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Viewing cable 07CHIANGMAI125, CURFEWS, CELL PHONE RESTRICTIONS EXPOSE MIGRANT WORKERS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07CHIANGMAI125 2007-07-11 17:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO9545
RR RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHCHI #0125/01 1921737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111737Z JUL 07
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0518
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0567
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0023
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ELAB SMIG TH
SUBJECT: CURFEWS, CELL PHONE RESTRICTIONS EXPOSE MIGRANT WORKERS TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000125  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. SUMMARY. Recent efforts by the Thai government to restrict 
cell phone use and movement by migrant workers, particularly in 
areas with significant Burmese populations, could exacerbate 
abuses and exploitation of vulnerable groups. RTG officials say 
the measures are needed to contain illegal immigration and 
protect stability in border regions. NGOs point out that even in 
areas not officially affected by the Ministry of Interior's 
decrees, local officials have enacted similar restrictions that, 
like other anti-migrant measures, exploit workers and leave 
large communities of Burmese vulnerable to mistreatment by their 
employers. End Summary. 
 
2. The Ministry of Interior recently authorized new curfews and 
restrictions on cell phone and motorcycle registration for 
non-Thais living in some border areas. RTG and NGO contacts 
confirm that these restrictions initially applied only to 
provinces in southern Thailand, such as Phuket and Ranong, 
reflecting RTG fears that non-Thai Muslims might use migrant 
work as a cover to join insurgent movements in southern 
provinces. MOI officials dispute the severity of the 
restrictions, muddling ConGen and NGO requests for clearer 
explanations of the policies. NGOs and many local officials 
concur that the new orders prevent migrant workers from using 
cell phones, registering motorcycles, and gathering in groups of 
five or more people outside of their places of employment. Most 
areas under the MOI's decrees have also implemented an 8 p.m. 
curfew for migrant workers. 
 
Harsh Conditions, But Still Better Than Burma 
 
3. The Ministry of Labor reports that 485,000 Burmese migrant 
workers have work permits. However, there may be as many 1.5 
million more Burmese in Thailand, including those who live here 
illegally or slip over the border for short-term stints, 
according to the human rights NGO Migrant Assistance Programme 
(MAP). MAP staff say migrant workers face harsh conditions in 
the agricultural, service, and manufacturing sectors, often 
earning just USD 2-4 per day for shifts that reach 12 hours or 
more. According to the International Labor Organization, more 
than 60 percent of Thailand's migrant workers are "locked down" 
at their places of employment, forbidden by employers from 
leaving the premises during all hours of the day. 
 
MOI's Restrictions Expand From the South to Chiang Mai 
 
4. Labor activist Moe Swe, a leader in the Mae Sot-based Yaung 
Chi Oo Workers Association said the cell phone and motorcycle 
restrictions hit migrant communities particularly hard, as they 
eliminate workers' abilities to communicate with and visit 
family members. Moreover, Swe and other activists suspect that 
employers are manipulating current anti-immigrant sensitivities 
within the Thai government to further exploit workers. 
Restricting cell phones and public gatherings after 8 p.m. 
disrupts workers' ability to organize and protest against unfair 
labor conditions. Staff at the International Rescue Committee, 
which maintains close contact with migrant and refugee 
populations inside Thailand, say the measures have already 
created problems in southern provinces, where restrictions on 
leaving work compounds has increased the influence of organized 
crime and violent gangs, who run black markets and other 
operations that are now migrants' only link to the outside 
world. 
 
5. In May, the MOI added Chiang Mai province under the new 
restrictions, leading ethnic Shan leaders to charge that police 
use the measures to harass and extort money from the growing 
number of Shan crossing into Thailand from northern Burma. 
Activists suspect this is a sign local officials have realized 
there is little they can do to stop the flood of migrant labor 
pouring across the border, and have instead chosen to profit 
from the confusion the new restrictions have created. Shan 
journalist Khuensai Jaiyen told PolOff that Shan migrants caught 
with improper paperwork are now fined and released within Chiang 
Mai province, instead of being deported back to Burma. 
 
Employers and Provincial Officials Follow MOI's Lead 
 
6. Although they haven't received specific orders to do so, law 
enforcement officials in provinces not under the restrictions 
have implemented similar measures on their own. During a recent 
PolOff visit to Tak province - a border region rich with foreign 
investment reliant on cheap labor from Burma - local businessmen 
said Burmese migrants face harsher restrictions than their Thai 
counterparts. One member of the Tak chapter of the Federation of 
Thai Industries (FTI) told PolOff that human rights among 
migrants should be viewed in relative terms. The conditions in 
Thai factories may not be ideal, he said, but Burmese workers 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000125  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
are much better off than they were in Burma. In a startling 
moment of self-congratulation, he said factory owners should be 
commended for how much they've surpassed Burma's human rights 
record and not criticized for falling short of international 
standards. 
 
In Border Towns, a "Second Class" Becomes the Majority 
 
7. Mae Sot's chief district official believes most previous RTG 
efforts to decrease illegal immigration have failed. Although he 
supports the new restrictions on migrants, he says government 
officials need to work on presenting a softer image to local 
Burmese, lest Thais face the wrath of a migrant community that 
far outnumbers actual citizens in his region. Local police are 
aware of the population imbalance as well, and enact a strict 
curfew in Mae Sot, where 10 p.m. each night brings a cattle 
call-like ringing of bells that sends Burmese running for home. 
The heavy police presence quickly turns the normally chaotic and 
colorful Mae Sot into a ghost town, leaving only a few sparse 
tourists and ex-pats left wondering where all the action went. 
 
8. Thai legal experts sympathetic to migrant workers say their 
efforts to reverse the restrictions and promote better 
conditions for Burmese working in Thailand have largely been 
unsuccessful. One legal expert with the Labor Law Clinic in Mae 
Sot blamed Thailand's complex citizenship laws for creating 
generations of de facto stateless people inside the country's 
borders. Without the protections of Thai citizenship, a "second 
class" of residents not subject to the same protections and 
rights enjoyed by citizens has emerged, she said. Others blame 
the current anti-immigrant mood among post-coup RTG officials 
and continued instability in Burma. One long-time NGO activist 
noted that human rights concerns have always lost out to 
national security under military-run Thai governments. 
 
9. COMMENT: The MOI's new restrictions - and the similar 
measures in other provinces they've inspired - will likely lead 
to increased exploitation of the large Burmese population living 
in Thailand. The prohibition on cell phone use is of particular 
concern in light of recent collaborative efforts by the ILO and 
MOL to establish telephone hotlines for migrant workers to 
report abuses. Such hotlines will be useless for workers without 
access to telephones. With much of the RTG focused on internal 
security, NGOs have little room to maneuver for expanding rights 
to non-Thais, many of whom cross illegally into Thailand or run 
afoul of an overly complex and unfair work permit bureaucracy. 
Curfews and these other restrictions severely limit the work 
NGOs and migrant leaders can do to organize workers, monitor 
abuses, and promote more humane working conditions. End Comment. 
CAMP