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Viewing cable 07NEWDELHI2258, TERRORIST INFILTRATION FALLING IN INDIAN KASHMIR, INCREASING IN INDIAN HEARTLAND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NEWDELHI2258 2007-05-10 13:15 2011-06-09 04:00 SECRET Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO1246
PP RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNE #2258/01 1301315
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101315Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5557
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6147
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3603
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2084
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4983
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4656
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6914
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL PK IN

SUBJECT: TERRORIST INFILTRATION FALLING IN INDIAN KASHMIR,  INCREASING IN INDIAN HEARTLAND 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 02072 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (S) Summary: The Indian Home Ministry released its finding on May 10th that terrorist infiltration from Pakistan and Pakistani Kashmir into Indian Kashmir fell to an all time low from January through March of 2007. Although these winter months are often considered a low period in violence and infiltration, the numbers demonstrate a continuous positive drop since 2003. . . .

Dropping Numbers 
---------------- 
 
2. (S) . . . . While there were 59 missions during those months in 2006, in the same period in 2007, there were only 39, by the Home Ministry's calculations. . . .
 
Calibrating for the Peace Process 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (S) Hindu journalist Praveen Swami, who has strong ties to India's security services, told Poloff on May 8th that the drop in infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir was part of a clear calibration by Pakistan. It is obvious, he commented, that someone in Pakistan has made an order to cut off infiltration across the LOC. The drop in infiltration, he explained, along with the slow down in large scale terrorist attacks outside of J&K for nearly a year -- with the exception of the Samjhauta Express bombing -- is all part of an effort by Pakistan to build goodwill with India to support the peace process. This does not mean, he qualified, that infiltration into India has stopped. Instead terrorists were infiltrating from third countries, including Bangladesh and Nepal. They would travel through several countries first to hide their connection to terrorist camps in Pakistan. Just recently, he said, there were nine highly trained terrorists caught on their way into Mumbai. They were all coming from Pakistan originally, but they had traveled through several countries, and eventually tried to enter Mumbai by sea. While most of the nine were headed to Mumbai, he explained, at least one was told to travel to Northern Kashmir. Swami said his sources had no idea why the terrorist was told to go to Northern Kashmir, because the suspect himself did not know why he was sent there. This and other arrests demonstrate, he warned, that Pakistan-based terrorist groups continue to build a very capable network of sleeper cells inside India. They are waiting to strike, he said, when the restrictions are lifted. 

Denial of Deniability 
--------------------- 
 
4. (S) Institute for Conflict Management analyst Dr. Ajai Sahni told Poloff on May 10th that the Home Ministry's statistics are part of a steady drop in infiltration and violence from a peak in 2001. He attributed this to several factors: First, Pakistan had withdrawn more than 80,000 troops from the LOC, leading to a steady drop in covering fire that had allowed terrorists to infiltrate easily into J&K. Second, India constructed a fence along the LOC, and although there were certainly places where infiltration was still possible, the fence makes these incursions more difficult. Third, Pakistan was clearly under significant American pressure to end support for terrorism, leading to what Sahni called a “denial of deniability.” In essence, he explained, Pakistan had to be less obvious about what it was doing. This was not, he declared, a change in Pakistan's intentions. The fact that Pakistan is still unwilling to dismantle terrorist training camps, he said, means that they still want to keep the violence in J&K at a sustainable level, albeit at the smallest sustainable level so as to ward off international attention. 
 
Sleeping Cells 
-------------- 
 
5. (S) Dr. Sahni said further that in the rest of India there was a change since the early 1990s in the tactics of Pakistan-based terrorists. While previously these groups would link up with small local networks to support localized attacks, now they were building a system of sleeper cells that could attack anywhere in the country. Each cell, he explained, is independent from the others and receives information only from terrorist leaders in Pakistan, who plan the attacks. Regardless of where a cell is located at any particular time, he described, it can be mobilized at any moment to launch an attack anywhere in the country. All that was needed was to contact local handlers in a specific area, who would handle logistical issues. Each cell had little to no information about the other until they were mobilized. The groups were now using this pattern to maintain their network inside India. While violence has been down for the last year, Dr. Sahni underlined, this should not be mistaken for a lack of capacity. 
 
6. (S) Comment: Indian analysts don't necessarily believe that this drop in violence is a permanent trend. They see it instead as a change in Pakistani strategy, keeping violence at a minimal level temporarily to support peace negotiations or to escape U.S. scrutiny. In the long term, they remain distrustful that this trend will continue, especially if U.S. influence over Pakistan were to diminish. On the other hand, observers from the G-8 community (see reftel) are taking the trend seriously. End Comment. 
PYATT