projects should focus mainly on vaccinations, which 
are a standard good practice in any emergency situation. At this 
time, support for community animal health workers (CAHWs) is not 
sustainable due to insecurity.  While CAHWs may be trained and used 
for vaccination campaigns, it would be more time- and cost-efficient 
to delay these programs until the region achieves greater stability. 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ