Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07TOKYO2761, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/19/07

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07TOKYO2761.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO2761 2007-06-19 08:01 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9094
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2761/01 1700801
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190801Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4630
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 4031
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 1611
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 5184
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0748
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 2442
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7485
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4653
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 002761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/19/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on Abe cabinet, pensions fiasco 
 
(2) US to provide North Korea with 2 million dollars in aid in 
return for implementation of initial actions 
 
(3) Editorial: Is Kim laughing himself silly over US decision on 
money transfer? 
 
(4) Defense technologies: Japan, US agree on intercorporate 
technology transfer 
 
(5) Editorial: Diplomatic efforts necessary to prevent other 
countries from anticipating a spear as next step in missile defense 
 
(6) 2007 Upper House election (Part 5): LDP puzzled by New Komeito's 
eagerness to adjust votes 
 
(7) Total lifting of ban on US beef imports so quickly? - part 2: 
"The US has not changed the risk at all," says Food Safety 
Commission Chairman Yasuhiro Yoshikawa 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on Abe cabinet, pensions fiasco 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 19, 2007 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in % age. Parentheses denote the results of a survey 
conducted in May.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Abe cabinet? 
 
Yes 38.3 (49.6) 
No 50.6 (36.8) 
Other answers (O/A) 2.8 (3.5) 
No answer (N/A) 8.3 (10.1) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) 
Give up to two reasons for your approval of the Abe cabinet. 
 
I can appreciate its political stance 30.8 (33.4) 
It's stable 11.8 (14.9) 
The prime minister is trustworthy 23.2 (23.2) 
There's a fresh image of the prime minister 34.8 (40.2) 
I can appreciate its economic policy 4.8 (6.2) 
I can appreciate its foreign policy 15.2 (15.2) 
Because it's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito 14.8 (10.7) 
It's better than its predecessors 11.9 (10.1) 
O/A+N/A 7.2 (4.8) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Give 
up to two reasons for your disapproval of the Abe cabinet. 
 
I can't appreciate its political stance 45.9 (43.1) 
It's unstable 34.4 (24.9) 
The prime minister is untrustworthy 25.3 (25.2) 
The prime minister lacks political experience 14.4 (16.7) 
I can't appreciate its economic policy 22.9 (21.9) 
 
TOKYO 00002761  002 OF 010 
 
 
I can't appreciate its foreign policy 6.8 (13.9) 
Because it's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito 11.3 (14.2) 
It's worse than its predecessors 10.0 (7.5) 
O/A+N/A 3.9 (3.8) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 32.9 (38.5) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 14.3 (11.1) 
New Komeito (NK) 4.0 (3.3) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.4 (1.8) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.2 (0.9) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.2 (0.3) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) --- (0.1) 
Other political parties --- (---) 
None 44.4 (42.4) 
N/A 0.7 (1.6) 
 
Q: Do you appreciate the job performance of Prime Minister Abe and 
his cabinet so far on the whole? 
 
Appreciate very much 6.3 
Appreciate somewhat 36.3 
Don't appreciate very much 37.2 
Don't appreciate at all 16.7 
N/A 3.4 
 
Q: If there is anything you can appreciate about what Prime Minister 
Abe and his cabinet have actually done, pick as many as you like 
from among those listed below. 
 
Relations with the US 9.5 
Relations with China 14.7 
Relations with South Korea 5.8 
Efforts for the North Korea problem 31.1 
Efforts for educational reform 15.3 
Efforts for social divide 4.4 
Efforts for the pension issue 12.7 
Efforts for constitutional revision 6.8 
Efforts to reform the government's public service personnel system 
3.0 
Response to the problem of politics and money, involving former 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Matsuoka 1.8 
Response to cabinet ministers' gaffe, including Health, Labor and 
Welfare Minister Yanagisawa 1.7 
O/A 0.3 
Nothing in particular 38.3 
N/A 1.7 
 
Q: If there is anything you cannot appreciate about what Prime 
Minister Abe and his cabinet have actually done, pick as many as you 
like from among those listed below. 
 
Relations with the US 8.4 
Relations with China 7.2 
Relations with South Korea 4.7 
Efforts for the North Korea problem 14.4 
Efforts for educational reform 13.5 
Efforts for social divide 25.0 
Efforts for the pension issue 50.2 
Efforts for constitutional revision 10.1 
Efforts to reform the government's public service personnel system 
 
TOKYO 00002761  003 OF 010 
 
 
9.0 
Response to the problem of politics and money, involving former 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Matsuoka 49.4 
Response to cabinet ministers' gaffe, including Health, Labor and 
Welfare Minister Yanagisawa 32.1 
O/A 0.5 
Nothing in particular 13.8 
N/A 2.1 
 
 
Q: Do you trust the government's pension system on the whole? 
 
Yes 7.6 
Yes to a certain degree 15.7 
No to a certain degree 26.8 
No 48.7 
N/A 1.3 
 
Q: Concerning the government's pension record-keeping flaws, the 
government has worked out a plan to compensate unpaid pensions under 
a new law. At the same time, Prime Minister Abe has promised to 
check about 50 million pending cases within one year. Do you 
appreciate this government plan? 
 
Appreciate very much 12.5 
Appreciate somewhat 33.9 
Don't appreciate very much 27.7 
Don't appreciate at all 24.2 
N/A 1.6 
 
Q: Do you think the government's plan this time will resolve the 
problem of missing pension records? 
 
Yes 26.6 
No 66.8 
N/A 6.5 
 
Q: Which political party gave you a bad impression in view of moves 
in the Diet over the problem of missing pension records? If any, 
pick as many as you like from among those listed below. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 37.6 
Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) 17.5 
New Komeito (NK) 9.5 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 5.9 
Social Democratic Party (Shaminto) 5.9 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 2.7 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 2.2 
Other political parties 0.2 
Nothing in particular 46.8 
N/A 3.9 
 
Polling methodology 
Date of survey: June 16-17. 
Subjects of survey: 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible 
voters throughout the country (at 250 locations on a stratified 
two-stage random sampling basis). 
Method of implementation: Door-to-door visits for face-to-face 
interviews. 
Number of valid respondents: 1,837 persons (61.2 %  ). 
 
(2) US to provide North Korea with 2 million dollars in aid in 
return for implementation of initial actions 
 
TOKYO 00002761  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
MAINICHI (Top Play) (Excerpts) 
Evening, June 19, 2007 
 
Toshihiko Kasahara, Washington 
 
The United States government has decided to provide North Korea with 
emergency humanitarian assistance worth 2 million dollars 
(approximately 230 million yen) if Pyongyang implements the initial 
steps that were stipulated in the six-party agreement in February, 
such as shutting down and sealing its nuclear facilities. Several US 
government officials disclosed this information to the Mainichi 
Shimbun yesterday. But Japan has taken the stance of not offering 
assistance unless negotiations on the abduction issue move forward. 
Should no progress be made in the six-party talks, the gap between 
Japan and the US, which is now positive about assistance to the 
North, will grow even wider. 
 
A joint statement on the February agreement stipulates that North 
Korea will receive 50,000 tons of crude oil in reform for 
implementing the initial steps. It has been decided that South Korea 
alone will offer 50,000 tons of oil independently. The aid planned 
by the US will be an additional contribution outside the framework 
of the agreement. 
 
(3) Editorial: Is Kim laughing himself silly over US decision on 
money transfer? 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 19, 2007 
 
The United States has finally started preparations to transfer 
approximately 25 million dollars (about 3 billion yen) of North 
Korea-related funds frozen at Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao to 
North Korea via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of 
Russia. Hearing this news, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il might be 
laughing himself silly. 
 
Negotiators adopted a joint statement in the six-party talks that 
wrapped up on Feb. 13. The statement stipulated the initial steps 
North Korea should take toward nuclear disarmament and specific 
conditions for them, specifying that these actions should be taken 
within 60 days. Although the statement makes no reference to the BDA 
issue, Pyongyang put forth the issue as a condition for it to take 
the initial actions. Washington accepted the North's demand by 
unprecedentedly getting its central bank involved in it. 
 
The Nikkei has so far posed questions about Washington's 
conciliatory policy in its editorials titled: "America should 
maintain the basic principles of its policy toward North Korea;" and 
"Don't follow North Korea's pace." The US finally fell into the 
other side's pace and came up with the decision. It can hardly be 
conceivable that the US money-transfer decision will prompt the 
North to take actions to resolve the nuclear issue. Even so, we hope 
North Korea will return the "goodwill" of the US. 
 
North Korea must be savoring the effect of its nuclear test last 
year. This experience might have the North believe that if it 
continues to play for time by presenting new demands, the US 
government will make concessions in the end. In this light, the US 
approach might be taken as working only negatively. 
 
We interpreted the agreement stipulated in the Feb. 13 joint 
 
TOKYO 00002761  005 OF 010 
 
 
statement as only one step toward North Korea's dismantlement of all 
its nuclear programs and weapons. On "the list of nuclear plans" in 
the joint statement, in particular, it will not be easy to move 
negotiations forward. There is leeway for North Korea to buy time, 
with so many loopholes in the joint statement, which is designed to 
have the North scrap all its nuclear weapons and programs. 
 
North Korea has extended an invitation to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), based on the judgment that the fund-transfer 
process is now in the final stage. Pyongyang intends to receive IAEA 
inspectors once the process is completed. However, it is uncertain 
to what extend the inspectors will be allowed to take action. 
Japanese harbor doubt and distrust of the US government's policy 
toward North Korea. The BDA decision by the US may be amplifying 
such feelings on the Japanese side. Unless North Korea makes a 
sincere response, the US government will be inevitably pressed to 
make a policy switch again. 
 
(4) Defense technologies: Japan, US agree on intercorporate 
technology transfer 
 
NIKKEI (NIHON KEIZAI) (Top play) (Full) 
June 17, 2007 
 
Japan and the United States will introduce a scheme allowing their 
private-sector companies to directly share their technical data with 
each other or transfer such data to each other in their joint 
research and development of defense technologies. In the first 
place, the Japanese and US governments will apply this scheme within 
the month to the two countries' joint development of a missile 
defense (MD) system. This is aimed at shortening the period of time 
for joint development or streamlining joint development in the 
advancement of defense technologies. However, this scheme is also 
saddled with problems, such as how to handle confidential 
information and oversee the behavior of private businesses. 
 
In May this year, the Japanese and US governments held a 
two-plus-two foreign and defense ministerial meeting of their 
intergovernmental security consultative committee in Washington. In 
the two-plus-two ministerial, the two governments reached a basic 
agreement on a framework to promote technology transfer between the 
two countries' private businesses. The two governments will reach a 
formal agreement in their official notes to be exchanged this 
month. 
 
The Japanese and US governments are currently to conclude a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) on each project for joint research 
and development. In principle, the Japanese and US governments 
exchange information just between themselves. Generally, the two 
governments take the form of providing their respective contractors 
with technical data for joint development. Japan and the United 
States therefore need to obtain each other's consent to technology 
transfer for each project. 
 
In the past, there were few problems about technology transfer. That 
is because basic research has been the mainstay of technology 
transfer. However, technical data will be massive in volume with the 
advancement of research, according to a senior official of the 
Defense Agency notes. The official added, "They will have to 
directly provide each other with their data, or they can't respond." 
The Japanese government also wants to improve the defense industry's 
technological capability through expanded exchanges. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002761  006 OF 010 
 
 
For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Raytheon, a US major 
defense-related company, are expected to conclude a technical 
assistance agreement and directly access each other's database. 
MD-related research and development between Japan and the United 
States do not conflict with Japan's self-imposed three principles on 
weapons exports, so companies will be required to abide by 
information security regulations incorporated in their MOUs. 
 
For the present, Japan and the United States are working together to 
research and develop four components, including a "nosecone," which 
is to tip the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), a next-generation missile 
to be launched from Aegis-equipped ships to intercept ballistic 
missiles. The two countries will also work together to research a 
new high-performance radar system that has a long detectable range. 
In addition, the two countries will also research an Aegis combat 
command system with its processing capacity enhanced with 
commercial-off-the-shelf products. The Japanese and US governments 
will consider expanding the scheme to joint research and development 
in non-MD areas. If Japan and the United States want to use each 
other's research results for other defense-related purposes in the 
future, the two countries can use them after notifying each other of 
specifics about their projects. 
 
In East Asia, the security environment has been intensifying further 
with North Korea's missile launches and other events. As it stands, 
the Japanese government wants to improve Japan's defense capability 
and streamline its budget through technical exchanges with the 
United States. However, there are concerns about the two countries' 
military integration. In addition, there are also voices pointing to 
the possibility of scrapping Japan's arms embargo policy. 
 
(5) Editorial: Diplomatic efforts necessary to prevent other 
countries from anticipating a spear as next step in missile defense 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
June 19, 2007 
 
The intensifying row between the United States and Russia over the 
deployment of a missile defense (MD) system in Eastern Europe 
brought to mind a Chinese researcher's words: "A person, who used a 
shield, might use a spear the next time." This is still a moderate 
criticism of MD. Having a shield is part of military strength. An 
increase in a country's defense capability means a decrease in the 
other party's strike capability. An arms race might follow a 
disturbance in balance of military strengths. 
 
President George W. Bush described the deployment of MD in Eastern 
Europe as a strictly defensive means. 
 
The logic is the same as the Japanese government explaining the 
deployed MD system as exclusively for self-defense. Such logic seems 
insufficient to contain criticism of MD and countermeasures, 
however. Winning support of neighboring countries takes constant 
diplomatic efforts and confidence building. 
 
The Antiballistic Missile Treaty concluded by the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the 1970s strictly restricted the two countries 
deploying antiballistic systems. The treaty came from the judgment 
that once intercepting enemy missiles became easier, countries would 
be tempted to launch a preemptive strike. Perceiving this treaty as 
a Cold War relic, the Bush administration declared in 2001 to 
withdraw from the treaty and started to pursue the development of 
MD. The decision might not be a total mistake. However, there is no 
 
TOKYO 00002761  007 OF 010 
 
 
mistake that the full-fledged development of MD that started with a 
rejection of the Cold War mentality has amplified the confrontation 
between the United States and Russia, which is also referred to as a 
new Cold War, drawing strong protests from Moscow and Beijing. 
 
The Bush administration's multiple layered defense initiative has an 
aspect of defending US allies with MD while shielding the United 
States by using their defense zones. The system is intended to 
intercept launched enemy missiles at the boost phase and in 
mid-course. Integrating the Clinton administration's National 
Missile Defense (NMD) program and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
program involving Japan into MD, the new system was born linking air 
defense systems of the world, including Japan and the United 
States. 
 
Washington could ask Tokyo to intercept a US-bound missile. Japan 
would find it difficult to cite the usual lack-of-interceptor 
explanation. The Defense Ministry has reportedly decided recently to 
study and develop the airborne laser (ABL) system apart from the 
interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. Laser 
weapons enables to intercept boost-phase missiles. 
 
Japan has been accused by China and other countries as having used a 
spear, while keep paying huge MD-related expenses in compliance with 
US requests. In the event 10 warheads were released over Japan, we 
do not know how many of them Japan and the US can intercept by using 
the current system. One nuclear warhead would be enough to deal a 
devastating blow to Japan. 
 
Some think that trying to shoot down fired missiles is better than 
doing nothing. Like Eastern Europe, there could be "political 
deployment" to regard the deployment of MD as proof of being US 
allies. Nothing is more fearful than an MD argument sidestepping 
limits to the intercept system, for such would prompt people to 
harbor illusions about their own security. 
 
(6) 2007 Upper House election (Part 5): LDP puzzled by New Komeito's 
eagerness to adjust votes 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 18, 2007 
 
Incumbent New Komeito Upper House lawmaker Tamotsu Yamamoto, 
attending a ceremony to open his campaign office in a central part 
of Nagoya on June 14, bowed his head deeply and said: "I am truly 
sorry. I should have been prepared to put everyone at ease." 
 
Aichi, which holds three seats, is one of the top priority districts 
for the New Komeito, which aims to get all eight proportional 
representation candidates elected and win the five electoral 
districts. New Komeito Representative Akihiro Ota kicked off his 
nationwide stumping tour with a press conference in Aichi on May 19 
in which he declared: "Of all the electoral districts, the situation 
in Aichi is the most severe. Winning Aichi will result in our 
complete victory." 
 
In the election three years ago, two Minshuto (Democratic Party of 
Japan) candidates garnered a total of 1.41 million votes. Yamamoto 
won less than half a million votes in the race six years ago. If two 
Minshuto candidates win about the same number of votes in the 
upcoming election, Yamamoto would be no match for them. Setting a 
target of 600,000 votes, the Yamamoto camp intends to obtain votes 
from the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Komeito's coalition 
 
TOKYO 00002761  008 OF 010 
 
 
partner. 
 
"Receiving rewards natural" 
 
New Komeito Aichi prefectural assemblymen and Soka Gakkai executives 
have repeatedly asked LDP lawmakers elected from Aichi to produce 
lists of individuals with substance from any part of the prefecture. 
They apparently think receiving rewards in return for their votes 
for LDP candidates in past Lower House and local elections is only 
natural. New Komeito Secretary General Kazuo Kitagawa held a meeting 
with his LDP counterpart Hidenao Nakagawa on June 14 in which they 
agreed that the New Komeito would cooperate for the LDP in Chiba and 
in return the LDP would assist the New Komeito in Aichi and 
Saitama. 
 
Many LDP lawmakers are wary of such arrangements. For instance, 
incumbent Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiji Suzuki garnered 
970,000 votes in the election six years ago by riding on the 
coattail of popular Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, but he is now 
highly alarmed about the impact of the pension fiasco and other 
issues. 
 
Meanwhile, Minshuto, which will field two candidates, is struggling 
to evenly distribute votes to Ikuko Tanioka and Kohei Otsuka. In a 
gathering held on June 3 in Nagoya to support Otsuka, one alarmingly 
said, "Organizational votes might be absorbed by Tanioka." 
Minshuto's strategy is to let Otsuka collect 80 %   of the Rengo 
(Japanese Trade Union Confederation) Aichi votes and Tanioka, a 
university president, to win support from unaffiliated voters. "We 
definitely don't want to see the two vie with each other over 
organizational votes," a senior Aichi chapter official said. 
 
In Saitama, maneuvering by the ruling and opposition camps is 
intensifying. Attending a gathering in Kawaguchi City on the night 
of June 10, Kitagawa highlighted the need for the party to win 13 
seats in order for the ruling coalition to maintain a majority. The 
Minshuto candidates garnered a total of 1.2 million votes in the 
previous election. A half of that would be about the same as 
incumbent New Komeito lawmaker Hiroshi Takano collected six years 
ago when he won 560,000 votes. On June 10, LDP Lower House lawmaker 
Yoshitaka Shindo called on Takano at his campaign office in the city 
to offer his total support. "We want 30,000 votes from the LDP," a 
New Komeito Saitama chapter executive said. 
 
 
"We cannot afford to give votes to New Komeito candidate" 
 
Toshiharu Furukawa, the LDP's first-time candidate, could not 
conceal his shock when 19 incumbents failed to win seats in the 
prefectural assembly race in April. Secretary General Nakagawa 
visited Saitama on June 10 to brace up the prefectural chapter. "We 
cannot afford to donate votes to the (New Komeito) candidate," a 
senior LDP prefectural chapter official noted. 
 
Minshuto is endeavoring to evenly distribute party votes to two 
candidates -- incumbent Ryuji Yamane and newcomer Kuniko Koda -- 
based on the bitter lessons from the previous race. At that time, 
the party was able to get only one of two candidates elected due to 
the large gap in the votes between the two. 
 
(7) Total lifting of ban on US beef imports so quickly? - part 2: 
"The US has not changed the risk at all," says Food Safety 
Commission Chairman Yasuhiro Yoshikawa 
 
TOKYO 00002761  009 OF 010 
 
 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 21) (Full) 
June 18, 2007 
 
US beef was once a strong competitor of Australian beef on the 
Japanese market. Now, however, Japan imports less than 2,000 tons of 
US beef a month. Australian beef now commands nearly 90 %   of 
Japan's imported beef market. 
 
While Japan sets no conditions on beef imported from Australia, 
where there have been no discoveries of BSE-infected cattle, US beef 
exported to Japan must be from cattle aged 20 months or younger. To 
meet this requirement, the US needs to select cattle for processing 
whose age can be identified. Some meat-processing plants set a 
specific day of the week to work on products bound for Japan. 
Operating plants in such a manner naturally drives costs higher. 
Given the trade statistics issued by the Department of the Treasury, 
US beef is nearly 30 %   more expensive than Australian varieties. 
Some meat retailers said, "We cannot do business with such high 
prices, though consumers can feel a sense of reassurance about the 
product's safety." 
 
In order to solve the situation like this, the US places high 
expectations on the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 
which has classified it as a country with a controlled BSE risk. 
 
This is the intermediate category out of three categories to be 
determined, based on such factors as whether BSE-infected cattle 
have been discovered in that country and measures that country takes 
to prevent BSE. Australia is categorized at one level higher. Though 
the OIE has not necessarily rated the US as a "country free of BSE," 
the arrangement is that countries in this category are not subject 
to trade restrictions, such as age limits, unless such restrictions 
are based on scientific grounds. 
 
Following the release of the OIE report, US Secretary of Agriculture 
Johanns released a statement that the US would use this 
international recognition in order to seek its trade partners to 
reopen their markets for all US beef products. Accordingly, the US 
has urged the Japanese government to revise its import conditions at 
an early date. 
 
Following the request, the Japanese government has drawn up a 
scenario of entering talks with the US possibly at the end of the 
month and inquiring the Cabinet Office's Food Safety Commission 
(FSC) to consider the propriety of easing import condition that 
limits beef eligible for exports to cattle aged 20 months or younger 
to cattle aged 30 months or younger, which is virtually a total 
lifting of the ban. It will then decide whether to totally remove 
the ban, following the panel's recommendation at the end of the year 
or early next year. 
 
A senior official of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) noted, "It is a hard job to reopen the market after 
a long hiatus, but the situation should be quite different if it is 
just to ease restrictions." Some view that procedures to ease the 
age restriction will go much more smoothly than the partial lifting 
of the ban the year before last. 
 
However, Tokyo University professor Yasuhiro Yoshikawa, chairman of 
the Food Safety Commission (FSC), a panel that holds the key to the 
issue, categorically said: "If you ask me whether it is all right to 
ease Japan's import conditions set on US beef, it is hard to say 
 
TOKYO 00002761  010 OF 010 
 
 
that it is all right, because the background risk of US beef has not 
changed. It is illogical to ask and answer such a question." 
 
He is especially concerned about the fact that the US allows 
meat-and-bone meal made of burnt specified risk material (SRM) as 
feed for chickens and other animals. He noted: "Unless the feed 
restrictions are tightened, the infectious agents that cause BSE in 
cattle would continue circulate in the country. It is a major minus 
factor for the US that it did not strengthen the regulation due to 
opposition from the industry. The OIE has pointed out this concern 
in a footnote of its report." 
 
The panel's report that approved the partial lifting of the ban in 
Dec. 2005 called for strengthening the feed regulation and 
inspection. However, the US has instead reduced the number of cattle 
subject to inspection. Yoshikawa revealed the distress he feels, 
sandwiched between political moves and science: "Japan carries out 
thorough inspection and sets a feed regulation. Its approach to root 
out BSE is accurate, but it is not the case for the US. If this 
situation continues, Japanese and US scenarios in dealing with BSE 
will become wide apart." 
 
Toshinobu Kitabayashi heads the Agricultural Information Research 
Center, which has studied the BSE issue since the occurrence of BSE 
in Britain in 1986. He pointed out: "Both Japanese and European 
people have begun eating beef, trusting the efficacy of BSE 
preventive measures - removal of SRM, feed regulation and 
inspection." He then made a bitter remark on US beef: "I do not 
think the US is a high-risk country, but I do not think that US beef 
is safe, either. I cannot be sure about this, because there is no 
premise for judgment. A BSE-infected cow was discovered in the US, 
and yet, its BSE-preventive measures are less proactive than those 
taken by Japan and European countries. Unless it does what it can 
do, matters, including a boost to the consumption of its beef, will 
not move forward." 
 
SCHIEFFER