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Viewing cable 07MANILA1939, AFP-MILF MEET TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR MINDANAO PEACE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANILA1939 2007-06-12 08:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
VZCZCXRO2250
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #1939/01 1630816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120816Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6914
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINS PTER MOPS KISL MY RP
SUBJECT: AFP-MILF MEET TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR MINDANAO PEACE 
AT A "CRUCIAL STAGE" 
 
REF: A. MANILA 1543 
     B. MANILA 1243 
     C. MANILA 952 
     D. MANILA 828 
     E. MANILA 281 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) officers exchanged views 
on the peace process and cease-fire mechanisms during an 
unprecedented roundtable discussion on June 9.  Participants 
cited the MILF's expeditious rescue and turnover of four 
kidnapping victims to the AFP May 31-June 1 and use of the Ad 
Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) to prevent Abu Sayyaf Group 
and Jemaah Islamiyah members in the Sulu Archipelago from 
relocating to central Mindanao as successes.  While the 
cease-fire continues to hold, challenges remain 
on-the-ground, including "rido" (clan feuds), conflicts over 
personal interests, land and water supply issues, 
availability of firearms, inadequate support and/or 
mishandling of internally displaced persons, the presence of 
terrorists, criminal syndicates, and other lawless elements, 
and the emergence of "a third party" determined to sabotage 
the peace process.  Philippine Government Peace Panel 
Chairman Secretary Silvestre Afable Jr. requested support 
from the AFP, MILF, foreign diplomatic community, and civil 
society groups in overcoming obstacles to a strong, just, and 
durable peace agreement for Mindanao at this "crucial stage." 
 End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
First-ever Roundtable 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  On June 9, the Malaysia-led International 
Monitoring Team (IMT) sponsored an unprecedented roundtable 
discussion on the peace process and cease-fire mechanisms in 
Cotabato City for commanders and officers of the AFP and the 
MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF).  The 30 AFP 
and 20 BIAF participants all wore red, blue, or beige sport 
shirts bearing the logo "1st AFP-BIAF Roundtable Discussion." 
 However, many of the MILF's key field commanders were not 
present, 
 
3.  (SBU) The roundtable panel included IMT Chief of Mission 
Major-General Dato Md Ismail Bin Ahmad Khan, Philippine 
Government Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of 
Hostilities (CCCH) Chairman Brigadier-General Edgardo M. 
Guerrea, MILF/CCCH Chairman Von Al Haq, Philippine Government 
AHJAG Chairman Major-General Benjamin Mohammad Dolorfino, 
MILF/AHJAG Chairman Attorney Abdul Dataya, Philippine 
Government Peace Panel Chairman Afable, Oblate Father With 
Mary Immaculate (OMI) Inter-Religious Dialogue Coordinator 
Father Roberto C. Layson, Bangsamoro Development Agency 
Ustadz Abdul Kadir Abdullah, and Institute for Autonomy and 
Governance Executive Director Attorney Benedicto Bacani, who 
served as moderator. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Among the observers were U.S., Canadian, Japanese, 
and Libyan diplomats, members of civil 
society/non-governmental organizations (including Bantay 
Cease-fire, Non-Violent Peace Force, and Geneva Call), and 
the media. 
 
---------------------- 
"Peace on the Horizon" 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) IMT Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Mustapha Bin Omar 
opened the forum by commenting that "we are here today 
because we all believe there is light at the end of the 
tunnel."   As he highlighted the 70-80 percent decrease in 
armed encounters since the IMT's deployment to Mindanao in 
October 2004 and the absence of fighting for the past seven 
months in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao Province and the past 
three months in Midsayap, North Cotabato Province, Omar 
proclaimed that "peace is on the horizon." 
 
6.  (SBU) IMT Chief of Mission MG Khan emphasized the primacy 
of the peace process when describing the mission, role, 
objectives, and mandate of the 60-man IMT, which currently 
includes 10 members from Brunei, 9 members from Libya, and 1 
member from Japan.  Khan noted that Canada and Sweden may 
also become members of the IMT in the future. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Cease-fire Holds, amidst challenges 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
MANILA 00001939  002 OF 003 
 
 
7.  (SBU) The Philippine Government CCCH Chairman BG Guerrea 
described the cease-fire mechanisms -- IMT, CCCH, AHJAG, and 
Local Monitoring Teams (LMT) -- as "very effective" in 
providing the relative peace that allowed the Philippine 
Government-MILF Peace Panels to tackle substantive issues 
during negotiations.  According to BG Guerrea another LMT 
will soon deploy in the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan, 
bringing the total number of LMTs in conflict-affected areas 
to 14. 
 
8.  (SBU) BG Guerrea and MG Khan identified one of the 
greatest challenges to peace in Mindanao as traditional 
"rido" (clan feuds);  "there seems to be no end to rido," 
said Khan.  They identified other key challenges and "gaps" 
as: conflicts over "personal interests;" land and water 
supply issues; firearms in the hands of unauthorized persons; 
inadequate support and/or mishandling of internally displaced 
persons; the presence of terrorists, criminal syndicates, and 
other lawless elements; the emergence of "a third party" 
determined to sabotage the peace process; exposure of 
cease-fire mechanism officers to physical harm; the 
vulnerability of the cease-fire to suspicion, bias, 
criticism, and loss of confidence; and, "provocative 
statements" that could undermine the peace process. 
 
--------------- 
AHJAG To Remain 
--------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) MILF/AHJAG Chairman Dataya emphasized adherence to 
AHJAG's formal procedures/guidelines (e.g. validation of 
target information, timely provision of written requests, and 
advance notification) to reduce the potential for 
misunderstandings and conflict during operations against 
terrorists and criminal syndicates.  With an exception for 
"high priority targets," Dataya noted that the AHJAG was 
required to inform the Philippine Government/CCCH and 
MILF/CCCH at least 24 hours in advance of conducting an 
operation.  He further noted that paramilitary and irregular 
forces were not allowed to enter MILF areas in hot pursuit of 
criminals. 
 
10.  (SBU) Philippine Government/AHJAG Chairman MG Dolorfino 
said that, although the AHJAG's implementing guidelines were 
due to expire on June 21, the AHJAG mechanism -- created on 
May 6, 2002 but which only came into effect in 2005 -- would 
indeed remain operational with or without renewal. 
 
--------------- 
Success Stories 
--------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Several participants recounted cease-fire 
mechanism "success stories," notably the MILF/AHJAG's rescue 
and turnover of four kidnapping victims -- including a German 
national -- to the Philippine military May 31-June 1.  MG 
Dolorfino explained how the cease-fire mechanism had also 
recently prevented Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah 
members in the Sulu Archipelago from relocating to Mindanao. 
He described an alert against them along the entire coastal 
area of central Mindanao, which had been "very effective" 
against these terrorist organizations, and would likely force 
them to look toward Tawi-Tawi, Malaysia, and/or Indonesia as 
future places of refuge. 
 
---------------------------- 
Peace Talks at Crucial Stage 
---------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Secretary Afable attributed the postponement of 
the May 1-2 peace talks in Kuala Lumpur to the May 14 
Philippine mid-term elections but expressed hope that the 
peace panels would soon be able to resume discussions on the 
final issue of territory now that the elections were over. 
Afable asked the AFP and MILF participants to insulate 
themselves from pressure by "those who do not want peace to 
succeed," and requested support from the AFP, MILF, foreign 
diplomatic community, and civil society in overcoming 
obstacles to a strong, just, and durable peace agreement for 
Mindanao now that the peace talks were at a "crucial stage." 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (SBU) This was a welcome initiative by the IMT, AFP, and 
MILF, and again demonstrated a shared commitment both to the 
 
MANILA 00001939  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
AT A "CRUCIAL STAGE" 
 
overall peace process and to the actual peace talks.  The 
Philippine Government was pro-active in ensuring the presence 
of interested observers, including an Embassy representative, 
as another recognition that the stakes for peace in Mindanao 
are broader and deeper than the issues on which the 
Philippine Government and MILF are currently negotiating. 
The only dark clouds were the repeated references to a 
would-be spoiler "third party" and others opposed to peace, 
whose identities were left unspecified. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/ 
 
 
 
 
KENNEY