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Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON452, NEW ZEALAND'S RESERVE BANK BALANCING ACT - TRYING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WELLINGTON452 2007-06-19 06:49 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO9033
PP RUEHNZ
DE RUEHWL #0452/01 1700649
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190649Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4375
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4868
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 1358
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0145
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO USTR, STATE FOR EAP/ANP, EB, INR, PACOM FOR 
J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND'S RESERVE BANK BALANCING ACT - TRYING 
TO KEEPING BOTH INFLATION AND THE KIWI DOLLAR IN CHECK 
 
REF: WELLINGTON 351 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 11, in what was initially seen as a 
surprising move, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) begun 
to intervene for the first time in 20 years in the 
international currency markets in an attempt to stem the 
rapid appreciation of the Kiwi dollar. Many critics say the 
move was very risky, as New Zealand's limited monetary 
reserves can not compete with huge international hedge funds 
drawn to New Zealand's high 8 percent official cash rate (OCR 
-- the Bank's interbank loan interest rate.)   Ironically, it 
is RBNZ's efforts to keep the housing market and other 
inflationary pressures under control by setting the OCR rate 
at record rates that is simultaneously driving the value of 
the Kiwi dollar up. The conflicting aims of RBNZ monetary 
policy - low inflation and lower exchange rate - are leading 
the Bank into uncharted territory whose outcome is uncertain. 
If the Bank's actions fail to produce the desired results of 
lower housing costs and lower exchange rates it may find 
itself at the limits of its monetary tools.  Not 
surprisingly, many economists are calling for other means to 
drive down inflation and interest rates, but politically 
unpopular proposals such as capital gains on property would 
be hard for the Labour Government to push through.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) In what some analysts see as risky, on June 11 the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) intervened for the first 
time in 20 years in  international currency markets in an 
attempt to stem the rapid appreciation of the Kiwi dollar. 
The move shocked currency markets, and initially the Kiwi 
dollar fell nearly US2 cents from a 22-year high of US76.39 
cents, to trade under US75 cents. This intervention followed 
the raising of the official cash rate (OCR) by the Reserve 
Bank by 25 basis points to a record 8 per cent three weeks 
ago.  (It is now one of the highest rates in the developed 
world, see reftel.) 
 
3.  (U) Initial business reaction to the intervention was 
mainly supportive, particularly among exporters hoping for a 
lower Kiwi dollar.  Some analysts, however, pointed out that 
the move was a risky one.  The bank sold approximately NZ$500 
million out of a total estimated reserve of NZ $3.5 billion. 
The analysts warned that New Zealand's high interest rates 
would remain attractive for investors, and it would be 
difficult for the Bank to use its relatively small NZ 
reserves to outbid those international hedge fund managers 
who believe the currency is now undervalued.   . 
 
4. (U) These concerns may already have been borne out.  The 
June 11 intervention had only a short lived success in 
decreasing upward pressure on the NZ$ exchange rate.  A 
second, unconfirmed intervention on the morning of June 18 
(size unknown but rumored smaller than the first) saw the 
exchange rate fall from about US75.5 cents to US75 cents. 
Taking advantage of the local time difference, the action was 
carried out while the NZ markets were the only ones open in 
order to dampen unnecessary speculation.  But by the time the 
New York markets closed, the NZ$ had returned to its 
pre-intervention rate.   Apparently, immediately after both 
interventions foreign investors increased their purchase of 
NZ$ assets.  (NB: In the past, Japanese companies and 
individuals have been the most active investors in NZ$ 
assets.) 
 
5. (U) While the first intervention may have indicated to 
some market watchers a glass ceiling of US76 cents, the 
second intervention occurred just below 75.5US cents, which 
some market analysts believe must be the true set level. 
Regardless what the Reserve Bank sees as the breaking point, 
NZ exporters are complaining that even the current rate (or 
lower) is too high an exchange rate burden for them to 
maintain competitiveness overseas. Though the RBNZ is legally 
independent in its mandate to set monetary policy some 
politicians have expressed surprise and annoyance at the 
Bank's lack of prior consultation. Prime Minister Clark and 
Minister of Finance Cullen have said publicly that they did 
not have prior knowledge of either intervention and have 
continued to remain publicly neutral to insure the continued 
independence of the RBNZ. 
 
6. (U) COMMENT: Currently RBNZ Governor Bollard has not ruled 
 
WELLINGTON 00000452  002 OF 002 
 
 
out further interventions or further increases in the OCR 
rate and analysts are laying odds on yet another rate 
increase sometime this year. Early reactions from investors 
and rising commodity prices suggest that the NZ$ will 
appreciate again and the RBNZ will be forced to choose 
between modifying the exchange rate and the interest rate. If 
these conflicting goals remain unresolved RBNZ may enter into 
an unsustainable cycle in which it is neither able to keep 
inflation within the target band (i.e., between one and three 
per cent) nor affect the appreciating NZ$. The present 
balance between the two objectives is delicate and could tip 
in an unwanted direction as a result of actions by officials 
within NZ or by international investors. END COMMENT. 
MCCORMICK