Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM975, Confusion and Criticism Follow Further Changes to Foreign

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM975.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM975 2007-06-20 14:28 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0975/01 1711428
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201428Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7669
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000975 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EPS, EB/IFD, AND EB/ESC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON EAID SU
SUBJECT:  Confusion and Criticism Follow Further Changes to Foreign 
Currency Laws 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 902 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  On May 29, in an action widely understood as a 
measure designed to prevent capital flight following tightened U.S. 
sanctions, the Foreign Exchange Administration of the Central Bank 
of Sudan announced an amendment to its foreign exchange regulations 
(reftel).  After widespread criticism of this amendment, the law was 
further altered on June 10, reducing the prepayment margin on 
imports and adding further clarification to the law.  Critical 
newspaper editorials and public debates followed this June 10 
change.  Some commentators have boldly argued that the ruling party 
and political elite imposed these changes to defend their economic 
interests and ultimately prevent political opposition.  Less extreme 
though more prevalent, most analysts view the volatile foreign 
currency laws as a direct reaction to tightened U.S. sanctions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) Following widespread criticism of the Foreign Currency 
Amendment, the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS) published another change 
to its foreign currency law on June 10.  While upholding most of the 
previous changes, the memorandum describes a reduction in the 
prepayment margin on imports from 50 percent to 15 percent for 
industrial and agricultural materials.  The prepayment margin for 
other import goods will remain at 50 percent of their value. 
Furthermore, the law clarified that all commercial banks must 
provide the Foreign Exchange Administration with monthly reports 
detailing their imports operations.  The law upholds the previous 
amendment which puts limitations on transferring foreign currency to 
accounts abroad. 
 
3.  (U) Abbas Hassan Ahmed, in a June 17 editorial in the Sudanese 
Arabic daily newspaper "Al-Soudani," criticizes the changes to 
foreign currency law.  Acknowledging that the law may combat money 
laundering, Ahmed argues that the changes will negatively affect the 
most important areas of the economy.  Ahmed contends that there is a 
direct relationship between the tightened U.S. sanctions and the 
changes.  Ahmed believes that this round of sanctions differs 
substantially from those in the past because most of the companies 
on the new list have a direct connection to the ruling party and/or 
the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).  According to 
Ahmed, these sanctioned companies benefit from interaction with the 
American financial system and will be hurt by the sanctions.  He 
believes that the government changed the foreign currency law to 
choke any competition, prevent an economic opposition bloc that 
might be able to access foreign currency, and combat any rising 
internal economic power.  Ahmed states that since these changes 
occurred, the value of Sudanese currency has dropped and a black 
market for foreign currency has already emerged. 
 
4.  (U) Records of the debates in public meetings also illustrate 
the confusion surrounding the foreign currency law.  On June 10, 
Saud al Brier, the President of the Sudanese Businessmen and 
Employers Federation, met with Dr. Sabir M. Hassan, Governor of the 
Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) and submitted a public memorandum 
criticizing the recent foreign exchange regulations regarding 
imports. 
 
5.  (U)  On June 16, the Banks Association held a public forum about 
the new foreign exchange regulations, convened by Dr. Hassan.  Also 
in attendance were bank managers, businessmen, and university 
students.  Hatim Abdalla El-Zubair, Secretary General of the Banks 
Association, opened the session saying that the forum will help 
address the ambiguity that resulted from the changes. 
 
6.  (U)  Dr. Sabir M. Hassan, Governor of the CBOS, first stated 
that the amendment does not rule out foreign exchange altogether. 
He compared the amendments to traffic laws which allow for the 
freedom of movement within certain parameters. He stated that the 
Central Bank made the changes to reduce dependency on imports and 
combat money laundering activities. 
 
7.  (U) Many participants in the forum reportedly asked Dr. Hassan 
why the new foreign exchange regulations immediately followed 
tightened U.S. sanctions on Sudan.  He responded that the 
regulations had no relation to the sanctions.  He also dismissed the 
efficacy of any new restriction put on Sudan, saying that Sudan has 
become accustomed to living in this state.  Hashim Hago, President 
of the Sudanese Businessmen and Employers Federation, criticized the 
new regulations and stated that they will only result in further 
confusion. 
 
8.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  The additional changes to foreign currency 
laws, the public debates, and editorials that followed demonstrate 
widespread confusion and disapproval of the amendments.  According 
to the reports, most observers see a connection between the foreign 
currency laws and tightened U.S. economic sanctions.  Others view 
the foreign currency amendments not only as directly related to U.S. 
sanctions, but also as a move designed to hinder real competition to 
the businesses of the ruling elite.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ