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Viewing cable 07PRETORIA1712, LIMPOPO PROVINCE SPLIT OVER ZUMA AND MBEKI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PRETORIA1712 2007-05-11 13:32 2010-12-08 21:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO2549
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #1712/01 1311332
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111332Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9757
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 4334
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
Friday, 11 May 2007, 13:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001712 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR AF/S 
EO 12958 DECL: 05/09/2017 
TAGS PGOV, PINR, SF 
SUBJECT: LIMPOPO PROVINCE SPLIT OVER ZUMA AND MBEKI 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4( b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. PolOff and PolAsst’s trip to Limpopo Province on 24 April confirmed press reports that Zuma’s camp has made inroads in gaining provincial support for Zuma as ANC President, but the province remains split and difficult to call. As expected, Zuma’s supporters were fervent but short on substance, never making a case for what Zuma would bring to the party as ANC President. Instead, they emphasized that the ANC as an institution is greater than the sum of its members, dismissing the importance of leadership in the process. END SUMMARY.
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A LITTLE TASTE OF WHAT WAS TO COME
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2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst traveled to Limpopo Province on 24 April to gauge support for the upcoming ANC presidential election. Though several officials agreed to meet, some refused. Joshua Matlou, ANC Youth League (ANCYL) Provincial Chairperson, told PolAsst that “it would be useless for both of us since I would only talk about things that are in the newspaper.” Matlou added that ANC members do not trust American diplomats because “they have seen what the U.S. government does to elections in other countries when they do not like the locally preferred candidate.” Matlou believes this attitude cuts across the spectrum of ANC members. (NOTE:  With almost 53,000 ANC members, Limpopo is the ANC,s fourth-largest province after Eastern Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu-Natal. At the 2002 national conference, it fielded 324 candidates, almost twice those of the smallest province, the Northern Cape, but half that of the largest, Eastern Cape. Limpopo will host the December 2007 ANC conference where the next ANC President will be chosen. END NOTE)
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ANC LARGER THAN LIFE, LITERALLY
------------------------------- 
3. (C) ANC Provincial Secretary Cassel Mathale refused to be drawn into a conversation about who he supports for ANC President, even though he is widely reported to be pro-Zuma. Instead, Mathale, who was polite, persistent, and yet unpersuasive, argued that the ANC as a party is so strong that it does not matter who becomes President. He added that the ANC would soon be finishing what it started in 1994 -- building strong institutions so that no one person would have too much power. (COMMENT: This is likely a reference to next month’s ANC policy conference which will debate transferring some powers from the ANC President to the ANC Secretary General (septel). END COMMENT)
4. (C) Rosina Semenya, Provincial Minister for Public Works and the ANC Women’s League’s (ANCWL) Provincial Chairperson, echoed Mathale’s comments that the ANC as a party, institution, and culture is more important than any individual leader. When asked how the ANCWL and ANCYL work together at the provincial level given the ANCYL’s outspoken support of Zuma, Semenya surprisingly asked what was wrong with Zuma. She added that “people should be willing to overlook certain qualities if someone was brought up in ANC culture and tradition. That is what is most important.” To maintain and enrich this tradition, she told us the ANC is creating a policy institute to inculcate its members in ANC policies and that former controversial Limpopo Premier Ngoako Ramathlodi, who fell out of favor with Mbeki last year, is in charge of the project. XXXXXXXXXXXX END NOTE)
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YOUTH LEAGUE: YOUR WORST BEST FRIEND
------------------------------------ 
5. (C) ANCYL Provincial Secretary Julius Malema, who was frank and friendly, started the conversation with stories of his “young pioneer” days when the ANC taught him how to use a gun 17 years ago, at the tender age of 9. He then boasted that Limpopo’s ANCYL has more members than any other province and is “100 percent united” in its support of Zuma. Malema never explained why he or the league supports Zuma, but did
PRETORIA 00001712 002 OF 002
admit that Zuma would likely not have been picked up by the ANCYL “if Mbeki hadn’t gone after him.” Malema stated matter of factly that Zuma is “a victim of a conspiracy similar to what would happen in American politics.” When PolOff politely challenged him about his analogy, he backed off and said, “Well, that’s how it’s portrayed in movies.” When asked what triggered the loss of Mbeki’s support from the ANCYL, he replied that “Mbeki thinks he’s too clever for all of us and he won’t engage with us.” In a subsequent aside, Malema admitted that ANCYL President Fikile Mbalula did not want to support Zuma during the rape trial but that the regional leadership insisted, arguing that if the YL defended Zuma on corruption charges, they could defend him on rape charges since both acts are immoral. He also hinted that Fikile was told his position depended on his support of Zuma.
6. (C) PolOff was shut down every time she tried to turn the discussion to other potential candidates. When asked about the possibility of a female successor, Malema dismissed the idea, saying South Africa needs a “man who is ahead on issues, but who can walk with the masses.” He also dismissed Tokyo Sexwale saying he had his chance. When asked if Tokyo’s involvement in big business soured the ANCYL, he said that he is not against the rich, just capitalists, but that Sexwale is not a capitalist “because he only owns shares of companies, not actual means of production.” (COMMENT: Malema wore a sweatshirt with NIKE emblazoned on it and also complained about the bank’s right to repossess his Audi if he does not make payments. END COMMENT) When asked what the league plans on doing if Zuma goes to jail, he said they would accept the decision and throw their support behind ANC Secretary General Kgalema Motlanthe. However, he added that
SIPDIS though “Motlanthe is brilliant, you can’t understand anything he says.”
--------------------------------------- 
LIMPOPO UNLIKELY TO LAY CARDS DOWN SOON
--------------------------------------- 
7. (C) Mathale told us that Limpopo will hold its provincial conference to declare its candidate for ANC President in late November or early December, but admitted that the province will know long before the conference where the regions stand.  In fact, soon after the June policy conference, the ANC will send out a communiqu urging regions to start sending in their preferred names and delegates. Semenya also said that Limpopo’s ANCWL has not yet set a date for its provincial conference, but will wait until after June’s policy conference as to not “distract from ANC policymaking.”
8. (C) Malema could not say when Limpopo would hold its regional conference, but did mention that the national ANCYL would not be holding a conference at all this year (in violation of its constitutional requirement to do so every three years), having already decided to support Zuma. Malema justified the position by echoing Fikile’s statements that the league “already has leaders in place who can influence the outcome and that they want to keep it that way.” When asked how this strategy differs from the ANC’s Eastern Cape youth league, which was “officially” disbanded in part because they had not held their regional conference in time, Malema said with a straight face that Eastern Cape postponed for a year, while the national level is only postponing six months. (COMMENT: Eastern Cape’s ANCYL branch was disbanded unofficially because of its support of Eastern Cape’s call for a third term for Mbeki. END COMMENT)
------- 
COMMENT
------- 
9. (C) Despite the fact that most of those free (or willing) to talk with us were pro-Zuma, we should not overestimate his supporters’ bark nor discount the pro-Mbeki camp within the province. The ANCWL and ANCYL will have approximately 53 votes each for the entire country in December, likely a third to a quarter of Limpopo’s vote as a province. Moreover, heavyweights like Limpopo’s Premier Sello Moloto, ANC Regional Secretary David Magabe, and ANC Regional Chairperson Dickson Masemola are pro-Mbeki, having publicly declared their continuing support to the current elected leadership. Bost