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Viewing cable 07KAMPALA1171, SLM-Abdelshafi's Faith in UN/AU Roadmap Undermined

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KAMPALA1171 2007-07-17 03:26 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kampala
VZCZCXRO4283
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1171 1980326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170326Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9085
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0611
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KAMPALA 001171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UG SU
 
SUBJECT: SLM-Abdelshafi's Faith in UN/AU Roadmap Undermined 
 
REF: Khartoum 01092 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Members of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) 
Abdelshafi faction were disappointed in the failure of the Center 
for Humanitarian Dialogue meeting to take place.  After being 
informed by UN/AU officials that the CHD meeting was off, faction 
members concluded that the UN/AU may have sabotaged it and/or 
deliberately failed to support what they viewed as a U.S. 
initiative.  The UN/AU was vague in its explanation of where the 
peace process was headed and short on details of its planned meeting 
in Arusha on July 23.  As a result, Abdelshafi's confidence in the 
prospects for UN/AU-led negotiations on Darfur is extremely low at 
this point.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On July 12, Pekka Haavisto, the Senior Advisor to UN Envoy 
Jan Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, the Head of the African Union's Darfur 
Peace Implementation office, met with Ahmed Abdelshafi and faction 
members in Kampala.  During the meeting, Haavisto informed them that 
the CHD meeting planned for Mombasa was off.  He cited two factors: 
the "disappearance" of the Chadian official needed to give 
permission for the chartered plane to pick up rebel commanders and 
Kenyan "cold feet" over the purpose of the gathering.  As a result, 
Haavisto continued, the UN/AU would "take over" the CHD initiative 
and hold a meeting of rebel leaders in Arusha, Tanzania on July 23. 
The invitees would be Abdullah Yeyia, Ahmed Abdelshafi, Sharif 
Harir, Khalil Ibrahim, Khamis Abdullah, and Abdelwahid El-Nur.  The 
sole purpose of the meeting, according to Haavisto, would be to 
discuss the venue of the Darfur negotiations.  Abdelshafi suspects 
that the meeting would be used to make statements about forging 
common rebel positions.  (Note: Per reftel, Eliasson admitted during 
a July 12 meeting with Special Envoy Natsios that the UN/AU hoped 
the meeting would result in a common set of rebel positions.  End 
Note.) 
 
3.  (SBU) Abdelshafi was surprised and puzzled that the UN/AU 
announced the scuttling of the CHD initiative and then volunteered 
to take it over.  Abakar Abuelbashar, who led the SLM's 
wealth-sharing negotiations at Abuja, asked the UN/AU officials how 
negotiations could take place without any discussions among the 
various SLM factions on a common position.  Haavisto and Ibok told 
them that the convergence phase of the UN/AU roadmap was over and 
the parties were now in "pre-negotiations".  Abdelshafi and other 
faction members were astonished that no internal meeting of the SLM 
was on the roadmap, according to Abuelbashar.  Haavisto said that 
the Darfur negotiations would begin on August 25.  Abdelshafi asked 
about the venue.  Haavisto asked him for suggestions.  Abdelshafi 
offered Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, or Namibia.  Haavisto encouraged 
them to write letters to those governments with a request to host. 
(Note: We have heard the UN/AU is planning to hold the talks in 
Arusha.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  Nouri Abdullah, an outspoken and extreme member of the 
faction, told P/E Chief and CHD that to the rebels, it "looked like 
the UN/AU completely and deliberately undermined the Americans." 
Abdelshafi also told P/E Chief that he was very concerned about the 
future direction of negotiations for the very same reason.  He has 
relied heavily on U.S. advice to participate in the CHD dialogue and 
expressed his concern that the U.S. was being cut out of the 
process.  During the UN/AU meeting, Ibok tried to reassure 
Abdelshafi by appealing to his ego and telling him that he was the 
person to provide the Fur the leadership it needed.  The endorsement 
was flattering, according to other faction members, but did not give 
Abdelshafi any clear sense of where a process without SLM unity 
could go.  As far as Abdelshafi was concerned, the UN/AU plan was 
headed the same direction as the Abuja talks, relying on individuals 
to deliver without having a mandate from their constituencies. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
5.  (SBU) Abdelshafi had worked hard to prepare for the CHD 
dialogue, including clarifying his vision and concrete steps SLM 
needs to take in the future.  He had looked forward to the Mombasa 
meeting as an opportunity to meet with other SLM leaders without the 
interference of outside actors.  He and others in his faction 
believe that without this basic foundation, negotiations are doomed, 
a prediction that is shared by other SLM field commanders in contact 
with various U.S. officials in the region.  Abdelshafi's suspicion 
that the UN/AU deliberately sabotaged the CHD meeting or at a 
minimum, did not support it, has seriously undermined his already 
low opinion of UN/AU leadership.  These changes have confused the 
Kampala-based rebels as to whether or not the UN/AU listens to U.S. 
advice and/or understands the underlying dynamics of the rebel 
movements.  The leaders of several faction indicate that they view 
the USG as the guarantor of an eventual peace agreement and consider 
a U.S. role in the process as vital. 
BROWNING