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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK370, SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK370 2007-05-14 19:09 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED USUN New York
VZCZCXRO4731
OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0370/01 1341909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141909Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1864
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0833
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0714
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0280
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET 
WITH USG GUEHENNO 
 
 
1. U.S., U.K. and French ambassadors met with Under Secretary 
General Guehenno on Friday, May 4, to discuss benchmarks for 
Darfur.  The three ambassadors conveyed the need to see quick 
progress on the political, security, and humanitarian fronts. 
 They encouraged Guehenno to show results soon because 
patience is running out for more time. 
 
2.  Guehenno cautioned that turning benchmarks into a 
technical box-checking exercise would see us lose sight of 
the wider picture.  In deciding whether to act, the Council 
should focus in particular on Sudan's actions, or lack of 
actions, on the ground.  Khartoum liked to provide diplomatic 
overtures while at the same time stepping up its military 
campaign.  It was too much focus by the international 
community on securing a deal on peacekeeping that allowed 
them to do this. 
 
3.  Guehenno and his staff then gave a PowerPoint 
presentation on recent developments.  He identified four 
critical problems facing the UN on deployment of the Heavy 
Support Package and Hybrid.  First, the UN had now twice 
drilled for water in Al Fasher but found none.  It was 
seeking permission to drill further, but this hadn't been 
forthcoming.  Second, the UN also hadn't been able to secure 
land for two (Nyala and El-Geneina) of the four camps 
required for the HSP.  As with drilling, the local authority 
was looking to Khartoum, which was dragging its feet.  Third, 
AMIS hadn't yet restructured, meaning those UN officers that 
had been deployed as part of the Light Support Package were 
underutilized.  Fourth, before the two additional AMIS 
battalions (one Nigerian, one Rwandan), required to protect 
the HSP, could be deployed, they would need to be equipped. 
Egypt had promised 36 Armed Protection Carriers, but hadn't 
delivered.  Guehenno asked if the P3 could press Cairo.  The 
new battalions would also require new camps, which would take 
(at least) 60 days to build.  Put together, this meant that 
we were looking at September/October at the earliest for the 
HSP to begin to deploy, with a January 2008 target date for 
the Hybrid to begin.  But these timelines could slip further 
if countries refused to deploy during the rainy season and/or 
Sudan sought to hold things up.  In the meantime, there would 
be continued pressure from Konare, and Bashir, for the UN to 
pay for AMIS.  If the Council agreed to this, the UN would 
lose all leverage over securing the Hybrid. 
 
4.  Turing to the Hybrid specifically, Guehenno said DPKO had 
now finalized a proposal which Ban would send to the Council 
once the AU had signed off on it.  Guehenno noted that AU 
acceptance wasn't a foregone conclusion.  To be effective, 
DPKO was clear that the Hybrid would need to draw on 
non-African troop contributors.  This would create problems 
with Addis.  Both due to ignorance and pride, Konare still 
conceived of the Hybrid as an AU force with limited UN 
support.  Bashir was hiding behind this position.  The UN's 
"problem with Konare was a fundamental as that with Sudan." 
Libya was also lobbying against non-African troops.  We were 
already starting to see this tension on the HSP where, so 
far, Egypt and Nigeria were the only firm African offers. 
Non-Africans might include Pakistan, China, India, Jordan and 
the Nordics.  But the Sudanese PermRep had told DPKO he was 
reluctant to agree to these as the force should "be African 
in nature." 
 
5.  Ambassador Khalilzad asked if any visible pre-deployment 
activities could take place before the rainy season, and 
Guehenno was pessimistic, saying it was hard to get anyone to 
deploy assets into an environment where AMIS can't protect 
them, let alone protect themselves.  He said the Chinese DPR 
called him that morning to pledge an engineering battalion, 
but not word on when it would take the field.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad urged as much action as possible before the rainy 
season. 
 
6.  Ambassador Khalilzad and UK Ambassador Jones Parry closed 
the meeting by asking Guehenno for a list of action items on 
the Light and Heavy Support Packages and the UN/AU hybrid 
force that the P3 could help execute.  Guehenno was glad for 
the offer and sent a list of HSP action items to USUN on May 
7.  USUN has requested and is awaiting action items from 
Guehenno on the Light Support Package and the hybrid 
operation. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000370  002 OF 002 
 
 
KHALILZAD