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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1789, Trilateral Land Exchange Revisited

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TELAVIV1789 2007-06-18 13:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #1789/01 1691345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181345Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1722
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2354
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0268
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3096
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2356
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 7157
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 001789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KBTS KWBG KPAL EG IS JO
SUBJECT:  Trilateral Land Exchange Revisited 
 
REF:  2004 TEL AVIV 1952; 2004 Tel Aviv 2552 (notal); 2004 TEL AVIV 
 
2968 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Hebrew University Geography Professor Yehoshua 
Ben-Arieh shared his trilateral land swap (IS-PAL-EGY) idea with the 
Ambassador and ECON/C on June 13, the general contours of which 
remain basically as it was unveiled in 2004 (see main points below). 
 Ben-Arieh has previously briefed U.S., Israeli, Palestinian and 
Egyptian officials on his plan, elements of which have been promoted 
by individuals ranging from Kadima MK Otniel Schneller (septel) to 
former National Security Council head Giora Eiland (reftels).  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) In his latest pitch for a three-way exchange of territory 
between the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel and Egypt, Ben-Arieh 
acknowledged the many challenges that would have to be overcome to 
implement his plan, including:  economic costs (of developing Gaza, 
building corridors between WB and Gaza and between Jordan and 
Egypt); political leadership (Hamas control of Gaza and Mubarak's 
risk-adverse reign in Egypt).  But he argued that progress in the 
West Bank was contingent on making Gaza viable.  Ben-Arieh 
discounted less ambitious land swap ideas (including those put 
forward in the Geneva Accord of 2003) as insufficient to create a 
viable economy for Gaza, which could conceivably serve as a magnet 
for Palestinian refugees if endowed with additional coastline, a 
deep-water port, an inland airfield, and off-shore gas fields and 
fishing resources.  Additionally, a direct connection between the 
Egyptian Sinai and Jordan (via a sunken road corridor across Israel) 
could allow President Mubarak the opportunity to realize former 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's dream of creating a "Dar 
al-Hajj" from Cairo to Mecca.  Compensation for valuable Sinai coast 
could be meted out in the form of international assistance for 
Egyptian efforts to modernize the Suez Canal. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ben-Arieh responded to questions of political feasibility 
by noting that exchanges of territory are accepted practice in the 
Arab world (e.g. Jordan/Saudi Arabia land swaps in the 1960's and 
more recently).  He averred that Israel could transfer land to the 
PA, which could, in turn, swap Negev land for Sinai coast near Rafah 
(see details in paras 6-10 below), thereby eliminating any direct 
Egypt-Israel deal that could be problematic to the Egyptians. 
Alternatively, Egypt might be able to condition its agreement to a 
trilateral swap on an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement. 
Ben-Arieh indicated that Egyptian contacts -- he claimed to have 
discussed the ideas with Mohammed Bassioni and Omar Suleiman -- had 
refused to embrace an Israel-origin plan, which led Ben-Arieh to 
believe that the Quartet would be a more appropriate vehicle for 
broaching such ideas. 
 
4.  (SBU) In response to our questions about security implications 
of an enlarged Gaza, Ben-Arieh noted that a 5km buffer zone between 
the enlarged Gaza and its new borders with Egypt and Israel would 
contain the smuggling threat that currently exists along the 
Philadelphi Corridor.  He clarified that many of the anticipated 
projects (port, airfield, etc.) would be contingent on a final 
status agreement, not an Oslo-like series of interim steps that 
would put Israel in the uncomfortable position of "giving, giving, 
giving" without requisite security assurances. 
5. (U) In response to Econ Counselor questions about costs 
associated with his plan, Ben Arieh acknowledged that he had not 
prepared any economic analysis of the costs of land swaps, economic 
development, or sunken corridors -- costs which he said the 
international community would have to consider. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
(U) Main Elements of Ben Arieh's Swap Plan 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (U) Israel will cede to Egypt an area of 200-500 square km. in 
the southern Negev, in the Nahal Paran region bordering Sinai, 
approximately opposite Kuntila, which will be annexed to Egypt. The 
security arrangements, which apply at present to the region of Sinai 
adjoining this area, in line with the peace agreement between Israel 
and Egypt, will also apply to this area. 
 
7. (U) Israel will cede to Egypt a highway corridor from the 
extremity of the area that is to be annexed to Sinai toward the 
Kingdom of Jordan, which will permit the construction of a 
multi-lane automotive highway, a railway, and adequate area for 
laying fuel, water pipelines, and communication. 
 
8. (U)  In return for the area and passage that will be ceded to 
Egypt from Israel, Egypt will agree to cede to the PA an area 
similar in size and even larger because of the strategic passage it 
will get (between 500-1,000 sq. km.). This area will be south of 
Rafah in the Gaza Strip along 20-30 km. of coastline from the 
present Israeli-Egyptian border toward El-Arish, extending inland 
into Sinai. 
 
9.  (U)  In return for the area that is to be received by the PA in 
Sinai from Egypt, an area of similar size will be ceded by the PA to 
Israel beyond the line determined by the armistice agreement which 
was signed between Israel and Jordan in 1949 and which was in effect 
until June 4, l967. 
 
10.  (U) The precise demarcation of the area to be annexed to Israel 
beyond the lines of June 4, 1967, and as a corollary the permanent 
border between Israel and the PA, as well as the determinations 
concerning the city of Jerusalem and its environs, will be made as 
part of additional steps to be agreed upon in advance of the signing 
of the peace agreement between Israel and the PA. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Ben Arieh's Win-Win-Win Rationales for the Swap 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
11. (U) The Gaza Strip today, covering only a small area, suffers 
from over-crowding and poverty, with no possibility of 
self-sustainability.  The plan calls for the addition of territory 
which will allow the Strip to evolve from being an economic and 
demographic burden into an area with considerable natural resources 
and land, thus enabling the Palestinians to establish a sustainable 
state, economically and culturally in both Gaza and in the West 
Bank. 
 
12. (U) Israel would receive Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, 
the large blocks of Jewish settlement close to the Green Line, and 
some small vital areas in the West Bank.  The transfer of these 
vital areas would have to be agreed upon between the two sides. 
 
13. (U) Egypt would receive a land and road connection to Jordan, 
and thus land access to Jordan's neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Iraq.  Moreover, it will enjoy additional economic benefits as well 
as earning a position of leadership in the Middle East and elevated 
status in the world. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) The plans of a passionate Israeli geographer display 
creative non-official Israeli thinking about a two-state solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however, Ben Arieh's proposal for 
making Gaza larger/viable via land swaps involving Egypt was 
unrealistic -- even before Hamas took over Gaza.  To our knowledge, 
Palestinian interlocutors are not pushing for such a plan, and we 
are doubtful that West Bank Palestinians would be willing to make 
border concessions to Israel (i.e., settlement blocks) that would 
only result in territorial gains for their Gazan brethren.  Counting 
on Egypt to make territorial concessions is another non-starter, and 
Ben Arieh's plan ignores the difficulties of redrawing borders in 
the Sinai sands and the complexity that adding a third party would 
bring to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. 
 
CRETZ