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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM906, DARFUR - A CARJACKING A DAY KEEPS NGOS AWAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM906 2007-06-10 05:50 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0712
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0906/01 1610550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100550Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7530
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000906 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, DS/IP/AF AND DS/DSS/ITA, 
AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI ASEC UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - A CARJACKING A DAY KEEPS NGOS AWAY 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 0878 
 
KHARTOUM 00000906  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
(SBU) Carjackings present the greatest security risk to humanitarian 
operations in Darfur, according to the UN.  Between January 2006 and 
April 2007, the UN received reports of 159 carjackings in Darfur, 
with a surge in attacks since December.  Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are the primary target, and humanitarian staff 
are frequently abducted for several hours before being released. 
The loss of vehicles and communications equipment has forced 
reductions and suspensions of relief activities on several 
occasions.  UN agencies, donors, and NGOs are taking steps to revise 
security procedures, provide additional training, and establish 
precautionary measures, yet carjackings remain a serious threat to 
the humanitarian community. (End cuMm`rynQ 
-%----=-------/-)--------%,) 
TBtRQZKs$N$CISJABSJnCcyN#IUDSQ5-%,]/5(}-,=!-- =-)/+,Q-)/}Q*&Bd9"evs#Qfazj>ix 
iQ#Q5:FPyLpl XQ incidents takarms fire, with shots being fired at the 
targeted vehicle in a quarter of reported incidents.  However, 28 
percent of carjackings occur in the vicinity of a home or office, 
highlighting the importance of security measures and vigilance in 
all areas.  Nearly all vehicles targeted are Landcruiser Buffalo or 
Toyota pickup trucks.  NGOs, including many USAID-funded 
organizations, are the primary target.  While humanitarian staff 
tend not to be harmed, temporary abductions are becoming 
increasingly common. 
 
2. (SBU) The suspected perpetrators include members of the Sudan 
Liberation Army factions under Minni Minawi and Abdul Wahid, Arab 
militia, unaffiliated armed bandits, and possibly trans-Sahelian 
crime networks.  The UN notes that carjackings tend to emerge 
wherever humanitarian organizations are operating, although distinct 
patterns are apparent in each Darfur state.  In North Darfur, most 
carjackings have occurred in and around El Fasher, while incidents 
in South Darfur are exclusively in remote locations.  Both urban and 
rural areas are affected in West Darfur. 
 
-------------------------- 
DEMAND FOR STOLEN VEHICLES 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The stolen vehicles and accompanying communications 
equipment are in demand from two sources, namely armed opposition 
groups and growing demand from markets in Chad.  UN agencies and 
NGOs report that stolen aid vehicles are often handed off to a 
second group, in Saraf Omra or other locations in Darfur, before 
heading towards Chad.  The vehicles are then sold to buyers from 
Chadian armed opposition groups, Sudanese armed opposition groups, 
or potentially other regional armed opposition groups.  UN security 
officials believe that the recent trend of keeping staff in the 
vehicle for two to three hours after stealing the vehicle is a 
strategy to delay reporting of the incident and give the carjackers 
more time to leave the area.  Unlike carjackers intending to sell 
the vehicles in Chad, other armed groups, primarily SLA and Arab 
militias, do not often abduct staff members. 
 
4. (SBU) In a May 14 meeting, the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that 50 percent of all carjacking 
incidents in Darfur in the past four months have been perpetrated by 
SLA/Minawi forces, meaning that the vehicle was either stolen from 
or ended up in an SLA/Minawi-controlled area.  OCHA urged donors to 
pressure SLA/Minawi leadership to stop stealing vehicles and 
endangering humanitarian staff. 
 
5. (SBU) The current carjacking trend, which generally involves the 
theft of vehicles and communications equipment but not usually theft 
of personal assets or physical attacks, indicates that the 
perpetrators intend to obtain assets and not to disrupt humanitarian 
 
KHARTOUM 00000906  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
operations.  However, NGOs are concerned that assailants may be 
moving towards future abduction of international staff for ransom. 
In recent meetings, NGOs reported that assailants have discussed 
possibly abducting an expatriate staff member for ransom during two 
recent carjackings.  If carjackings begin to be motivated by intent 
to collect ransom for staff members, the impact on aid agencies will 
be devastating. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IMPACT ON HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) The impact of carjackings is already being felt as several 
NGOs have had to reduce or suspend humanitarian operations following 
the loss of vehicles and communications equipment.  In Gereida, 
South Darfur, the majority of relief organizations evacuated staff 
and closed operations following an unusually violent incident in 
December.  In North Darfur, carjackings have repeatedly led to 
suspended health activities in Tawila locality (REFTEL).  In 
addition, multiple NGOs have temporarily suspended operations in 
response to carjackings involving harassment or detention of staff. 
 
-------------------- 
SECURITY INITIATIVES 
-------------------- 
 
7. (U) In response to the escalating threat of carjackings, the UN, 
in collaboration with RedR, is training Darfur-based aid workers in 
carjacking avoidance and survival skills and is tracking incidents 
in order to analyze the larger trends.  In addition, USAID and other 
donors are reviewing security protocols, NGO preparedness measures, 
and potential donor coordination mechanisms to support the safety 
and security of partner organizations.  In May, OCHA conducted a 
safety training workshop, emphasizing procedures to avoid carjacking 
situations and survival tactics, for NGOs in Darfur.  As this 
training only occurred in El Fasher, further training in El Geneina 
and Nyala are needed. 
 
-------------- 
RECOMMENDATION 
-------------- 
 
8. (U) USAID strongly encourages partners to review vehicle 
selection given the perpetrators' preference for Landcruiser 
Buffalos or Toyota pickup trucks. 
 
FERNANDEZ