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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK431, DPKO WARNS OF RISING TENSIONS ALONG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK431 2007-06-01 15:09 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO2848
PP RUEHBZ
DE RUCNDT #0431/01 1521509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011509Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1993
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1334
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1105
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0208
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0085
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0611
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0737
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: DPKO WARNS OF RISING TENSIONS ALONG 
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA BORDER 
 
REF: A. USUN NEW YORK 00359 
 
     B. SECSTATE 72880 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At May 29 United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) consultations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
Assistant-Secretary-General Annabi described rising tensions 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and dangerous restrictions on 
the movement of the UN Mission there (UNMEE).  Annabi warned 
that a minor incident could trigger military engagement in 
the area, and he advised Members to appeal to the parties to 
respect the cease-fire and to seek normalization of their 
bilateral relations.  Most Members urged appointment of a 
Special Representative (SRSG) to address the ongoing crisis, 
and after the meeting, the Norwegian delegation proposed 
sending a letter on behalf of the Group of Friends of UNMEE 
to the SYG urging the same.  Annabi recommended that Members 
invite the Permanent Representatives (PRs) from both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea to meet with the UNSC.  Annabi did not see a 
plus-up of UNMEE as feasible in the near future, given the 
UNSC's recent history of downsizing as a way of expressing 
displeasure with the parties.  Annabi did not make any 
predictions about what might happen when the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission (EEBC) leaves the scene in November.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Since DPKO's last briefing on May 8 (ref A), 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi reported there had 
been further security incidents, namely expanding Eritrean 
control over greater areas of the Temporary Security Zone 
(TSZ) and reinforcement of Eritrean military positions, 
including reconnaissance missions near the Humera bridge in 
Sector West and other TSZ locations.  Annabi also noted that 
the Eritrean Minister of Defense had visited Adi Quala in the 
TSZ on May 18.  Annabi was concerned that the 7000 recently 
 
SIPDIS 
relocated (and potentially armed) IDPs in Om Hajer in Sector 
West could be used if military activity broke out.  Annabi 
also noted Eritrean active troop rotations in Sector Center 
and Sub-Sector East and deployment of a total of 1900 
Eritrean military personnel in Sector Center as additional 
causes for concern.  According to Annabi, Ethiopia was 
reinforcing military positions near the southern boundary of 
the TSZ, despite its arguments to the contrary, with some 45 
tanks moved toward Humera in Sector West.  Annabi reported 
that Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of movement 
remained in place, with new limits imposed in Sector Center 
near Mendefera, where a UN patrol was detained at gunpoint by 
Eritrean police on May 18.  Annabi also told the Council of 
warning shots fired by Eritrean Defense Forces and militias 
when stopped at UNMEE checkpoints in the TSZ. 
 
3. (SBU) Despite UNMEE's reduced monitoring capacity, Annabi 
asserted that its presence still served as a deterrent to 
resumed hostilities between the sides.  A further reduced 
configuration, he argued, would jeopardize a "meaningful 
observation mission"  (NOTE: The question of UNMEE 
right-sizing will present itself to the UNSC when UNMEE's 
mandate is reviewed in July.  END NOTE).  Annabi worried that 
military preparations by both sides, compounded by the 
uncertainty surrounding the EEBC's November deadline and 
hostile public statements by both Governments against each 
other, risked turning a minor incident into a military 
confrontation.  Annabi highlighted May 28 remarks by 
Ethiopian President Girma Wolde Giorgis denouncing Eritrea 
for supporting terrorist elements bent on destabilizing 
Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.  Annabi also mentioned May 
24 remarks by Eritrean President Isaias, in which he called 
the TSZ "meaningless" and warned that any negative 
consequences that might result from the current impasse would 
be due to " a foreign power." 
 
4. (SBU) Annabi did not make any predictions about what might 
happen when the EEBC left the scene in November, saying only 
that demarcation by coordinates could have "unfortunate 
consequences" for one of the sides.  Annabi stressed that 
UNMEE and the SYG were committed to overcoming the stalemate 
and that the SYG was considering appointment of a new SRSG as 
part of this process.  Acknowledging Members' eagerness to 
move on such an appointment, Annabi warned that to designate 
a new SRSG too precipitously in the wake of Eritrea's 
effective dismissal of former SRSG candidates would send the 
message that the parties could dictate the terms of UN 
appointments based on their own political preferences (NOTE: 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000431  002 OF 002 
 
 
After the meeting, the Norwegian delegation proposed sending 
a letter on behalf of the Group of Friends of UNMEE to the 
SYG urging the expeditious appointment of an SRSG.  END 
NOTE).  Annabi admitted there was no magic formula to solving 
the impasse but recommended that Members continue their 
efforts, both collective and individual, to move Ethiopia and 
Eritrea away from the standoff by appealing to them to 
respect the cease-fire, defuse the situation and help 
normalize their bilateral relations.  Annabi also suggested 
that Members consider calling in PRs of both countries to 
underscore the Council's concerns. 
 
5. (SBU) Most Members - including Italy, the UK, Indonesia, 
Qatar, Congo, Russia, Ghana, South Africa, Panama and China - 
strongly supported the expeditious appointment of an SRSG as 
a way to promote a political process between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea.  Members agreed that adequate leverage with the 
parties had not yet been found to bring the sides to 
compromise, and UK PR Jones Parry singled out coordination 
with the USG as critical, given the role we had taken in the 
past to try to mend fences between the sides.  Members 
worried about the destabilizing effects of the crisis on 
Somalia.  Russian Deputy PR Dolgov suggested a UNSC stop 
during its Mission to Africa in June as a way to address this 
"explosive" situation, and the South African representative 
offered the upcoming African Union Summit in Accra as another 
forum to pressure the parties. 
 
6. (SBU) Drawing from ref B points, Ambassador Sanders called 
for the reinvigoration of the Military Coordination 
Commission (MCC) as a confidence-building measure between the 
sides.  Annabi responded that DPKO Under-SYG Guehenno had 
raised this issue with Ethiopian FM Seyoum during his New 
York visit, and that Seyoum had promised to take action so 
that MCC activity could resume.  Annabi assured that the UN 
would maintain pressure to ensure this happened, 
KHALILZAD