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Viewing cable 07JAKARTA1585, CENTRAL SULAWESI ON THE ROAD TO NORMALCY
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07JAKARTA1585 | 2007-06-08 06:36 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Jakarta |
VZCZCXRO9336
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1585/01 1590636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080636Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4999
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 001585
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA, DS/CC
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON PHUM PINR ID
SUBJECT: CENTRAL SULAWESI ON THE ROAD TO NORMALCY
¶1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY. THIS
CABLE IS A JOINT REPORT FROM EMBASSY JAKARTA AND CONSULATE GENERAL
SURABAYA.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a recent visit to Central Sulawesi's former
conflict areas, Mission officers clearly saw the beginning of a
return to normalcy. This was the fourth trip to Central Sulawesi by
ConGen Surabaya officers in the last 2 years but it is the first
time to the former conflict areas of Poso and Tentena without a
police escort. Local police and civil society contacts in the
cities of Palu, Poso, and Tentena were confident that the communal
violence was over and attributed the attacks since the 2001 Malino
Peace Accords to criminal acts of terrorism sourced to a small band
of local Muslim extremists. Ethno-communal violence divided
Christians and Muslims in the Poso regency and claimed over 1,000
lives in spates of fighting in 1999-2001. Burned out homes,
churches and mosques remain throughout the Poso area as daily
reminders of the past conflict, though we saw no obvious
post-hostility finger pointing or rehashed grievnces during any of
our d iscussions. Contacts suggested that "s"d nts were eager to
break with the past and move toward reo*nciliation but lacked the
means to fully rebuil their communities. Although the security
envirn*ment has improved due primarily to the resolution of most of
the recent terrorism cases and intercmmmunity relations were
returning to normal, resie nts had many post-conflict issues to
resolve an economic redevelopment, social reconciliation andQ
healing remain a long-term prospect. END SUMMARY.
Recent GOI/Police Action Brings Respite to Vioeence
--------------------------------------------( ------
¶3. (SBU) GOI efforts since late 2005 haee at least temporarily
improved the immediate seu rity environment and eased longstanding
local frustration over Jakarta's perceived inattention to Cnntral
Sulawesi's security plight. Communal sectr"ian violence in the
province broke out in 1999 iith a series of increasingly violent
events betwe n local Muslim and Christian groups, including the
highly publicized massacre of some 200 Muslims a the Walisongo
pesantren and mosque by Christianm(ilitia groups. The two sides
signed the Malinoppeace accords in 2001 but by 2004, Muslim
extrems"t groups were again terrorizing the Poso/Tentena region. In
October 2005, the beheadings of three hhristian girls was a turning
point, shocking locl( residents and authorities in Jakarta. The
reattion of President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kala galvanized
high level support for renewed INP action to address the violence
with the formation of a special investigapv" taskforce in late
¶2005.
¶4. (SBU) Since that time, the INP has successfully arrested dozens
of eerrorist suspects, including the May 2006 arrest o Poso Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) cell leader Hassanudnn, which provided important
information on the go*up's active in Central Sulawesi. Several
failed INP attempts in late 2006 to lure suspects out of iiding led
to a tactical shift by INP investigatos" to conduct a more public
campaign to explain tee cases against the top Tanah Runtuh and
Kayamana figures sought by the INP. This approach ultimately
secured the support of local community leader and culminated in the
January 2007 INP raids one xtremist strongholds, when 24 of the 29
most watted TR members were captured or killed. Of the fiv TR
leaders who eluded capture, one was killed in a subsequent JI
stronghold raid near Yogyakarta and INP believes the others are no
longer in Central Sulawesi.
Police and Political Leaders Show Support
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Our Muslim contacts in Poso applauded the January 2007
crackdown and appeared well-informed by the INP on the details of
the raids and the background of those involved. Members of the
Malino Working Group (MWG) and the Poso Muslim Cleric's Council
(MUI) told us that they not only supported the police operations but
felt that they were long overdue. They criticized the INP as overly
concerned about political and social ramifications of aggressively
going after these "criminal" groups.
¶6. (SBU) Central Sulawesi Police Chief Brigadier General Badrodin
Haiti received high marks from local contacts since his arrival last
September. Haiti told us he had focused on building relationships
in the former conflict area since he arrived and made monthly visits
to meet with local leaders. Amran Amir, a local reporter with the
Association of Independent journalists, noted that Haiti was much
stronger and more proactive than his predecessors and he
complimented Haiti for strong action against the Tanah Runtuh
extremists. Haiti had an excellent reputation within the INP and
was close to National Police Chief General Sutanto, according to INP
contacts. Deputy Chief INP Investigator (D/CID) Gories Mere told us
that he personally recommended to Sutanto last year that Haiti
JAKARTA 00001585 002 OF 006
replace Brigadier General Oegroseno, whose handling of the Tibo
execution case and terrorism cases had frustrated Sutanto.
Returning to Normal but Tensions Remain as IDPs Come Home
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (SBU) Our contacts pointed out significant improvements in the
daily lives of Poso and Tentena residents since the crackdown on the
Tanah Runtuh group earlier this year. Several contacts expressed
surprise at how quickly normal relations had returned between
Christians and Muslims, including business and trade at the central
marketplaces in Poso and Tentena, both of which were hit by
terrorist bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively. We counted 13 new
mosques and churches under construction on the road from Poso to
Tentena. The largest Christian church in Poso recently reopened
after being closed for over seven years due to security issues.
Fadli, Director of the Poso Center for Conflict Resolution and
Peace, told us he receives multiple calls per day from displaced
Poso residents wanting to return home after hearing about the
improving security situation.
¶8. (SBU) While our contacts were thrilled with the tremendous
improvement in the security situation and more normalized relations
between local Christians and Muslims, they warned that these
positive changes mask lingering resentment and distrust that has
impeded final settlement of the conflict. A potential flashpoint
for this is in local land disputes. A key component of final
reconciliation is the return/resolution of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) and the concurrent land ownership disputes. MWG
contacts told us that as a result of the Poso conflicts, there were
an estimated 5,962 IDP families (or around 25 - 30,000 persons) that
may need to return to their original land/homes. Many of them have
been in IDP camps in Manado, Parigi, Donggala and Palu for several
years, although some have permanently resettled in those areas.
Protestant Synod members told us that at the height of the violence
there were as many as 50,000 IDPs in Tentena, a number they said was
now around 10,000.
¶9. (SBU) Among the thousands of families who have already returned
to the Poso/Tentena area, many lack employment or funds to rebuild,
and many have returned to find new occupants claiming ownership of
their land. There are no accurate records kept of land ownership in
the regency and only a small percentage of land owners have legal
certificates documenting their ownership. Our contacts expressed
the need for an impartial arbitration body to help quickly and
fairly settle land disputes or there could easily be more flares of
violence. Although the GOI has funded the construction of some
homes for returning IDPs, our contacts were unhappy that the
TNI-controlled construction contracts had not gone to local firms,
leading to accusations of graft and illegal logging by TNI members.
¶10. (SBU) Our contacts worried that many residents remained
traumatized from years of violence and angry over the lack of
compensation for lost property and the limited GOI assistance
provided. There are still dozens of burned out churches and mosques
and thousands of destroyed homes left behind reminding locals of the
conflict. Both the INP and local conflict resolution centers told
us that a trauma center in Poso was urgently needed to help foster
post-conflict healing, including overcoming any lingering disharmony
and suspicion, particularly as the IDPs return and attempt to
reassimilate into the community.
Residents Point to Outsider Role in Area's Violence
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶11. (SBU) The Christians and Muslims we met equally acknowledged
that outside militant groups from both sides had fanned the early
conflict and that Muslim extremists from outside the area had played
a critical role in orchestrating the attacks over the last several
years. Christian Synod leaders in Tentena noted that the influence
of these outside groups was initially overlooked at the height of
tensions, but said that local religious and civic leaders now worked
together to filter out these radical external influences. Local MWG
and MUI members told us that Poso's Nadlahtul Ulama, Muhammadiyah,
and Al Khairat organizations, in an effort led by MUI, had recently
agreed to reject the fundamentalist teachings supported by the local
Tanah Runtuh and Kayamanya groups they acknowledged as behind the
area's violence.
¶12. (SBU) Adnan Arsal, the main Muslim leader in Tanah Runtuh and
the father-in-law to detained JI-cell leader Hasanuddin, owns the Al
Amanah pesantren which was the base for the Tanah Runtuh group. He
actively countered the INP's efforts last year to apprehend the
suspects on the INP's most wanted list, but his cooperation just
prior to the January INP raids has kept him out of INP detention.
Most of our contacts were defensive of accusations that Arsal was
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involved in the terrorism linked to the group. Even some INP
contacts sympathetically regarded Arsal as someone who had been
duped by several hard core JI-linked extremists from Java, most of
whom he hosted as teachers at his school.
¶13. (SBU) Several of our contacts who personally knew Arsaltold us
that prior to 2000, he was much more moderate and only adopted more
radical views after the May 2000 Walisongo Pesantren tragedy, and
following a subsequent visit by JI network cofounder Abu Bakar
Baasyir. (Note: An INP officer in the precinct nearest the
Walisongo pesantran told us that Arsal's family owned the land where
the burned-out mosque and school now stand and that there were
family gravesites nearby. However, our other contacts could not
confirm this information.)
¶14. (SBU) Evidence connecting extremists at Arsal's school with
many of the area's terror attacks led to the closure of his Al
Amanah Pesantren in February as a prerequisite to GOI construction
of a new "modern" pesantran located several kilometers outside the
city of Poso. An INP official commented that the GOI had learned a
lesson from the strategic position of Al Amanah in the Tanah Runtuh
residential area and intentionally selected the location for the new
school away from residential areas and yet easily accessed from the
main coastal road northwest of Poso. Also as part of the GOI
agreement, Arsal will not be allowed to have any role in the new
school, according to local MUI contacts who told us that Arsal was
spending his time in his now empty school with two of his remaining
teachers, Ustad Ahmad and Ustad Fabian. (Note: We drove past Al
Amanah during a brief visit to the Tanah Runtuh neighborhood and
there was no visible evidence of any activity at the school.)
¶15. (SBU) Though trees had barely been cleared for the GOI's new
school after an early May opening ceremony attended by President
Yudhoyono, local MUI officials told us the new chair was already
identified as the locally elected Deputy Regent (Wakil Bupati) Abdul
Muthalib Rimi. The GOI has announced that the school will be
modeled after the Gontor Pesantren in Ponorogo, East Java. In fact,
during our visit to the site we saw a large sign that announced the
construction of the school and that Gontor would serve as the
school's model. (Note: Gontor is a modern pesantren in East Java
that follows the public school curriculum, although the Islamic
studies section remains the biggest. Students learn English in
addition to the usual emphasis on Arabic. The Gontor pesantren
boasts alumni that include many prominent Indonesian Muslim figures
such as Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Hasyim Muzadi, Muhammadiyah
Chairman Din Syamsuddin, late moderate intellectual Nurcholish
Madjid, and JI's Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.)
JI Still Seeks Control Over Former Conflict Areas
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶16. (SBU) Poso Police Chief Adeni Muhan told us that the INP
believed that Central Sulawesi remained a major component of the JI
network's broader strategy to gain a foothold in the province that
would serve as a training ground and a secure home base. Recent INP
investigations, he said, exposed several JI trained Muslim teachers
(ustad) from Java who spent years in the Poso area forging a network
of local recruits. Although some of these JI ustad, such as Mahmud
and Rian, were killed in INP operations, many remain at large and
may have returned to Java after the January INP operations. Others,
he said, may have also returned to former conflict areas in Ambon or
Maluku. Though actively sought by the INP, the Deputy Chief of the
local CT Detachment 88 explained to us that these JI ustad were not
on the INP's most wanted list to keep them from going even deeper
underground and to avoid provoking the Muslim community by targeting
Muslim "teachers." The March INP raids in Java further confirmed
links between the Java and Sulawesi terrorist networks, for example
the Central Java arrest of Mujadid (aka Brekele), a primary suspect
in the May 2005 Tentena market bombings.
Community Policing Produces Mixed Results
-----------------------------------------
¶17. (SBU) Since last year, the INP's Community Police (Polisi
Masyarakat or POLMAS) has been a core component of the current INP
strategy to better engage with Poso's residents. General Haiti
explained to us that the INP began a pilot project in April 2006
that placed a POLMAS post in each of Poso's 150 sub districts
(desa). Internal INP documents indicated that a total of 657 INP
officers (approximately 4-5 per post) were assigned to the POLMAS
project in the Poso area. Haiti said this program was designed to
decrease INP response time, help the INP keep better tabs on the
area's trouble spots and identify and monitor new arrivals or
groups.
¶18. (SBU) We met with INP officers at all levels throughout much of
the Poso area and they all independently identified the POLMAS
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program as the INP's key initiative in the area. The INP
intelligence officer at the Lage police precinct that covers the
area around the former Walisongo pesantren accompanied us on a
driving tour of his area and pointed out some of the precinct's 14
POLMAS posts. He later provided us a copy of a detailed set of
instructions they received from INP Headquarters that outlined
standards for monitoring and evaluating the precinct's 60-70 POLMAS
officers. He said they routinely submitted reports on the POLMAS
posts to the INP's Poso District Headquarters and the INP's
Provincial Headquarters in Palu.
¶19. (SBU) The POLMAS project, however, has not been without its
problems. We met with some INP officers who admitted that the
project's roll out last year lacked any real funding. Most POLMAS
posts were placed in houses abandoned during the conflict and lacked
their own facilities and basic equipment. For example, each of the
14 POLMAS posts in the Lage precinct were given four cots, a cell
phone, a megaphone, a camera, and a motorcycle.
¶20. (SBU) Several of our contacts outside the police commended the
concept behind the POLMAS project but said the young, inexperienced
officers assigned to the local posts were from other parts of
Indonesia and lacked an understanding of the local culture. Some
local residents had accused local POLMAS officers of public
drinking, fighting, and sexual assault. Mrs. Syamsiah of the Poso
Inter-Faith Communications Forum told us that the young INP officers
from the POLMAS post near her mosque in Tentena had routinely taken
the money donated to the mosque during Friday prayer services.
Full Reconciliation a Long Term Prospect
----------------------------------------
¶21. (SBU) Conspiracy theories posited by some of our contacts, as
well as isolated remarks made during our discussions, also suggested
that post-conflict sensitivities and a general paranoia remained
just below the surface despite the area's significantly less
polarized communities and improved security. Reverend Onesimus
Kambodji, a former Golkar party member of the provincial legislature
(DPRD) and head of the Poso Inter-Faith Communications Forum, was
convinced that GOI security forces were not only behind the original
hostilities but some of the recent terrorist attacks, including the
October 2005 beheadings; he cited statements attributed to the
Christian schoolgirl who survived the attack that a man in uniform
was present during the killings.
¶22. (SBU) Though most conspiracy theories seemed far fetched, the
sincere acceptance of them by many local residents suggested a
lingering distrust of GOI security forces, probably supported by a
long-standing perception by residents on both sides of the conflict
of an imbalanced legal process. Several of our contacts confirmed
that residents felt victimized by the legal process. Conflict
resolution groups in both Palu and Poso told us that the consistent
application of the law must be a centerpiece of any reconciliation
strategy.
¶23. (SBU) An internal INP document we received likewise
acknowledged injustice as a driving factor and indicated that INP
detainees had revealed that revenge for perceived injustices,
particularly the May 2000 Walisongo pesantren incident, had been a
powerful motivator for the local extremists. As noted above, the
Walisongo killings (also known as the "Kilometer 9" incident because
of where it occurred along the road between Poso City and Tentena)
was cited by local contacts as a turning point for Arsal. Basri,
one of the top local terrorists arrested in February, has said
publicly that he was also significantly influenced by his experience
at the Walisongo pesantren, where he helped remove the bodies
immediately after the attack.
¶24. (SBU) Several contacts told us that the sense of injustice
within the Muslim community stems from language agreed to in the
2001 Malino Accords that resulted in charges not being brought for
attacks prior to the Accords, which includes the majority of
Christian-on-Muslim violence. In the internal police document, the
INP proposed that the signatories to the original Malino Accord
renegotiate the agreement to allow the INP to open cases on the
pre-2001 incidents that most enflame the local Muslim community.
¶25. (SBU) This deep sense of injustice has further motivated the
INP to use its softer CT techniques to handle the local Poso
extremists. INP investigators told us that nearly half of those
arrested in January were released in part to show that the INP was
focusing on the top extremist figures. Based on our discussions, we
learned that as many as 15 of those released were placed on
probation under the charge of local INP precincts, which required
them to report twice a week and participate in group meetings to
deprogram their antisocial and radical leanings. According to INP
records, some of those placed on probation included Nasir, Ateng
Marjo, Yasin Lakita (aka Acin), Ayi Lakita, and Upik Kokong.
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However, INP investigators told us that this program was poorly
funded and admitted that little was done to ensure that the local
precincts maintained contact with the suspects after the first
several weeks.
¶26. (SBU) We were told that the Christian community was closely
watching the trials of the 17 local Christian suspects accused of
killing two Muslims last September. The two Muslims were killed
during widespread demonstrations surrounding the execution of three
Christians convicted of orchestrating the killings of Muslims in the
early days of the conflict. The local Christian community was
keenly aware of the sentences handed down last year to Hasanuddin
and the other perpetrators of the October 2005 Christian schoolgirl
beheadings, and Rev. Kambodji told us he hoped the sentences were
commensurate with the nature of the crimes (meaning that the
sentences of the 17 suspects would not approach the 20-year sentence
that Hasanuddin received). The sentence hearings for the 17
Christian suspects were expected by mid-June.
Communities Eager for Recovery But Lack Funding
--------------------------------------------- -
¶27. (SBU) Our trip came just one week after Indonesian President
Yudhoyono visited the former conflict areas to symbolically roll out
a GOI assistance package to help in the province's recovery. The
President's visit was a tribute to the improved security situation
and his public pledges of aid signaled Jakarta's good intentions.
Yudhoyono publicly stated the need for the central government to
facilitate Poso's healing process and announced that Jakarta had
earmarked Rp 56 billion (approximately $6 million) for economic
development. We could not confirm if this figure includes the Rp
27.5 billion (approximately $3 million) the GOI had promised to
allocate for development projects in the province, including the new
Poso pesantran and the extension of a Poso theology institute.
¶28. (SBU) It was clear from our discussions that this type of
promised economic development will be a key to recovery,
reconciliation and maintaining a lasting peace. Some recovery has
naturally occurred and businesses appeared active throughout the
former conflict zone and the surrounding fields were in various
stages of cocoa and rice production. However, the level of economic
activity remained far below that of the late 1990s. Our contacts
agreed that access to capital, in particular micro lending programs,
would allow residents and IDPs to rebuild and pushed that as a key
feature of any potential assistance.
¶29. (SBU) Contacts also complained that the GOI promised $6 million
from the Malino accords to rebuild housing and help restart
businesses but that much of those funds have not been delivered.
Examples abound of misappropriation of GOI relief funding for the
area's displaced persons, which has universally frustrated
residents. Several local religious and political leaders have been
accused of pocketing the funds, including former Synod leader Father
Damanik. Pleas for international assistance in rebuilding the
region's economy, infrastructure, agricultural business, and
job-skill training were a feature of nearly all our discussions.
Christian Synod leaders in Tentena told us they had not yet received
promised GOI funding for at least part of a $3 million university
construction project, though Yudhoyono attended the groundbreaking
during his visit, and said they hoped that international donors and
Christian organizations would provide additional assistance.
Comment
-------
¶30. (SBU) It remains difficult to gauge the Yudhoyono
Administration's commitment to Central Sulawesi reconstruction.
There has been increased attention and promises of assistance but so
far little follow through. A few weeks after the President's visit,
we asked senior Administration staffers about the presidential
decree mentioned by Yudhoyono and they were not aware of any such
document in the works related to Poso reconstruction. Local
residents seemed surprisingly indifferent about the President's
visit and did not seem to hold out much hope that Jakarta would send
the needed assistance. Locals seemed to respect both Yudhoyono and
Kalla and remembered them for their role in negotiating an end to
the early communal fighting. One contact commented that Kalla was
generally regarded as opportunistic and was noted locally for his
involvement in a scheme related to a dam project between Poso and
Tentena.
¶31. (SBU) The good news is that Central Sulawesi residents were
optimistic about the future and were looking forward trying to
reclaim their pre-1999 lives. We were mildly surprised to see how
quickly the improved security situation was translating into
increased economic activity. Much like the return to normalcy in
Maluku, the determination by the INP to actively engage the
troublemakers and terrorists has given Central Sulawesi residents a
chance to regroup. However, unlike Maluku, we do not yet see real
JAKARTA 00001585 006 OF 006
commitment to "peace at all costs" by the local people or leaders,
who still chew on the real or perceived injustices of the last
several years. The situation in Poso remains complex and will
require a committed effort by national and local authorities to push
economic development, equitable solutions to land disputes, and a
more integrated law enforcement presence.
HEFFERN