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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI530, GOF PREPARING REPORT AIMED AT INCREASED ISAF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI530 2007-07-11 12:18 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0530/01 1921218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111218Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3550
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0051
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2011 
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PREL EAID FI AF
SUBJECT: GOF PREPARING REPORT AIMED AT INCREASED ISAF 
COMMITMENTS 
 
REF: A. THOME-MIDDLETON E-MAIL 
 
     B. 10 JUL 07 
 
Classified By: Polchief Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOF is preparing a wide-ranging 
proposal for increased participation in NATO/ISAF and for 
increased assistance to Afghanistan.  Details are 
currently sketchy, but MFA officials expect the proposal 
to include an increase in Finnish troops; increased 
weapons and other materiel to support them; and possibly a 
donation of non-lethal equipment to Afghan security 
forces.  The package is unlikely to include a donation of 
lethal weapons (i.e., AK-47s), because that issue has 
become very divisive and highly sensationalized, and the 
GOF wants to avoid seeing its commitment in Afghanistan 
derailed by hard political opposition to a lethal 
donation.  Even without the AK-47s, we welcome this new 
initiative and believe it will lead to an increased 
Finnish role in ISAF.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Finns Look to Do More in Afghanistan 
------------------------------------ 
2. (SBU) According to Finnish MFA security policy 
contacts, Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva has directed that 
a report be compiled recommending a broad increase in the 
Finnish contribution to the NATO/ISAF Mission in 
Afghanistan.  The proposal is to be coordinated closely 
between the MFA and the MOD, then submitted this fall for 
cabinet consensus and eventual Parliamentary approval. 
Precise details are still unknown, as the drafters have 
only begun their work, but they tell us they expect the 
proposal to call for an increased Finnish troop commitment 
to ISAF; increased weapons and other materiel to support 
those troops; and -- possibly -- a donation of non-lethal 
equipment to the Afghan security forces. 
 
Seeing is Believing 
------------------- 
3. (SBU) The Finnish MOD had been contemplating for months 
various scenarios under which it could do more in 
Afghanistan.  However, our contacts say, three recent 
factors have influenced the ministerial level decision to 
begin moving forward: (1) a change in Government; (2) FM 
Kanerva's June 11 meeting with Secretary Rice, during 
which she encouraged Finland to do more in Afghanistan; 
and (3) perhaps most importantly, Defense Minister Jyri 
Hakamies's late June trip to Afghanistan.  Hakamies was 
reportedly very impressed, both with the good work Finnish 
troops are doing in provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 
in Meymenah and Mazar-al-Sharif, as well as with the 
tremendous amount of work yet to be done to stabilize and 
rebuild Afghanistan. 
 
No AK-47s Likely 
---------------- 
4. (C) Hakamies has publicly stated that no form of 
assistance is categorically "off the table," and our MFA 
contacts confirm that their report is to include an 
analysis of the pros and cons of making a donation of 
lethal materiel to the Afghan National Police (ANP). 
However, they caution, the "AK-47 issue" -- i.e., the 
long-standing, joint US-Afghan request that Finland donate 
some 100,000 excess Kalishnikovs to the ANP -- has become 
an extremely divisive domestic political issue.  The 
previous government, led by then-FM Erkki Tuomioja and 
President Tarja Halonen, had rejected the request.  Since 
then, both Halonen and Tuomioja -- from his new position 
as a senior Parliamentary committee chairman -- have 
remained vocally opposed to re-opening that decision. 
Technically, the issue was decided by the previous 
government and has never been re-opened.  However, while 
in Afghanistan MOD Hakamies did publicly allude to the 
GOF's desire to do more.  The press promptly seized on his 
suggestion that "nothing is off the table" as an 
indication that the divisive AK-47 issue had been re- 
opened -- prompting harsh responses not only from 
Tuomioja, but also from senior politicians in several 
political parties, including members of the governing 
coalition. 
 
Vanhanen seeks calm. . .but no weapons 
-------------------------------------- 
5. (C) In seeking to calm the waters, PM Matti Vanhanen 
told the press that the AK-47 issue had not been re- 
opened, but went on to explain that the GOF was indeed 
contemplating other forms of increased assistance in 
Afghanistan.  (Comment: Predictably, the press 
sensationalized the PM's comments about the AK-47s, but 
said little about the broader support proposal that is 
being prepared.)  Privately, MFA officials tell us they 
 
are enthusiastic about the possibility of the Vanhanen 
Government's winning broad-based parliamentary support for 
a package that includes increased Finnish troop 
commitments to ISAF and increased reconstruction and 
development assistance.  However, they say that the senior 
political leadership is concerned that Tuomioja and others 
might torpedo the entire package if a lethal donation is 
included in the proposal. 
 
Comment 
------- 
6. (C) Even without the lethal donation, we welcome this 
new initiative and believe it will lay the foundation for 
an increased Finnish role in the ISAF Mission.  Kanerva, 
Hakamies (who personally may not be opposed to a lethal 
donation) and Vanhanen (who probably is opposed) appear to 
have hit upon a solid strategy -- i.e., excluding the AK- 
47s in their broader proposal, so that they can win broad 
based approval for a more robust Finnish commitment to 
ISAF.  We believe that if they force the issue of the AK- 
47s, it could divide the cabinet (the Greens and the 
Center Party will oppose, with the Conservatives and the 
Swedish Peoples likely supporting), which in turn could 
kill the entire proposal.  However, if handled carefully 
without a lethal component, the package is likely to win 
Parliamentary approval, even among the outspoken skeptics, 
and further improve the Finnish public's understanding 
of the positive leadership role their country can play in 
Afghanistan.  Post will follow this issue closely and 
encourage the GOF in its efforts to create a proposal 
that leads to greater Finnish commitments.  End Comment. 
WARE