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Viewing cable 07STATE62354, IRAQ AMBASSADORS' FORUM - APRIL 30, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07STATE62354 2007-05-08 20:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO9507
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHC #2354/01 1290335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 082053Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0261-0262
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 062354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - SENSITIVE CAPTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IR IZ MOPS PREL EAID SY
SUBJECT: IRAQ AMBASSADORS' FORUM - APRIL 30, 2007 
 
REF: NONE 
 
STATE 00062354  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Political Military Bureau hosted an 
Iraq Ambassadors' Forum on April 30.  Ambassador David 
Satterfield, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and 
Coordinator for Iraq, briefed on the challenges faced by Iraq 
in advance of the launch of the International Compact with 
Iraq (ICI) and Expanded Neighbors Ministerial Conference in 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.  He also discussed key tasks ahead 
for the Iraqi government, regional engagement, and 
expectations for the two conferences.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
SECURITY BACKGROUND 
------------------- 
2.  (SBU) The Political Military Bureau hosted an Iraq 
Ambassadors' Forum on April 30.  Ambassadors and DCMs from 60 
countries, including all contributing coalition nations, 
NATO, G-5, and neighbors were invited with 55 representatives 
attending. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ambassador Satterfield began with a brief synopsis 
of the security situation as Operation Fardh al-Qanoon 
progresses:  sectarian killings have dropped to Spring 2006 
levels; forced expulsions from greater Baghdad neighborhoods 
appear to be lower; and there is limited anecdotal evidence 
that some expelled families have begun returning to their 
homes.  These successes are attributed to a persistent and 
meaningful presence of U.S. and competent Iraqi forces. 
Unfortunately, some violence has now shifted out of Baghdad 
into areas like Ba'qubah in Diyala Province and other 
surrounding towns.  However, Ambassador Satterfield noted, 
the purpose of the surge is not to achieve lasting and 
permanent security but rather to provide space for the 
Government of Iraq to get at the roots of the conflict 
through national reconciliation. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ ACTION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Emphasizing that "much more needs to be done and at 
a much more rapid pace," Ambassador Satterfield identified 
five actions that the GOI must complete as soon as possible: 
--The various pieces of the draft hydrocarbons law package 
need to be approved by the Council of Representatives. 
 
--The right de-Ba'athification reform legislation needs to be 
implemented. 
 
--A program for disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration should be approved in conjunction with an 
amnesty. 
 
--Appropriate constitutional reform must be approved. 
 
--Provincial elections need to take place before the end of 
the year (ideally with an open list system). 
 
However, even if all of these actions are taken, full 
national reconciliation is not guaranteed.  Iraqis need to 
begin thinking of national interests and unity rather than 
individual, partisan, or confessional interests.  The role of 
the Coalition is to provide the security setting in which 
this reconciliation effort can succeed. 
 
5.  (SBU) On the economic front, Ambassador Satterfield noted 
that the Administration has requested four billion dollars 
from Congress despite the GOI's having 12.5 billion dollars 
remaining from its 2006 budget.  The USG money is needed 
because Iraq lacks the capacity to disburse funds for 
critical needs quickly.  Ambassador Satterfield noted that 
this is the last year that the Congress will likely be 
willing to consider providing this kind of assistance to 
Iraq.  In the future, the Congress will reasonably expect 
Iraq to be able to execute its own budget.  Iraq's progress 
on budget execution so far this year has given Ambassador 
Satterfield confidence that, by the end of this year, Iraq 
will be able to move its own monies. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
REGIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH CONFERENCES 
 
STATE 00062354  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Regarding regional diplomacy in the wake of his 
recent visit throughout the Middle East and in advance of the 
May 3-4 Sharm-el-Sheikh meetings, Ambassador Satterfield 
noted a "sense of skepticism" regarding Iraq.  One 
contributing factor to this skepticism is that real progress 
on the ground is not being adequately reported.  Recent 
visits by Prime Minister Maliki throughout the region were 
crucial in enabling Middle Eastern leaders to witness 
first-hand Prime Minister Maliki's own commitment to 
reconciliation and reform.  Egypt and Kuwait, in particular, 
exhibited supportive attitudes towards Iraq.  Saudi Arabia, 
on the other hand, did not host a visit from Prime Minister 
Maliki. 
 
7.  (SBU) In concluding, Ambassador Satterfield discussed 
expectations and background for the two Sharm el-Sheikh 
conferences which are intended to create a more supportive 
dialogue between Iraq, its neighbors, and the international 
community.  Success or failure in Iraq will have meaningful 
consequences for all of these parties.  The ICI document is a 
credit to the hard work by representatives of Iraq, the UN, 
the World Bank, and others and merits support.  It represents 
a significant step forward.  Saudi Arabia, despite its 
differences with the GOI, has offered 80 percent forgiveness 
of Iraqi debt.  As for the Expanded Neighbors Ministerial, it 
should help to dispel distortions and confusions, 
legitimizing the concept of a democratic, post-Saddam Iraq. 
It should also send a message to Iraq's Sunni insurgents that 
violent acts are not supported by their Sunni brothers 
throughout the region.  The draft of the Neighbors' 
communique is good and headed in an extremely promising 
direction for which the Government of Egypt deserves thanks 
for its efforts.  However, it is critical that the neighbors 
move beyond rhetorical support, backing it up with action. 
There must be a concerted effort to disuade further violence. 
 
 
8.  (SBU) Noting the speculation about possible meetings 
between the U.S. and Iran or Syria, Ambassador Satterfield 
stated, "We are professionals, and fully committed to working 
on Iraq."  If Iran or Syria want to discuss Iraq with us, 
then those discussions will be handled professionally. 
 
----- 
Q & A 
----- 
 
9. (SBU) Following Ambassador Satterfield's remarks, Iraqi 
Ambassador Samir al-Sumaidaie thanked Ambassador Satterfield 
for "covering the field remarkably well," adding that he 
looked forward to the meetings in Sharm el-Sheikh.  A German 
embassy representative inquired about the status of the three 
working groups announced at the Neighbors prepcon in Baghdad. 
 Ambassador Satterfield responded that working groups on 
refugees, fuel and electricity, and border security had been 
announced on March 10 to be formally launched at the 
ministerial.  The GOI also gave general approval of 
participation of non-neighbors in an advisory capacity at the 
March 10 meeting.  The venue and timing of the initial 
working group meetings are still under discussion. 
RICE