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Viewing cable 07PARAMARIBO297, TAIWAN STRIKES AT CHINA IN SURINAME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARAMARIBO297 2007-06-12 11:32 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Paramaribo
VZCZCXRO2457
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0297/01 1631132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121132Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9426
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0126
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1132
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0012
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000297 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR FOR LAURA LUFTIG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NS CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN STRIKES AT CHINA IN SURINAME 
 
REF: A. 2007 PARAMARIBO 165 
 
     B. 2006 PARAMARIBO 698 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000297  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
This cable is the first in a series on Chinese and Taiwanese 
activities in Suriname in the Spring of 2007. 
 
1. (U)  SUMMARY:  Responding to a charm-and-funding offensive 
(ref A) by the government of the People,s Republic of China 
(GOC), the Government of Taiwan (GOT) offered more than U.S. 
$100 million in loans and grant assistance to Suriname 
through a "Friendship Foundation" in April.  Select 
government of Suriname (GOS) officials come out quickly with 
a strong rejection of Taiwan's offer and an unequivocal 
reaffirmation of Suriname's "One China Policy."  Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Lygia Kraag-Keteldijk declared that the GOS 
has made its choice and is not at all interested in what 
Taiwan has to offer, and Vice President Ramdien Sardjoe said 
the One-China Policy is not up for discussion.  In marked 
contrast, Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation 
Rick van Ravenswaay of governing-coalition member-party 
Democratic Alternative ,91 (DA-91) said that, while his 
party supports the position of the GOS, it is worth examining 
what Taiwan has to offer instead of just blindly following a 
"One China Policy," especially if Taiwan offers better 
prospects for the development of Suriname.  The Foreign 
Minister and Vice President,s strong statement of support 
confirms the long-standing policy of President Venetiaan, and 
in particular his National Party of Suriname (NPS).  A 
proposed better deal from Taiwan, if true, will not change 
the minds of the coalition-leading NPS, but did help to 
highlight differences within the coalition, and may provide a 
map to a more rocky future for the GOC in Suriname.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
---------------------------------- 
Taiwan Offers Hundreds of Millions 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (U)  Working through the recently established 
Suriname-Taiwan Friendship Foundation, the GOT began by 
donating U.S. $3,600 in goods for a foster home, then offered 
to finance three costly infrastructure projects in the 
country, plus provide budgetary assistance of up to U.S. $15 
million for the next three years.  Additional offers of loans 
and grant assistance were estimated at various values between 
U.S. $100 million and $200 million (and one newspaper used 
the figure U.S. $1 billion).  The full-page newspaper ads 
detailing the proposal read like a laundry list of 
Suriname,s development needs.  The ads also specifically 
said that the offer was conditional on diplomatic recognition 
of Taiwan (despite saying in another paragraph that "Taiwan 
makes the offer with absolutely no conditions regarding 
Suriname,s foreign policy, unlike the attempts of some other 
nations").  Meanwhile, the Foundation launched an extensive 
media campaign designed, according to Foundation Secretary 
David Chin, "to foster friendship between the peoples of 
Suriname and Taiwan." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Dollar Diplomacy or Long-Term Commitments? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (U)  What the campaign fostered best, however, may have 
been greed.  In the weeks after the offer and the GOS's hasty 
refusal, heated debate o6QFBzksAdo the same.  Minister of Planning and 
Development Cooperation Ricardo van Ravenswaay, however, 
zy  Nor can it be said the GOS is more in line with 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000297  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
communist China than the democratic GOT, particularly since 
there is widespread anti-Chinese sentiment in the public and 
the press in Suriname (septel), largely due to a perception 
of favoritism in the granting of residency, business, and 
other permits.  So, standing up for its long time alliance 
with the GOC rather than caving in at the first sign of cash 
could be seen as a breath of fresh air from the GOS, whose 
foreign policy,s first principle often seems to be 
opportunism.  However, caution is also an important principle 
for the delicately-balanced, multi-party government, and 
changing horses in mid-stream is dangerous.  With all the 
assistance Suriname is already receiving from China, it is 
very unlikely the Venetiaan-Sardjoe administration will 
change its mind and turn on one of its biggest donors.  What 
subsequent administrations will do remains to be seen: and 
van Ravenswaay,s comments may be a shot across the bow.  END 
COMMENT 
SCHREIBER HUGHES