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Viewing cable 07KABUL2299, PAG DISCUSSES SCHOOL SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL2299 2007-07-17 13:37 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4851
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2299/01 1981337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171337Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9165
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PTER EAID NATO AF
SUBJECT: PAG DISCUSSES SCHOOL SECURITY 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On July 12 the Policy Action Group (PAG) 
chaired by NSA Rassoul discussed school security.  Education 
Minister Atmar reported that there had been 20 attacks 
against schools in the previous week.  Education Minister 
Atmar assessed that the Taliban have shifted their focus from 
destroying school buildings to attacking students and 
teachers.  Atmar said that the GoA had decided that a "new 
paradigm" for school security needed to be developed.  He 
said there also was a need to develop a new approach on 
strategic communications to address the issue, but cautioned 
that a balance would need to be struck in the messaging, as 
it would be important to avoid creating a sense of panic 
among students and their parents.  On July 16, A/DCM attended 
a meeting on school security chaired by Atmar and attended by 
relevant Afghan interagency officials, as well as 
international community representatives.  Atmar advocated 
developing plans to provide security at 1,000 schools in the 
18 most vulnerable provinces.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On July 12 the regular Policy Action Group (PAG) 
chaired by NSA Rassoul discussed school security (one of a 
number of topics).  Education Minister Atmar reported that 
there had been 20 attacks against schools in the previous 
week.  Ten students and teachers had been killed in those 
attacks, and seven wounded; two schools were burned.  Atmar 
assessed that the attacks on the students and teachers 
indicated a recent trend in which the Taliban have shifted 
their focus from destroying school buildings to attacking the 
people studying and working there.  He concluded that the 
Taliban were frustrated by their inability to challenge 
ISAF/OEF forces effectively, and thus were targeting schools, 
students, and teachers with the objective of creating 
resentment in the Afghan population against the GoA for not 
being able to provide security. 
 
3. (SBU) Atmar said that the Office of the National Security 
Council (ONSC) had discussed the matter and decided that a 
"new paradigm" for school security needed to be developed. 
To that end, the ONSC was considering "community policing" or 
an extension of the duties of Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police (ANAP).  President Karzai had instructed the ONSC to 
discuss the matter further with the international community. 
Atmar explained that there seemed to be more support for some 
kind of local community-based security rather than attempting 
to use the ANAP.  He noted that the Ministry of Education had 
met with the 34 MOI liaison officers to the provinces, 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) representatives from 
each of the provinces, and UNAMA to discuss the matter.  The 
next step would be convening a technical team to launch a 
consultative process with provincial leaders.  Atmar 
requested the MOI to instruct governors to participate in the 
consultative process, and asked that an ONSC representative 
be assigned to participate in the meetings. 
 
4. (SBU) Ambassador Wood emphasized the USG's strong support 
for increasing school security, and noted the importance of 
getting the word out about such Taliban barbarity, to build 
support at the provincial level, where some governors might 
assume that such attacks are only a local problem.  NEA 
Naderi concurred, arguing for the need to "create a sense of 
outrage" among the Afghan population.  Atmar noted that 
President Karzai had spoken out on the issue frequently, but 
acknowledged disappointment in the performance of GoA 
mullahs, who "were not proactive enough" in condemning such 
attacks.  He said the mullahs felt vulnerable and feared they 
would be targeted if they speak out.  Atmar said there was a 
need to develop a new approach on strategic communications to 
address the issue, adding that he would welcome technical and 
funding assistance from the international community in 
developing a new approach.  He cautioned, however, that a 
balance would need to be struck in the messaging, as it would 
be important to avoid creating a sense of panic among 
students and their parents -- "there is a limit to how much 
risk the parents can accept" in sending their children to 
school.  (Note:  At its weekly meeting on July 15, the PAG's 
Strategic Communications Working Group discussed at some 
length the need for a new strategic communications approach 
 
KABUL 00002299  002 OF 002 
 
 
to this issue and agreed to work with the secretariat staff 
at the National Communications Coordination Center to develop 
a plan for PAG approval.  End Note) 
 
5. (SBU) On July 16, A/DCM participated in a meeting on 
school security chaired by Atmar and attended by relevant 
Afghan interagency officials, as well as international 
community representatives.  Atmar advocated developing plans 
to provide security at 1,000 schools in the 18 most 
vulnerable provinces.  During the discussion, a general 
consensus emerged in favor of a standing up local school 
guard personnel, rather than attempting to employ the ANAP 
for this specific purpose.  A technical group was established 
to develop a detailed proposal, including structures and 
necessary resources.  While most participants in the 
discussion advocated that the school guards should not be 
under the MOI chain-of-command, Atmar expressed some 
reservations about having them under the Ministry of 
Education, as that could possibly lead to misunderstanding 
about his ministry's motives. 
WOOD