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Viewing cable 07DILI247, FRETILIN, CNRT LEAD AS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION COUNT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI247 2007-07-02 10:46 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO0859
OO RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0247/01 1831046
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 021046Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3606
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0986
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1044
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0947
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0726
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0780
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0868
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0581
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0181
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2980
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DRL, IO 
USUN RICHARD MCCURRY 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: FRETILIN, CNRT LEAD AS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION COUNT 
CONTINUES 
 
DILI 00000247  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: East Timor's parliamentary elections went 
remarkably smoothly despite last minute logistical challenges 
brought on by an unseasonable period of heavy rains in the days 
leading up the June 30 poll.  International observers, including 
US mission teams present in almost all districts, have so far 
evaluated the poll as free and fair.  Initial delays in the 
counting, now taking place at district counting centers, have 
mostly been overcome and close to 40 percent of the count was 
complete as of late afternoon on July 2.  Initial results show 
the ruling FRETILIN party leading, but with a percentage well 
shy of a majority.  The National Congress for Timorese 
Reconstruction (CNRT) is in second place and appears to be well 
positioned to lead an opposition party coalition comprising a 
clear majority.  Despite the smooth sailing, some complaints and 
questions regarding possibly fraudulent observer batches have 
slightly marred the process and point to possible future 
challenges of the legitimacy of the results, particularly by 
FRETILIN.  End summary. 
 
Smooth voting process 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) East Timor's parliamentary elections went remarkably 
smoothly despite last minute logistical challenges brought on by 
an unseasonable period of heavy rains in the days leading up the 
June 30 poll.  According to the Technical Secretariat for 
Election Administration (STAE), 50 locations required final 
delivery of election materials by horse and porter as a result 
of the rains.  However, in the end, only five polling stations, 
in Viqueque and Manufahi districts, received materials late and 
delayed their opening by several hours as a result.  US mission 
observers, who monitored the elections in all but two of East 
Timor's 13 districts, in general found that the process went 
very smoothly on election day.  Other international missions, 
which deployed close to 500 observers nationwide, have likewise 
pronounced the June 30 poll as free and fair as well as 
proceeding in a very orderly and calm manner.  Several minor 
incidents were reported over the course of the day, such as a 
fight in Viqueque that broke out when a would-be voter presented 
the voting card of a person known to be deceased.  However, such 
incidents were rare and in all cases effectively dealt with by 
police and polling officials on the scene. 
 
Delays and hiccups as counting underway 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) The transport of uncounted ballots from the polling 
centers to district counting centers also went smoothly 
according to all reports, despite worries that this part of the 
process would represent the greatest vulnerability to fraud. 
The polling was well-scrutinized by almost 500 observers from 
international groups including the UNDP, IRI, NDI, the Carter 
Center, the European Union, the Japanese Government, and CPLP, 
the organization of Portuguese speaking-countries.  Our 
observers participated in long, festive, well monitored and 
secure convoys that wound their ways to district capitals 
collecting ballots from multiple polling centers along the way. 
However, once at the counting centers, the initial processing of 
the ballots, required in order to pool each districts votes 
before any counting could begin, was a laborious process, in 
most places stretching into the next day and leading to delays 
in counting.  Further delays and controversies arose at some 
counting centers regarding access for political party agents to 
monitor the process. 
 
5. (SBU) The counting center in Dili was particularly noisy on 
the evening of June 30 as a group of FRETILIN "observers" - 
including well-known national party figures and Members of 
Parliament - complained that boxes were being opened without 
their party agents present.  According to our current 
information, one of their agents was in fact present, but others 
were at the entrance waiting to get in.  The FRETILIN party 
agents are reportedly now filing a complaint regarding the boxes 
opened during this period and several of them walked out of the 
count this morning in protest of the boxes being included in 
 
DILI 00000247  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
ongoing counting.  Meanwhile, questions have been raised 
regarding the observer badges held by the original complainants, 
which appear to either be fraudulent or illegally issued by 
STAE.  Similar badges were discovered by observers throughout 
the eastern district of Lautem on election day.  Overall, while 
not so far seriously undermining the process, these developments 
raise the specter of FRETILIN continuing to challenge the 
process and possibly rejecting as illegitimate the outcome. 
 
Initial results show FRETILIN leading, but CNRT strong 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (U) With just under 40 percent of the count complete, the 
current results are as follows, with first round results from 
each party's candidate in the April 2007 first round of the 
presidential race in parentheses for comparison: 
 
-- The ruling FRETILIN party in first place with 32.1% (27.9%) 
 
-- Former President Xanana Gusmao's National Congress for 
Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) coming in second with 22.3% 
(21.8%) 
 
-- The coalition of the Social Democratic Association of Timor 
and the Social Democratic Party (ASDT/PSD) in third with 15.6% 
(23%) 
 
-- The Democratic Party (PD) in fourth with 11.3% (19.2%) 
 
-- The coalition of KOTA and PPT in a distant fifth with 4.1% 
(3.7%) 
 
7. (U) However, it should be noted that the status of results 
varies significantly from district to district, and the eastern 
districts where FRETILIN is strongest also produced the fastest 
results.  Thus, while these figures provide a sense of the 
trend, significant changes are likely to still occur, 
particularly in the FRETILIN and CNRT numbers, with the former 
possibly going down, and the latter increasing.  In particular, 
the Dili count has been very slow, starting only on July 2; with 
its largest voting bloc of any district in the country, it 
appears to be heavily favoring CNRT so far, but less than 10 
percent is included in the current national tally.  However, the 
overall picture of FRETILIN, CNRT, ASDT/PSD, and PD competing 
for most of the votes is expected to hold in all districts.  The 
only exception is the KOTA/PPT coalition which appears set to be 
one of the top vote getters in Ainaro district.  KOTA/PPT is 
also the only party in addition to the top four that appears set 
to surpass the three percent threshold to gain admission to 
parliamentary representation, leaving the strong likelihood that 
9 of the 14 competing parties will not be represented in 
parliament. 
 
8. (U) Both PD and the ASDT/PSD coalition have taken a hit in 
comparison with their candidates' support in the presidential 
race, despite their solid western bases.  PD, only recently 
considered the strongest of the opposition parties, has in 
particular seen a surprising drop off compared to its nearly 20 
percent pull in the first round presidential race.  This can 
mostly be explained by the "PD Xananista" phenomenon, that is, 
the large number of party members who, while retaining long-term 
allegiance to the party, opted to vote for Xanana Gusmao's CNRT. 
 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: There is still a chance for counting to veer 
off course, but in general we expect it to continue relatively 
smoothly.  However, as results start to crystallize the 
environment is likely to get more heated.  Most international 
observer missions, while citing the success of the process so 
far, caveat that evaluation with the question of whether party 
leaders and their grassroots supporters will accept the results, 
with the ruling FRETILIN party of greatest concern.  We will 
continue to track results and the potential for problematic 
reactions closely.  Then come the challenges of forming a 
coalition government and executing a peaceful, efficient 
 
DILI 00000247  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
transfer of power.  End comment. 
KLEMM