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Viewing cable 07STATE73696, SUDAN: Additional Sanctions Over Lack of Progress

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07STATE73696 2007-05-30 02:24 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO9378
OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #3696/01 1500232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300224Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0795
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 3602
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3118
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 9020
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 2565
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE IMMEDIATE 0377
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 7815
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE 2811
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 4444
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1733
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0323
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 3670
DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 7561
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 073696 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD AU UN SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: Additional Sanctions Over Lack of Progress 
(S/ES: 200708730/1) 
 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Posts are requested to draw from 
the following and demarche host governments at the highest level 
appropriate.  Info addressees may use the objectives and background 
materials at their discretion. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Objectives: Notification of Additional Sanctions 
and Request for Support 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2.  (U) Announce new U.S. sanctions on three individuals and 31 
Sudan government-owned or controlled companies to be implemented 
within days, due to lack of progress in Darfur. 
 
3.  (SBU) For Brazzaville, Pretoria, Accra, Lagos, Dakar, and 
Kigali: Emphasize that the crisis in Darfur is a blight on Africa 
and the international community.  We cannot let the situation 
continue. We look for their support to maintain pressure on Sudan. 
 
4. (SBU) For Brazzaville, Pretoria, Cairo, Tripoli, Beijing, Moscow, 
and Riyadh: Emphasize that we heard and listened to their requests 
to hold off on further sanctions. Specifically, President Bush and 
Secretary Rice heeded Secretary General Ban's request for more time 
 
SIPDIS 
for diplomatic negotiations to unblock the impasse with Bashir and 
obtain his unconditional acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid force. 
Nontheless, we cannot wait any longer to follow through on U.S. 
sanctions. 
 
5. (SBU) Additional points for Beijing:  In addition to the points 
in paragraphs 3-4, emphasize that the United States appreciates 
China's efforts to work with the international community to find a 
solution; highlight, in particular, China's decision to deploy an 
engineering unit as part of the heavy support package and the 
selection of a new special envoy for Sudan.  Assure Beijing that the 
United States takes seriously Beijing's concern that there must be a 
political solution to the crisis that incorporates all parties to 
the conflict, including non-signatory rebel groups.  Special Envoy 
Natsios looks forward to returning to Beijing at an early date to 
discuss next steps. 
 
6.  (SBU) For Brazzaville, Pretoria, and Accra:  We also request 
African members of the UN Security Council to support a resolution 
that would designate additional individuals responsible for abuses 
in Darfur and government-owned or controlled entities for sanctions, 
widen the arms embargo against the Government of Sudan, introduce a 
binding Chapter VII ban against military overflights of Darfur, and 
expand criteria for future designations of individuals and entities 
available under UNSCR 1591. Separately, we will also need to work 
together in the near future to ensure the UN/AU hybrid force is 
properly authorized with a robust mandate.  We believe the optimal 
way forward is on the basis of 1706 and see no need for a new 
resolution to mandate the hybrid force.  To be effective the hybrid 
force must have the authority under Chapter VII of the charter to 
use all necessary means to protect civilians. 
 
------------------------------- 
BACKGROUND - TIME TO ACT IS NOW 
------------------------------- 
 
7.(U) On April 18, President Bush gave a speech at the Holocaust 
Museum warning that the United States would enact more sanctions if 
the GOS did not quickly accept the UN/AU hybrid force, allow 
deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP), end support to the 
Janjaweed, observe existing ceasefires, support the ongoing 
political process, and enable delivery of humanitarian aid. 
 
8. (U) Because of the lack of progress in Darfur, the USG has 
announced new U.S. sanctions under various Executive Orders on three 
individuals and 31 Sudan government-owned or controlled companies. 
 
9. (U) The individuals include Sudan's State Minister for 
Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Harun (also indicted by the International 
Criminal Court) and the Chief of Military Intelligence and Security 
 
STATE 00073696  002 OF 002 
 
 
Awad Ibn Auf.  The USG also sanctioned Khalil Ibrahim, a rebel 
leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) who has obstructed 
the peace process. 
 
10. (U) In the past month, the Sudanese government has bombed 
villages, disrupted a rebel conference on the peace process, and 
indicated they will not accept the UN/AU hybrid force with command 
and control systems as agreed last November in Addis Ababa.  The GOS 
has also discouraged potential troop contributors through its 
belligerent statements regarding UN involvement, and delayed key 
force planning missions such as an important water survey to help 
determine camp locations.  They have failed to disarm Janjaweed 
fighters and continue to move military equipment into Darfur in 
violation of existing ceasefires and UNSC resolutions.  After 
agreeing to ease delivery of humanitarian aid on March 28, the GOS 
has not fully ceased its harassment of humanitarians. 
 
11. (SBU) Pressure is the only language Sudan understands.  We are 
confident that sanctions will bolster, not hinder, the international 
community's efforts to achieve progress in Darfur. 
 
12. (U) The United States remains committed to the UN/AU-led 
mediation process and we continue to support UN SYG Ban's efforts to 
convince Khartoum to accept the hybrid force. We will also continue 
to pursue appropriate action in the UNSC. It has been four years 
since this conflict began, almost a year since the UN Security 
Council passed a resolution calling for UN forces in Sudan, and six 
months since the GOS first agreed to that force.  The people of 
Darfur cannot wait any longer.  If the GOS remains intransigent, we 
are prepared to take more robust action, including increasingly 
stronger sanctions. 
RICE