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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA1174, THE OPPOSITION'S RECIPE FOR SUCCESS: A

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA1174 2007-05-07 22:30 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1174/01 1272230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072230Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0099
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1081
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: THE OPPOSITION'S RECIPE FOR SUCCESS: A 
MONTEALEGRE-JARQUIN-RIZO ALLIANCE 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1028 
     B. MANAGUA 0810 
     C. MANAGUA 0242 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Two former presidential candidates, Eduardo 
Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) and 
Edmundo Jarquin of the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), 
are working on forging a political alliance to counter 
President Ortega,s increasingly authoritarian inclinations. 
They are also reaching out to another former candidate, Jose 
Rizo of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC).  Combined, 
these three leaders represent about 62% of the votes cast in 
the November 2006 election, and could present a strong 
alternative to counter Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) in the 2008 municipal elections.  In a recent dinner 
hosted by the Ambassador, Montealegre and Jarquin deliberated 
opposition unity with five prominent Nicaraguan political 
analysts and Embassy officials.  While Nicaragua,s history 
is marked by numerous similar initiatives that failed, the 
current proponents believe that this one, like Violeta 
Chamorro,s UNO, will succeed because it must.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Over dinner hosted by the Ambassador on May 3, ALN 
and MRS former presidential candidates Eduardo Montealegre 
and Edmundo Jarquin, respectively, deliberated with five 
prominent Nicaraguan political analysts over how to forge an 
effective democratic opposition alliance to counter Ortega,s 
creeping authoritarianism and win a substantial number of 
mayoral races in November 2008.  The political pundits 
included Emilio Alvarez Montalvan, Foreign Minister during 
part of Aleman government and a Conservative; Sergio Garcia 
Quintero, a Liberal-dissident jurist; Sergio Ramirez, a 
renowned author, MRS supporter, and VP during the Ortega 
regime of the 1980s; Gabriel Alvarez, a constitutional expert 
associated with the ALN; and, Cairo Manuel Lopez, a 
constitutional specialist and Social Christian.  The DCM and 
PolCouns also attended. 
 
Clear Objectives, Organization, Funds Recipe for Success 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) Alvarez Montalvan opened the discussion by sharing 
his optimism that Nicaragua,s opposition forces will 
coalesce and prevail over Ortega,s efforts to turn the 
country into an authoritarian, autocratic regime.  To 
succeed, however, the effort will require clear objectives, 
organization, and of course, financial backing.  He asserted 
that funding alone is not the solution; without a clear 
purpose and order, the money will be useless.  Another 
essential ingredient is Nicaragua,s youth, especially given 
that 70% of the population is under 30.  Alvarez Montalvan 
added that civil society, particularly the Movimiento por 
Nicaragua (MpN), must play a pivotal role in the opposition 
effort. 
 
4.  (C) Other Nicaraguan guests nodded in agreement, although 
views were divided regarding whether political parties or 
civil society should take the lead in the opposition 
movement.  Lopez commented that the MpN represents only a 
small segment of the civil society and to be more effective, 
it should shed its elitist reputation.  He suggested that the 
Pro Justicia umbrella NGO (over which he presides) could also 
contribute.  They also agreed that civil society and 
political parties associated with the new opposition must 
create a common sense of purpose and spirit of volunteerism. 
Ramirez commented that President Ortega,s Venezuelan-funded 
literacy campaign, eye clinics, and generic pharmaceuticals 
will attract poor Nicaraguans to Ortega,s side.  In addition 
to arranging rallies and demonstrations, the opposition must 
also promote social causes, for example, helping Nicaraguans 
resolve basic problems like water shortages and illiteracy. 
Most Nicaraguans are not focused on corruption and good 
governance; they want food and jobs, argued Ramirez. 
 
5.  (C) Although Garcia was less optimistic than Alvarez 
Montalvan, he ventured that today,s political context is not 
as complex as what Violeta Chamorro,s UNO opposition faced 
in the late 1980s.  He explained that Violeta,s coalition 
contained 23 parties and leaders competing for position, 
while this time around the opposition can start with the 
three presidential candidates, who together garnered 62% of 
the vote in last year,s election. 
 
 
Democracy Vs Autocracy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Montealegre posited that the crucial debate is not 
whether Nicaraguans prefer left or right leaning political 
parties, but rather, whether they support democratic or 
caudillo-run, authoritarian regimes.  Jarquin opined that 
some of Daniel Ortega,s personality traits are 
uncontrollable -) including the president,s penchant for 
authoritarianism, a visceral loathing of free market 
economies, and his ingrained dislike for the United States. 
Jarquin explained that while he questions certain aspects of 
free market economies and U.S. policies, engagement, not 
empty, insulting rhetoric, is the proper manner to address 
these concerns.  Ramirez remarked that while Ortega is a 
skilled conspirator, he is lousy at governing.  Nonetheless, 
Ortega,s disjointed, scatter-shot style should not be 
misinterpreted or dismissed; behind the apparent chaos is a 
man with a clear mission, warned Ramirez. 
 
An Aleman-Free Opposition 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Jarquin suggested that today,s opposition should 
rally around two causes: defending Nicaragua,s democracy and 
ensuring that the November 2008 municipal elections are held 
on schedule.  Slippage in the municipal polls would allow 
Ortega more time to consolidate popular support in 
preparation for the 2011 national elections.  To succeed, the 
opposition must be aggressive and focused in its criticism of 
Ortega and his political pact with Aleman -) calling Ortega 
on every failure to deliver on his campaign promises of zero 
unemployment and zero hunger, he said. 
 
8.  (C) Expressing his optimism over forming an opposition 
alliance with Montealegre in preparation for the municipal 
elections, Jarquin clarified that under no circumstances 
should PLC caudillo/convicted criminal Arnoldo Aleman 
participate in this effort.  Montealegre seconded this view, 
saying that Aleman presents the main obstacle to unity. 
Garcia underscored the strategic importance of winning 
Managua,s mayoral race.  (Note: Edmundo Jarquin has publicly 
stated his interest in running for Mayor of Managua, where 
the MRS enjoys considerable support.) 
 
Counter Ortega through Aleman 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Monteleagre ventured that the most effective way to 
counter Ortega is by attacking Aleman.  In weakening Aleman, 
Ortega will lose PLC National Assembly votes, which he needs 
to advance his political project.  Ramirez agreed, adding 
that Ortega cannot afford to publicly defend any attacks on 
Aleman.  Alvarez warned that once Aleman,s utility expires, 
Ortega will find another Liberal to &replace8 him. 
(Comment: If Aleman,s influence on his party weakens, PLC 
legislators will be less likely to endorse legislation that 
advances Ortega,s interests and more likely to coalesce with 
the ALN and MRS legislators to block destructive elements of 
Ortega,s legislative agenda.) 
 
Rizo A Key Ingredient, But Will He Play Ball? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 
 
10.  (C) While all of the Nicaraguans rejected Aleman,s 
participation, they were unanimous that former PLC candidate 
Rizo should be included in the opposition formula.  Jarquin 
and Montealegre agreed that Rizo will not attract all PLC 
voters, but he can draw enough votes to create a critical 
mass to reduce support for Aleman, whose pact with Daniel 
Ortega allowed Ortega to win the election.  Jarquin noted 
that only Rizo can convince the hundreds of thousands of 
Nicaraguans who voted for him that supporting an 
Aleman-controlled PLC is tantamount to endorsing Ortega. 
Montealegre then recounted his latest failed attempt to draw 
in Rizo, who after agreeing to participate in a joint Liberal 
unity tour in Matagalpa department over the May 4-6 weekend, 
suddenly backed out with the excuse that he did not want 
people to think he had joined the ALN.  Montealegre 
questioned Rizo,s commitment to the opposition movement and 
courage to break with Aleman.  Alvarez Montalvan and Garcia 
offered to approach Rizo and coax him to &make the leap,8 
although they also acknowledged that on several occasions 
 
Rizo had been very close to joining Montealegre during last 
year,s electoral campaign, but always capitulated to 
Aleman,s pressure. 
 
Watch out for Constitutional Reform 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (C) The Nicaraguan analysts diverged over the 
advisability of lobbying for constitutional reforms.   Garcia 
warned that negotiating reforms would open a Pandora,s Box 
and would play into Ortega,s hands, while Alvarez reasoned 
that opposition lawmakers must be prepared in the event the 
FSLN and PLC allies push for adverse reforms.  (Note: The 
FSLN is jockeying for a constitutional reform that would 
permit consecutive presidential elections, while the PLC 
supports non-consecutive re-election, clearly to advance the 
personal interests of their respective leaders.  Together, 
the two parties hold enough votes to promulgate 
constitutional reforms.  The ALN and MRS oppose these 
measures, and instead, propose requiring presidential 
candidates to receive at least 50 percent of the valid votes 
counted to win the election on the first round.) 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
12.  (C) The 2008 municipal elections may offer the last 
window of opportunity for the democratic opposition to 
contain President Ortega,s apparent intentions to install a 
populist, family-run dynasty in Nicaragua.  Ortega is racing 
to attract new voters to his side through a variety of social 
programs targeting Nicaragua,s poor -- similar to Chavez,s 
approach with Venezuela,s impoverished.  He will exploit 
whatever legal resources are at his disposal to remove 
competitors like Montealegre from his path and keep the 
opposition disunited.  His control of the courts with 
political ally Aleman allows him this privilege. The ALN-MRS 
alliance is feasible in Nicaragua,s current political 
context, as both oppose the caudillo-controlled FSLN and PLC. 
 However, to reach the critical mass of support to win 
municipalities, including Managua, the ALN-MRS alliance must 
garner sizable support from traditional PLC voters. 
 
13.  (C) Nicaragua,s history is marked by dozens of similar 
initiatives that failed, but the current proponents believe 
that this one, like Violeta Chamorro,s UNO, will succeed 
because it must.  Clearly, time favors Ortega and he 
possesses the resources through Venezuelan assistance to buy 
hearts and stomachs.  How soon the opposition coalesces, 
obtains the necessary financial backing, and starts playing a 
visible role in helping resolve Nicaragua,s daunting social 
needs, will largely determine whether this latest initiative 
is yet another failed alliance, or an initiative that will 
prosper and succeed.  Thus far, the bulk of Nicaragua,s 
business elites have avoided association with opposition 
efforts and declined to support them.  The risk is that not 
enough Nicaraguans will awake in time, and instead, will be 
lulled into complacency, or threatened into silence. 
TRIVELLI