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Viewing cable 07SAOPAULO485, WHITHER THE LULA ADMINISTRATION - A PT EX-DEPUTY'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SAOPAULO485 2007-06-05 12:30 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO5677
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0485/01 1561230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051230Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7049
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8163
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2756
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 3015
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0502
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2353
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3362
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2059
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0283
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8110
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3603
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2793
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR FEARS 
STATE PASS USTR FOR SUE CRONIN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC 
USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO 
DOL FOR ILAB 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID FOR LAC/AA 
PARIS FOR ECON - TOM WHITE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM ELAB ECON BR
SUBJECT: WHITHER THE LULA ADMINISTRATION - A PT EX-DEPUTY'S 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: (A) SAO PAULO 367; (B) BRASILIA 555; 
     (C) SAO PAULO 129;  (D) BRASILIA 149; 
     (E) 06 SAO PAULO 449 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Workers Party (PT) stalwart and former Federal Deputy Luiz 
Eduardo Greenhalgh sees President Lula as working for the first time 
in his career without a real power behind the throne, either in the 
government or in his party.  This situation has turned Lula into a 
political operator who makes his own deals.  Greenhalgh cited Lula's 
distancing himself from his own party and political base (as 
illustrated by recent Cabinet decisions which short-changed the PT) 
as evidence that he is not, contrary to rumor, trying to position 
himself to make a presidential comeback in 2014.  While Lula's 
coalition-building efforts have been impressive, they have not been 
matched on the policy side.  The only major policy initiative to 
emerge in the first five months of Lula's second term is the Growth 
Acceleration Plan (PAC), which remains stalled and is viewed by some 
observers as at best a bundle of good intentions. End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Luiz Eduardo Greenhalgh served as a Federal Deputy from Sao 
Paulo from 1997 through 2006, when he failed to win re-election. 
One of many founders, along with President Lula, in 1980 of the 
Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT), he has served as a 
PT Vice-President and Secretary of International Relations, as well 
as Vice-Mayor of Sao Paulo (1989-92).  In February 2005, he was the 
party's candidate for President of the Chamber of Deputies, but lost 
when a rival within the party decided to seek the job, effectively 
splitting the pro-government vote.  During his years in Congress, 
Greenhalgh was strongly identified with the Landless Movement (MST) 
and with promotion of human rights.  In a recent conversation with 
Poloffs, Greenhalgh shared his irreverent views on the current state 
of play in the PT and in the Lula administration.  His opinion on 
relations between Lula's government and the MST are reported ref A. 
 
3.  (SBU) Greenhalgh attributed his own failure to be re-elected 
last October to three factors: Loss of support from social security 
beneficiaries due to his support for social security reform; loss of 
support from MST militants as he distanced himself from the landless 
movement; and the public's general weariness with the PT as a result 
of the political corruption scandals (though he acknowledged that 
this disillusion did not prevent several PT Deputies who were 
actually implicated in the scandals from being re-elected).  He has 
returned to his private law practice and remains active on the human 
rights front.  He told us he had been offered the position of 
National Secretary of Human Rights, but did not accept because Paulo 
Vanucchi was not ready to relinquish his office for another six 
months, and Greenhalgh did not want to wait. 
 
----------------- 
LULA AS CONDUCTOR 
----------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Historically, Greenhalgh said, President Lula was never a 
political organizer or operator.  Rather, he was the "star" or 
"talent" of the PT, surrounded by able handlers and managers who 
would bring him out to make speeches and inspire the faithful. 
There was always somebody in the shadows pulling the strings, 
whether Jose Genoino (erstwhile PT president), Jose Dirceu (Chief of 
Civil Household until June 2005), or Antonio Palocci (Finance 
 
SAO PAULO 00000485  002 OF 003 
 
 
Minister until March 2006).  Others took care of fund-raising, 
organizing, and expanding the party's reach and influence. 
 
5.  (SBU) However, late last September, in the last days of the 
first round of the election, Lula was suddenly deprived of his 
campaign manager when Ricardo Berzoini removed himself after being 
implicated in the "dossier" scandal, in which PT insiders and 
employees of Lula's campaign and that of Sao Paulo gubernatorial 
hopeful Aloizio Mercadante were accused of perpetrating a media 
smear campaign against opposition gubernatorial candidate Jose 
Serra.  Officially, Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula's foreign affairs 
advisor, took over as acting campaign manager and acting PT 
President, but in fact, according to Greenhalgh, Lula was 
essentially running his own campaign for the four weeks of the 
second round.  This experience (and especially his victory) 
convinced Lula that he was capable of "directing the orchestra and 
at the same time singing the lead role in the opera."  Though 
Berzoini has returned to the head of the PT, he is viewed as a weak, 
acquiescent leader, and Lula is increasingly making his own 
political deals and accommodations, and deciding strategies and 
tactics as well as policy, Greenhalgh said.  Lula's current Chief of 
Civil Household, Dilma Rousseff, is viewed as more of a technician 
than a political manager. 
 
6.  (SBU) It was Lula himself, Greenhalgh said, who united the 
hopelessly divided Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the 
largest single party, behind his government.  He also brought other 
parties like the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) into his coalition. 
It was he who negotiated the recent Cabinet changes (ref B) to 
ensure that each party (and each faction of some parties) was 
satisfied.  In so doing, Lula is increasingly distancing himself 
from the PT.  His actions, Greenhalgh argued, indicate that he is 
clearly thinking about supporting a non-PT candidate for President 
in 2010.  Elements in the party brought considerable pressure to 
bear on him to name former Sao Paulo Mayor Marta Suplicy (frequently 
mentioned as a possible successor) Minister of Cities or Minister of 
Education, but he wouldn't do it.  Only her persistence and tenacity 
led him in the end to give her the less attractive Tourism 
portfolio, and the manner in which he conducted her swearing-in 
ceremony made clear his lack of enthusiasm. 
 
-------- 
PT BLUES 
-------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The PT, Greenhalgh said, simply has few viable candidates 
- he and a staffer ticked off various names that came to mind, 
nixing each one - and apparently none that Lula really likes or 
fully trusts, so he will look elsewhere for somebody who will 
protect his legacy and let him retain influence.  Ciro Gomes of the 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), who Lula once said was the only 
person qualified to take over from him, is a perennial possibility, 
Greenhalgh said, or perhaps the PMDB can find a candidate to unite 
around. 
 
8.  (SBU) Greenhalgh dismissed speculation that Lula's reluctance to 
anoint a PT successor might signal his intention run to again in 
2014.  According to this commonly held view, Lula, who is precluded 
by constitutionally-mandated term limits from running again in 2010, 
would like to see a weak candidate without a strong political base 
elected as his successor so that he can return to the field in 2014 
(when he will again be eligible) with a good chance of winning. 
Asked why he thought this scenario was unrealistic, Greenhalgh 
pointed to the recent change at the Ministry of Labor, in which 
Minister Luiz Marinho, a former president of the powerful Unified 
 
SAO PAULO 00000485  003 OF 003 
 
 
Workers' Center (CUT - the nation's largest labor confederation), 
was transferred to the Social Security Ministry and replaced by 
Carlos Lupi, President of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT).  This 
surprise, last-minute move so angered Marinho that he considered 
quitting altogether.  Paulo Pereira da Silva (no relation to Lula), 
head of the Forca Sindical, the CUT's main rival, is a recently 
elected PDT Federal Deputy.  In essence, Greenhalgh said, Lula is 
turning the Labor Ministry over to the Forca Sindical to the serious 
detriment of his historical allies in the CUT.  The CUT was founded 
in 1984 by many of the same people who founded the PT.  It has 
served as a sister organization to the PT, and several of its 
leaders serve on the PT's National Directorate.  Lula would never 
alienate his base in this way if he had any plans for a political 
future, Greenhalgh argued. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Greenhalgh's insights into President Lula's plans and 
strategies ring true in many respects, but at times he gives Lula 
more credit than he deserves.  While Lula's coalition-building 
efforts - "conducting the orchestra" - have been impressive, they 
have not been matched on the policy side ("singing the lead role"). 
The only major policy initiative to emerge in the first five months 
of the second term is the Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC - ref D), 
which many observers consider at best a bundle of good intentions 
that is unlikely to stimulate much economic growth.  His 
administration is working hard to maximize and retain Brazil's 
advantage in the area of ethanol, but beyond that it is difficult to 
see much action on any front, especially pursuit of the structural 
political and economic reforms most Brazilians consider essential 
for their country's future.  End Comment. 
 
10.  (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. 
 
MCMULLEN