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Viewing cable 07KABUL2244, PRT GHAZNI: SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL2244 2007-07-12 13:14 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0616
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2244/01 1931314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121314Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9093
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002244 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT GHAZNI: SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ghazni province is split between 
the "have's" (Hazara districts in the north/west) and 
the "have-not's" (Pashtun districts in the 
south/east). In April 2007 a serious insurgent threat 
in the Pashtun districts brought reconstruction to a 
standstill in both areas, heightening anxieties that 
progress in governance, education and health care 
would similarly grind to a halt.  Governor Patan, 
well-intentioned and pro-American, often seems 
overwhelmed by the challenge of governing such a 
diverse province.  He is reluctant to travel except in 
the company of the PRT, leading to a widespread belief 
that he is out-of-touch with the local population. 
Accusations of corruption in the provincial government 
are troubling and damaging.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Provincial Overview 
------------------- 
 
2.  (U) There are 18 districts plus the city of Ghazni 
in the province.  The population is estimated at 1.7 
million people, with 250,000 in Ghazni city.  The Ring 
Road bisects the province.  West of the Ring Road is 
predominantly Hazara and water-rich; east of the Ring 
Road is ethnically Pashtun and arid.  The Hazara 
districts of Jaghuri and Kwaja Omari are generally 
more peaceful and prosperous, with active district 
administrators and large school enrollments (boys and 
girls).  The Pashtun districts of Andar, Giro, 
Qarabagh, Moqur, Gelan and Ab Band are volatile, with 
absentee administrators, subsistence farmers and few 
children (and no girls) in school. 
 
Security Situation 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Following the reported capture of Giro 
district by the Taliban in April 2007 and in order to 
address a potent insurgent threat across the Pashtun 
districts of Ghazni, the ANA (supported by the ANP and 
ISAF) planned and executed Operation MAIWAND - the 
first ANA-led military operation in the country.  This 
operation, which began June 2 and was centered on 
Andar district, was designed to separate the 
insurgents from the local population, regain control 
of Highway 1, and create space for GOA officials to 
offer an alternative to the Taliban.  Throughout the 
month of June, there was little direct contact between 
the ANA/ANP/ISAF coalition and the insurgents, 
although there was a sharp increase in rocket attacks 
and IEDs.  Several key Taliban commanders were 
captured, including the man believed responsible for 
beheading the district administrator of Giro in April. 
While Andar will now have a chance to experience GOA 
assistance, it is widely believed that the insurgents 
have simply moved to neighboring districts (Giro, 
Waghez, Ab Band and Nawa)until the ANA and the ANP 
have given up.  An important piece of Operation 
MAIWAND, therefore, is the establishment of a 
reinforced ANA and ANP presence in Ghazni. 
 
4. (SBU) The insurgent threat was able to grow in 
Ghazni as a result of a lack of GOA presence in key 
districts, and especially by the lack of effective 
police.  The most urgent and most crucial requirement 
to improving security in Ghazni is an honest, 
effective police force.  The Chief of Police gets low 
marks from ISAF.  Ghazni has had few problems 
recruiting for the auxiliary police (of the 980 
authorized, approximately 700 have been trained), but 
quality has been an issue, as has equipment.  The 
Chief of Police has allegedly taken away weapons (AKs) 
meant for the ANAP and vehicles are "missing" from the 
inventory.  The ANP office in charge of recruiting 
recently reported multiple cases of men re-enrolling 
in the ANAP (having either sold or stockpiled the 
weapon from the first class they attended).  ANP/ANAP 
escorts provided to the PRT for trips outside the city 
 
KABUL 00002244  002 OF 003 
 
 
regularly show up at the PRT for the mission without 
ammo, without food and without enough diesel to get to 
the destination and back. 
 
Political Situation 
------------------- 
5. (SBU) Governor Patan, while well-intentioned and 
pro-American, has a hard time setting priorities and 
plans.  He has surrounded himself with "advisors" who 
have no official status in the province, and for the 
most part, are not natives of Ghazni.  Patan cannot 
resist dabbling in security matters (in part because 
he distrusts the Chief of Police, and in part because 
he likes to portray himself as a militant opponent of 
the Taliban).  Patan also cannot resist introducing 
potential contractors to the PRT -- whom we later 
learn are close relatives.  This practice calls into 
question Patan's much-touted incorruptibility. 
 
6. (SBU) Line directors for the various ministries are 
rarely included in the Governor's deliberations (the 
Director of Education - a superior performer - is a 
notable exception).  The Director of Agriculture is 
under investigation by the Attorney General for 
pocketing 200,000 USD of the PRT's money.  Patan's 
unofficial inner circle and the exclusion of ministry 
representatives in the province from decision-making 
have isolated Patan from the people he claims to 
govern. 
 
7. (SBU) At the district level, Ghazni employs (at 
most) four effective district administrators. For the 
rest of the province (14 districts), administrators 
are either absent altogether (Ab Band and Nawa) or 
corrupt (Andar and Qarabagh).  A recent reshuffling of 
district administrators in several Pashtun districts 
may lead to some improvements. 
 
8. (SBU) Governor Patan, who loudly promotes his love 
of "the people" and his willingness to confront 
things, will only travel outside Ghazni City with 
ISAF, and he prefers to travel by helicopter. 
Provincial Council members, for the most part, do not 
leave the capital city and are largely unknown in 
their districts.  The same is true of line directors. 
The PRT has made a point of inviting members of the 
provincial government to travel with them and to urge 
them to travel on their own to keep in touch with the 
districts. This remains the exception rather than the 
rule. 
 
Economic Situation 
------------------ 
9. (SBU) Across Ghazni, the demands for infrastructure 
development are consistent - water and roads.  In 
terms of capacity building, Ghazni residents want 
teachers and doctors. 
 
10. (SBU) The Provincial Development Council (PDC) 
meets monthly, but has not developed a Provincial 
Development Plan (PDP) and, despite the PRT's best 
efforts, is not focused on the upcoming ANDS sub- 
national consultations (scheduled in Ghazni for the 
last two weeks of July).  The provincial director for 
MRRD is believed to be corrupt, and is at best 
incompetent.  He could not tell the PRT how many 
projects MRRD was running or the dollar amount of 
funds committed last year.  His own list of demands 
starts with a new office building for himself, and 
fails to mention the urgently needed refurbishment of 
the two largest irrigation canals in the province. 
 
Cultural/Societal Trends 
------------------------ 
11. (SBU) Ghazni residents of the more peaceful 
districts list education and health care as 
priorities.  While schools are open in many parts of 
Ghazni, there is often no money to pay the teachers, 
 
KABUL 00002244  003 OF 003 
 
 
no books and no desks.  In some districts (such as 
Kwaja Omari) locals donate land for tent schools and 
supplement teachers' pay.  Whereas in Kwaja Omari the 
teachers also provide some adult literacy classes, in 
the Pashtun district of Nawa (at the opposite end of 
the province in every respect), no one is in school 
because there are no teachers at all. In the Hazara 
areas, most girls attend school, up to and including 
high school.  In Pashtun areas, security concerns are 
cited as the reason for keeping girls out of school, 
but in fact, the priority in these areas is to educate 
only the boys. 
 
12.  (SBU) The Director for the Ministry of Health has 
estimated that at least half of the men in Ghazni 
suffer from anxiety and half of the women from 
depression.  Children, widely, suffer from 
malnutrition, something the Health Ministry and the 
PRT are working actively to address.  Most districts 
have clinics; the principal problem appears to be the 
lack of staff, especially female doctors, and medical 
supplies. 
WOOD