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Viewing cable 07GENEVA1478, ILO - BURMA: CONFERENCE SEES MINIMAL STEPS BUT LITTLE REAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07GENEVA1478 2007-06-07 11:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED US Mission Geneva
VZCZCXRO8331
RR RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHPOD
DE RUEHGV #1478/01 1581103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071103Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4334
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0472
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2712
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0941
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 0226
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1926
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5582
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2276
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LABOR FOR ILAB 
STATE FOR IO/T; IO/UNP; IO/FO; DRL/IL; EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ELAB PHUM PREL ILO
SUBJECT: ILO - BURMA: CONFERENCE SEES MINIMAL STEPS BUT LITTLE REAL 
PROGRESS IN ENDING FORCED LABOR 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY.  The ILO Committee on the Application of Standards 
considered the situation of forced labor in Burma in its special 
sitting during the 96th International Labor Conference, June 4, 
2007.  The Burmese ambassador said nothing about real steps in 
ending forced labor.  He focused solely on the Supplementary 
Understanding (SU) between Burma and the ILO, signed on February 26, 
2007, which, he said, was effective in submitting forced labor 
complaints to prompt legal action.  Employers and workers considered 
the SU a positive, but very limited step.  They focused on Burma's 
continuing failure to implement any of the recommendations of the 
1998 ILO Commission of Inquiry.  Workers' comments were particularly 
caustic, not only on Burma but on multinationals doing business 
there. Governments' statements, except the U.S. and Canada's, were 
weak.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  Burma's ambassador seemed to take the Supplementary 
Understanding, in effect for a one-year trial period, as an end 
rather than a means to address the forced labor problem.  His 
opening and closing remarks ignored all other relevant issues.  The 
regime, he said, was "considering staff increases" for the ILO's 
Office in Rangoon, per the Supplementary Understanding.  He labeled 
the Free Trade Unions of Burma terrorists, implying that the 
repression of opposition was a national security matter. 
 
3.  Representatives of both employers and workers emphasized that 
the 1998 Commission of Inquiry's recommendations and those of the 
2000 International Labor Conference's resolution should be the 
proper focus of the special sitting.  The employers held that 
Burma's Village and Towns Act must be amended or repealed.  In a 
litany of accusations against named multinationals and governments, 
workers implied that U.S. and EU multinationals operating in Burma 
were, at best, creating conditions favorable  to the practice of 
forced labor and, at worst, conniving in the practice.  They 
provided various estimates of the number of forced labor abuses 
since February (3,405), primarily in biofuel and rubber tree 
plantations or perpetrated by the military. 
The workers (the only ones to do so) mentioned the potential 
referral of Burma's forced labor practices to the International 
Court of Justice.  A Singapore worker representative aptly warned 
that the committee was diverting its attention to counting the 
number of complaints since February's SU and losing sight of its 
goal, eradication of forced labor. 
 
4.  For the most part, government statements focused on the SU. 
Most governments praised short-term progress:  positive signs in the 
mechanism (Germany/EU); a "spirit of cooperation" as the beginning 
of a whole process (Japan); "commendable cooperation" (India); 
dialogue is the best approach (Belarus); "progress working" (China); 
more prosecutions will lead to Burmese people's confidence in the 
mechanism (Australia).  The United States (see below) and Canada 
took a firmer line, keeping the focus on the long-term goals, not 
only an end to forced labor, but the enfranchisement of democracy 
and freedom for detained civil society leaders, including Aung San 
Suu Kyi.  Canada opened remarks by noting the 17th anniversary of 
the last democratic elections, overwhelmingly won by Aung San Suu 
Kyi, and emphasized that forced labor, as well as actions against 
labor unionists such as Su Su Nwe, must be seen in the wider context 
of systemic abuse of human rights in Burma. 
 
5.  Committee conclusions cited profound concern about continuing 
and pervasive forced labor, and the risk that those guilty of 
perpetrating forced labor could get off with administrative, rather 
than criminal, punishment.  Again putting Burma on the November ILO 
Governing Body's agenda, the organization asked for concrete and 
verifiable progress to meet the recommendations of the 1998 
Commission of Inquiry.  The Committee thanked ILO Liaison Officer ad 
interim, Richard Horsey, for five years of service, and welcomed 
appointment of Steven Marshall as his successor, as of July 1, 2007. 
 
 
6.  U.S. Statement: 
 
The United States thanks the Office for its summary of developments 
since June 2006 and its update of developments since the Governing 
Body last considered this issue in March. 
 
We note with interest that the complaint mechanism, established 
under the Supplementary Understanding, has been put into practice. 
We are encouraged that, according to latest reports, the Liaison 
Officer ad interim has received 25 complaints.  At the same time, 
 
GENEVA 00001478  002 OF 002 
 
 
since relatively few cases have reached a conclusion that the 
Liaison Officer has been able to confirm, it is obviously premature 
to judge whether the mechanism is producing real and meaningful 
results. 
 
That process requires continuing effort.  It requires continued, 
unrestrained access by complainants to the Liaison Officer and proof 
that complainants are not being subjected to harassment or 
punishment for their complaints.  It requires proof that those who 
impose forced labor are punished and that the punishment is 
appropriate to the seriousness of the act.  It requires 
strengthening of the staff of the Liaison Office to deal with the 
obviously increased workload.  In this regard, we note with concern 
that, at the time the Office's report was finalized, the ILO's 
request for suitable international staff to assist the Liaison 
Officer had not been acted upon.  We hope we are not seeing a return 
to the practice of delay and deception we have seen too often in the 
past.  The authorities should act expeditiously to facilitate the 
necessary staff expansion of the ILO Liaison Office, in keeping with 
the commitment they made in the Supplementary Understanding. 
 
As we review developments within the scope of the Supplementary 
Understanding, we need to remind ourselves that these are still 
small and preliminary steps, and that the goal that ILO members have 
kept in our sights for years -- the complete elimination of forced 
labor in the country -- is still distant.  Nearly a decade ago, the 
Commission of Inquiry specified the steps the authorities must take 
to reach this goal.  They must implement these steps.  We also need 
to recognize that the goal of the end of forced labor is 
inextricably bound to progress in allowing the country's people 
their democratic rights, which includes freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi 
and other civil society leaders. 
 
We members of the ILO also have responsibilities.  The United 
States, for its part, has taken action.  Within the past week, 
President Bush extended for another year stiff economic and travel 
sanctions against the regime. 
 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to acknowledge the dedication, 
courage, and compassion that the Liaison Officer ad interim, Mr. 
Richard Horsey, has devoted to the cause of eliminating forced labor 
in Burma for the last five years.  We hope that the mechanism he has 
overseen will prove to be the real beginning of positive change.  We 
also welcome the appointment of Mr. Stephen Marshall to replace Mr. 
Horsey.  We know that he will apply the same measure of dedication 
and skill to the task, and we offer him our full support as he works 
to advance what Mr. Horsey has so ably begun. End statement. 
 
7. Comment: Governments took the booby prize in this discussion.  It 
took the employers spokesman to put the focus where it belongs, on 
real and demonstrable steps to end forced labor.  The workers, 
usually the most vehement party in these discussions, wasted some of 
their capital on long-winded statements and ill-advised ventures 
into naming corporations (which earned a reprimand from the chair) 
and into ILO conventions that were not within the purview of this 
special sitting.  The Committee's conclusions, fortunately, focused 
succinctly on the issue -- virtually no real progress has been made 
against forced labor in Burma. 
Tichenor