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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI553, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU COMMISSIONER OLLI REHN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI553 2007-07-20 10:37 2011-05-20 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXRO8092
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0553/01 2011037
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201037Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3594
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0118
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0033
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4796
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4726
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0327
RUEHMO/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 0143
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0069
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0033
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN TU FI YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU COMMISSIONER OLLI REHN 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL CHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary: EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn 
told Ambassador Ware that French President Sarkozy's 
opposition will complicate Turkey's EU accession bid, but 
does not necessarily need to derail it if the EU manages 
the process carefully.  Rehn was pessimistic about 
Kosovo, and very disappointed in the Serb leadership's 
failure to realize that Russia's cynical handling of the 
UNSCR process is directly contrary to Serbia's long term 
interests.  He predicted that the US and each EU member 
state will ultimately be forced to make a decision about 
unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's independence.  EU 
unanimity on recognition will not be possible, but 
recognition "by the US and 15-20 member states" will be 
necessary in order to demonstrate to Russia that it 
cannot "dictate Europe's security policy."  Rehn expressed 
appreciation for US efforts to promote EU unity on Kosovo, 
noting that our leverage with Romania could be useful. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Ambassador Ware and PolChief met with EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn July 19 on the 
margins of the "Finland Arena," a gathering of Finnish 
political leaders that takes place annually on the 
margins of the world famous Pori Jazz Festival. 
 
MANAGING TURKEY. . .AND MANAGING SARKOZY 
---------------------------------------- 
3. (C) Rehn suggested that Turkey's July 22 election 
could have an "unpredictable" effect on Turkey's troubled 
EU accession process.  The AKP remains the best bet for 
keeping reforms on track, and one-party governments -- as 
opposed to coalitions -- tend to have the best record, 
both on reform and in managing domestic expectations. 
One troubling aspect, he added, is that the rapidly growing 
youth vote in Turkey is divided, and there are no clear 
leaders emerging. 
 
4. (C) Turning to the EU's role, Rehn emphasized that the 
Council-approved policies currently in place regarding 
Turkey's accession process will not change -- despite 
clear messages from President Sarkozy suggesting 
otherwise.  That said, Sarkozy promised the French 
electorate he would seek to slow or even halt Turkey's 
bid, and "one should not underestimate his determination" 
to deliver on them.  Rehn outlined one possible solution: 
The EU may ultimately need to draft new conclusions that 
allow Sarkozy to say to the French public, "I've 
introduced 'privileged partnership' to the EU 
discussion."  At the same time, those conclusion's "fine 
print" would have to include language that allows the 
Turks to say that if they stay on track, they still have 
some control over their long term EU prospects.  "It's 
not very elegant," Rehn smiled, "but that's how the EU 
works." 
 
KOSOVO: RUSSIA'S GAME IS SIMPLE 
------------------------------- 
5. (C) Turning to the Balkans, Rehn reluctantly predicted 
that Moscow, will probably never allow a UNSCR mandating 
Kosovo's independence to move forward.  "Russia's UN 
strategy is very simple," he explained.  "If Kosovo is 
resolved, Serbia is relieved of the burden of relying on 
Russia and thus can immediately put itself on the faster 
road to the EU."  Russia is determined not to lose its 
client relationship with Serbia, and will veto a Kosovo 
UNSCR on that basis alone.  Russia's stance on Kosovo has 
everything to do with Russia's own interests, nothing 
really to do with Kosovo, and -- perhaps worst of all -- 
runs directly counter to Serbia's long-term interests, 
Rehn continued.  Unfortunately, most of the Serb 
leadership, including the Foreign and Prime ministers, 
cannot or will not grasp this reality, and 
President Tadic -- who does understand it -- "doesn't 
have the guts or the tools" to move Serbia away from 
Russia and toward the West. 
 
6. (C) For now, EU unity behind Ahtisaari's proposals has 
been shaken a bit, but remains intact.  However, he 
warned, if a UNSCR on Kosovo fails to emerge following a 
brief period of additional negotiations, all bets on EU 
unity are off.  He singled out Romania as being 
 
HELSINKI 00000553  002 OF 002 
 
 
particularly susceptible to Russia's shop-worn arguments 
about setting an international precedent on ethnic 
minorities, and suggested that the US could play a helpful 
role in convincing Bucharest otherwise.  Rehn also suggested 
that while Chancellor Merkel remained committed, the German 
Parliament might move in a different direction absent a UNSCR. 
 
UNILATERAL RECOGNITION 
---------------------- 
7. (C) In the medium term, Rehn said that the US and the 
EU still need to try to show the Serbs that Russia is not 
acting in their country's best interests.  However, in 
the long term, the US and the 27 EU MS will need to face 
the reality of unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's 
independence.  If, after four months, Moscow remains 
obstructionist, "we have to be prepared to say to Russia 
that it cannot dictate Europe's security policy." 
Unanimity among the 27 will not be possible, Rehn added, 
but we can still send a clear message to Russia if "the 
US and 15 to 20 member states" unilaterally recognize 
Kosovo.  EU unanimity will, however, again be crucial on 
the issue of a post-independence ESDP mission for Kosovo, 
because "a coalition of the willing with no full EU 
mandate would be a disaster," Rehn said. 
WARE