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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM782, REQUEST FOR SECURITY WAIVER AND EXCEPTIONS - JUBA,
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07KHARTOUM782 | 2007-05-20 11:54 | 2011-08-24 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Khartoum |
VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKH #0782/01 1401154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201154Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7248
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 2628
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000782
SIPDIS
AIDAC
SIPDIS
NAIROBI FOR SFO
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EX
DS/IP/AF FOR BARRY, DS/C/PSP, DS/PSD/PCB FOR LIPTAK
D/IPRD
OBO/AM/AF, OBO/PE/DE/SB
AID/W FOR DCHA/SUDAN TEAM, OMS, SEC, AFR/SP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA ASEC AMGT EAID SU
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY WAIVER AND EXCEPTIONS - JUBA,
SUDAN
¶1. (U) Summary: Post requests expedited consideration of the
following waiver request, for an interim, unclassified U.S.
Government facility in Juba, Southern Sudan. Charge signed
COM statement on May 17, 2007. The package, including
attachments, will be forwarded via DHL. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) ACTION MEMORANDUM/ISSUE FOR ACTION - Requesting the
"Chief of Mission's statement" for the request for a setback
waiver to the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas
Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an
interim, unclassified U.S. Government (USG) facility on the
former USAID office building/compound under lease by USAID,
in Juba, Southern Sudan.
¶3. (SBU) ESSENTIAL FACTORS - In January 2005, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed ending a 21-year
civil war between northern and southern Sudan. USAID has
plans underway to establish a new interim unclassified office
site on an existing USAID compound that will provide support
services to all U.S. agencies through International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS). Thusly,
there will be no co-location waiver required.
¶4. (SBU) The USG has leased a new 19-acre site in Juba from
the host government for the construction of a permanent
facility meeting all the OSPB standards and the requirements
of SECCA. The Overseas Building Office (OBO) in the
Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the design and
construction of the new 19-acre USG compound in Juba.
¶5. (SBU) Currently USAID maintains ownership of two compounds
in Juba: the residential compound leased November 19, 1979,
with the lease expiring on December 31, 2029, and the interim
office compound leased April 24, 1980, with the lease
expiring on December 31, 2030. USAID and ConGen Juba are
required to implement OSPB security standards to the maximum
extent feasible, and seek OSPB exceptions for those that
cannot be achieved. USAID will fund the initial renovations
of the interim office and residential compounds to include
the implementation of all security upgrades.
¶6. (SBU) In September 2005, the USAID Office of Security and
Diplomatic Security conducted a joint physical security
survey that outlines the security upgrades that would be
required for the two existing USAID compounds. It should be
noted that at the time, the sites were planned to be used by
USAID for its programs in Southern Sudan, with the
possibility of a very limited Department of State presence.
The paradigm changed in 2006 when the Deputy Secretary of
State declared the presence of DoS personnel on the Juba
housing compound to be a "Consulate General."
¶7. (SBU) The results of the above mentioned survey are
contained at Tab 1. In February 2007, a Department of State
Office of the Inspector General team visited both sites. In
March 2007, RSO/Khartoum staff surveyed the facilities (Tab
2). This request incorporates recommendations from all three
surveys, and the RSO (Tab 3). Based on these reviews, USAID
and ConGen Juba are of the opinion that the proposed
upgrading of the USAID "GSO" compound to include office space
presents the best option in meeting security objectives for
the creation of interim offices for the ConGen and USAID
pending completion of the New Consulate Compound (NCC) in
Juba. The proposed USAID office compound achieves the
following:
--Allows the quickest relocation of ConGen and USAID
employees from the residential facilities operating as office
space to more secure office facilities.
--Will accommodate the current USAID/USG staff as well as
proposed staffing increases starting in FY 2007.
--Provides a reasonable level of protection to USG employees
under the Chief of Mission authority in actual office spaces.
--In the opinion of USAID and ConGen Juba, the proposed
compound offers the most practical and cost effective option
for the USG for the short term on an interim office building.
¶8. (SBU) BACKGROUND - The two existing USAID compounds in
Juba are the only two compounds that provide basic
infrastructure and facilities to establish a USG presence.
There are no commercial and/or residential buildings or
compounds that are presently available in Juba. The existing
USAID/USG office compound was sub-leased to Action Contre la
Faim during the last ten years of conflict in the south. The
compound is approximately 77,000 square feet or 1.7 acres.
There are currently four structures on the compound: an
office building, warehouse, tukul/conference room, and guard
booth. Existing setbacks for buildings on the office
compound are as follows:
--Office Building: North 135.5 feet, south 24 feet, east 23
feet, and west 309.6 feet.
--Warehouse: North 45.6 feet, south 141.7 feet, east 110
feet, and west 54.3 feet.
--Tukul/Conference: North 162.4 feet, south 23 feet,
east 145 feet, and west 237.8 feet.
¶9. (SBU) USAID recently negotiated an MOU with the EU/EC to
secure easement to increase setback by two meters on the
USAID compound on the south perimeter.
¶10. (SBU) The existing office building is planned to be used
as office space for up to 40 desks. It is constructed from
local brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 300 mm
(12 inches) thick. The structure has concrete spread
footings with 6 inch minimum concrete structural slab over
compacted earth fill. The roof is constructed from steel
frame and covered with 24 gauge corrugated metal sheets. The
doors and windows are commercially fabricated with
non-standard grille work on the windows.
¶11. (SBU) The existing warehouse is constructed from local
brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 250 mm (10
inches) thick. It will not be used as office space. The
structure has concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum
concrete structural slab over compactedearth fill. The roof
is constructed from steel frame and covered with 24 gauge
corrugated metal sheets. The doors and windows are
commercially fabricated with non-standard grille work on the
windows.
¶12. (SBU) The existing tukul will be converted into a
conference room with a capacity up to 45 people. It is
constructed from local brick and masonry work with the
exterior wall 250 mm (10 inches) thick. The structure has
concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum concrete
structural slab over compacted earth fill. The roof is
constructed from steel frame and covered with thatching
material. The doors and windows are commercially fabricated
with non-standard grille work on the windows.
¶13. (SBU) USAID/SEC supports the use of the existing USAID
office compound on an interim, unclassified basis. This
support is given with the understanding that once the new
office building/compound is complete on the new 19-acre site,
that all USAID office space will be maintained within the new
USAID/Consulate office building/compound, and that Washington
approves the interim use of the existing USAID compound as
the interim ConGen/USAID office compound.
¶14. (SBU) JUSTIFICATION - The interim USAID/USG facility has
been inspected and security recommendations to improve the
overall security posture at this facility are outlined in the
USAID/SEC security assessment. Implementation of the
recommended security enhancements is underway. The physical
security applications will be in place and operational before
USAID/USG employees can occupy the compound.
¶15. (SBU) The proposed USG office compound will be an
unclassified interim solution to provide safe and secure
SIPDIS
office facilities until the new Consulate General Compound
(CGC) is completed, at which time all USG offices will
collocate on the CGC compound.
¶16. (SBU) The joint USAID/SEC and DS physical security
survey that was conducted in September 2005 is based on the
OSPB standards to a high political violence threat for a sole
occupant of building or compound.
¶17. (SBU) SECCA WAIVER - The Secure Embassy Construction and
Counter)Terrorism Act 1999 (P.L.106-113) requires two
elements of the law to be met: 100 feet of setback on all new
USG office buildings and that all USG agencies under the COM
be co-located on the Embassy or Consulate compounds.
¶18. (SBU) A co-location waiver is not required for USAID/USG
Juba as the two existing USAID compounds (functional and
housing) will be used by USAID, Consulate General and other
agencies under the COM authority.
¶19. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen/USAID is seeking a 100 feet setback
waiver to Public Law 106-113 in accordance with the Secure
Embassy Construction and Counter)Terrorism Act 1999.
¶20. (SBU) To mitigate the vulnerability to vehicle borne
improvised explosive devises (VBIED) USAID has constructed a
DS approved anti-climb and anti-ram perimeter wall around the
office compound. In addition, USAID has/is implementing the
following counter measures:
--Mitigate the lack of setback and blast resistant perimeter
wall by placing extremely large boulders or DS approved
planters in front of the existing wall outwards to the
maximum extent feasible to limit vehicle traffic on all sides
of the compound.
--Install sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers between the
anti-ram perimeter wall and the warehouse building.
--Improve the drainage ditch on the attack-side of the east
perimeter to add another layer of protection.
¶21. (SBU) Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Standards -
The following OSPB standards apply to the USAID/USG office
compound in Juba: 12 FAH-6 H-113.6 Physical Security (Sole
Occupant of Building or Compound):
a. Perimeter walls will be constructed to a minimum of nine
feet (2.75 meters) on the attack side and non-attack sides,
and without footholds or handholds.
b. Perimeter walls provide anti-ram protection to all areas
that are accessible to vehicle approaches to prevent or limit
vehicle penetration, equal to that identified for primary
vehicle barriers, in accordance with DS/PSP/PSD
specifications (SD-STD-02.01).
c. Traffic lanes will be a maximum width of 12 feet (3.7
meters), but no less than 10 feet (3.1 meters) wide, with a
gate and active anti-ram barrier(s) as a means of containing
a halted vehicle during vehicle inspection or identification.
d. A compound access control (CAC) allowing passage through
the perimeter will include a guard booth, a nine-foot
(2.75-meter) anti-climb wall or fence, and a personnel and
package screening area. The guard booth, from which vehicular
access through the perimeter entrance is remotely controlled,
will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant
protection. The walls of the remaining portions of the CAC
will be constructed of some substantial material, i.e.,
concrete masonry units or "cinder block," masonry, brick or
concrete. All non-FE/BR windows and door glazing on the
street side will be grilled and provided with an application
of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent
shatter-resistant window film to the interior side or with
laminated glass (12 mm thick) in a steel frame with 25 mm
bite.
e. New office buildings and newly acquired buildings will
provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters)
between the protected side of the perimeter barrier and the
building exterior. Existing office buildings will provide a
minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) to the
maximum extent feasible.
f. A clear zone on new office building and newly acquired
building compounds, free of auxiliary buildings, parking, or
man-made obstructions, will be provided which extends 20 feet
(6 meters) inward from the protected side of the perimeter
barrier. Existing office buildings will comply to the maximum
extent feasible.
g. Employee parking at new office buildings will be located
at least 20 feet (6 meters) from the office building.
Employee parking at newly acquired buildings will be located
at least 50 feet (15 meters) from the office building.
Existing office buildings will comply with the latter
requirement to the maximum extent feasible. There will be no
visitor parking inside the chancery/consulate compound.
h. Compound lighting will provide a minimum of 1 foot-candle
(10.8lx) measured one meter above ground on vertical surfaces
of buildings requiring surveillance by guards or closed
circuit television (CCTV) to detect and deter an intrusion.
i. All new office buildings are required to be constructed to
provide protection from blast. Structural framing and the
exterior envelope of such buildings, including the exterior
faade (and windows), walls, and roofs, shall be designed in
accordance with administratively controlled criteria (contact
DS/PSP/PSD) to resist the effects of a specified
TNT-equivalent hemispherical surface burst.
j. For newly acquired buildings, a blast vulnerability study
will be developed to identify specific
recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of blast on
the building and occupants in accordance with
administratively controlled criteria.
k. For existing office buildings, a blast vulnerability study
will be developed for all major facade/window and seismic
renovation/upgrades and major building renovations to
identify specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the
effects of blast on the building and occupants in accordance
with administratively controlled criteria. When it is
impractical to produce a building upgrade to the full extent
of required criteria, the blast vulnerability study will
address feasible upgrades that mitigate lesser threats and
indicate the resulting protection achieved.
l. Building exterior walls will provide 15-minute
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum
of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform.
m. Building exterior doors will provide 15-minute
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection.
n. Building exterior windows will provide 15-minute
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum
of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform.
o. All major renovations involving newly acquired buildings
and existing office buildings will be provided with exterior
laminated windows composed of thermally tempered glazing or
heat-strengthened glass, except those areas that provide
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection.
Existing exterior windows not laminated must be treated with
eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent
shatter-resistant window film.
p. All new interior glazing will be composed of laminated
thermally tempered glazing or laminated heat-strengthened
glass. All existing interior glazing will have a daylight
application layer of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance
equivalent shatter-resistant window film applied to the
protected side if the glazing is not a laminated product.
q. All man-passable non-window openings in exterior walls
below 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform
will be grilled or louvered to provide 15-minute forced-entry
protection.
r. The interior hardline will provide 15-minute forced-entry
and ballistic-resistant protection.
s. All public access control operations will include
provisions for active inspection of personnel before allowing
passage through the building hardline.
t. The guard booth from which access through the hardline is
controlled will provide 15-minute forced-entry and
ballistic-resistant protection, whether a Marine, Diplomatic
Security guard or local guard is assigned there.
u. In the public access area, where teller windows or
transparent partitions are part of the hardline, 15-minute
forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection are required.
v. Where public access areas are located behind the hardline,
a DS-approved nonman-passable barrier system to provide
office staff protection is required.
w. A safe haven will provide a minimum of 60-minute
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, emergency
power, ventilation, communications, and emergency egress.
This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired
buildings, and existing office buildings.
x. The safe haven generator room will provide a minimum of
60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection.
This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired
buildings, and existing office buildings.
¶22. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen Juba/USAID are seeking exceptions
to the following OSPB standards (12 FAH-6):
e. Setback - New office buildings and newly acquired
buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100
feet (30 meters) between the protected side of the perimeter
barrier and the building exterior. Existing office buildings
will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30
meters) to the maximum extent feasible.
--A setback waiver to SECCA is requested.
f. 20-foor clear zone. A clear zone on new office building
and newly acquired building compounds, free of auxiliary
buildings, parking, or man-made obstructions, will be
provided which extends 20 feet (6 meters) inward from the
protected side of the perimeter barrier. Existing office
buildings will comply with the regulations to maximum extent
feasible.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
are existing conditions on the site and cannot be altered.
USAID will incorporate additional close circuit television
(CCTV) to overcome this deficiency.
j. Blast vulnerability study - For newly acquired buildings,
a blast vulnerability study will be developed to identify
specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of
blast on the building and occupants in accordance with
administratively controlled criteria.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the
structure and cost to the United States Government (USG). To
implement this standard would not be practical or cost
effective to the USG for an interim office building. USAID
has installed sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers
adjacent to the warehouse to mitigate blast. USAID will
submit design and location of the containers to DS for
concurrence. USAID is also planning the installation of
HESCO bastions along the interior side of the perimeter walls
adjacent to the proposed office building to mitigate the
effects of a blast.
l. Exterior wall. Building exterior walls will provide
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to
a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible
platform.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to
the USG for an interim office building. USAID will
incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements such as
grilled windows and forced-entry doors in accordance to the
OSPB standards.
n. Exterior windows. Building exterior windows will provide
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to
a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible
platform.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to
the USG for an interim office building. USAID will
incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements (grilles) in
accordance to the OSPB standards to all windows on office
spaces. HESCO bastions described above will mitigate
ballistic threat.
r. Interior hardline. The interior hardline will provide
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to
the USG for an interim office building. USAID will
incorporate 15 minute forced entry and ballistic-resistant
doors and 15 minute forced entry to the windows in accordance
to the OSPB standards. USAID will establish public access
control (PAC) at the entrance to all office buildings with a
walk through metal detector as required by public law.
w. Safe haven. A safe haven will provide a minimum of
60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection,
emergency power, ventilation, communications, and emergency
egress. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly
acquired buildings, and existing office buildings.
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the
structure. USAID will incorporate 15 minute FE walls,
windows, and doors to establish an area of protection in the
office building. The area of protection will have emergency
communications and power.
x. Safe haven generator room - The safe haven generator room
will provide a minimum of 60- minute forced-entry and
ballistic-resistant protection. This applies equally to new
office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing
office buildings.
--Justification: USAID will incorporate the same security
applications as the area of protection for the emergency
generator room. To implement this standard would not be
practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office
building.
¶23. (SBU) SUMMARY - The proposed interim, unclassified ConGen
Juba/USAID office compound in Juba has been inspected and
security recommendations to improve the overall security
posture at this facility are outlined in the security
assessment conducted by USAID/SEC and DS in September 2005
along with the additional security requirements outlined in
this document. Implementation of the security
recommendations is currently underway. All security
enancments will be in place and operational before USG
employees can occupy the compound. The majority of all
security equipment is on site and installation is underway.
USAID will fund the renovation of the new compound to include
the security upgrades. To ensure the security requirements
are met, Diplomatic Security and the Regional Security
Officer will be provided the opportunity to review and
provide comments on design documents prior to construction.
¶24. (SBU) The interim office property will be an unclassified
interim solution to provide safe and secure office facilities
to ConGen Juba/USAID staff until the new Consulate General
Compound (CGC) is completed by OBO, at which time all USG
agencies in Juba will collocate on the CGC compound.
¶25. Attachments (to be sent by DHL):
--Tab 1 ) USAID/Juba Security Design Plan
--Tab 2 ) Security Assessment, USAID/Sudan*Juba
--Tab 3 ) Hesco Bastions to Mitigate Ballistic Threat
--Tab 4 ) Map and Photos of Proposed USAID/USG Office
facility
----------------------------
Chief of Mission's Statement
----------------------------
¶26. (SBU) Chief of Mission's Statement ) I have reviewed the
documents submitted in support of the request for a setback
waiver to the Security Embassy Construction and
Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas
Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an
interim U.S. Government office facility on the former USAID
office building compound in Juba, Southern Sudan. I have
also been briefed by USAID and Embassy Khartoum's Regional
Security Officer concerning this request. I am keenly aware
of my statutory responsibilities, as the Acting Chief of
Mission, for the safety and security of U.S. government
employees who serve under "Chief of Mission authority." I am
also aware of the RSO's similar responsibility. After
careful consideration of the RSO's comments and a balancing
of the risks inherent in any waiver of security standards
with our Mission's overall objectives in achieving
reconstruction and redevelopment in Southern Sudan, I have
determined that this waiver request merits Washington review
and recommend that it be granted.
¶27. (SBU) In Juba, USAID and State employees currently reside
at the Consulate General compound. These officers live in
and work out of several houses on the compound. Each officer
has a single room for occupancy. These rooms serve as
bedrooms as well as working spaces for the officers. Such an
arrangement is an untenable one for the long term, and
impedes our Mission's ability to operate effectively in the
south. Identifying and setting up alternative office space
for the current officers and the additional staff required is
critical if the U.S. Government is to maintain a robust
presence in Juba. Our interests in Southern Sudan are
significant. The requirement for increasing our support for
the Government of Southern Sudan, and for the enforcement of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), are important
components of our long term policy goals in the region and
have a significant nexus to the global war against terrorism.
¶28. (SBU) Secretary Rice's vision of "Transformational
Diplomacy" changed the paradigm in which our Foreign Service
now works. As the RSO himself remarked, "the standards and
rules that we have based much of our past risk management on
have not kept up with the new requirements placed upon us by
transformational diplomacy." I believe that the goals that
the U.S. seeks to achieve in Southern Sudan are worthy of
taking yet one further step forward in our definition of
"risk management" as regards transformational diplomacy
working environments. Given that the U.S. Government already
has a footprint in the south with a residential compound for
several State and AID employees, it is critical that we
provide office space and administrative support for these
employees to enable them to carry out their work. The office
facility proposed on the former USAID compound still under
lease is aimed at doing just this. The February 28, 2006,
Security Design Plan developed by USAID Office of Security
underscores the careful thought given to providing an
adequate level of protection for the personnel envisaged, and
sets forth a number of physical security upgrades for the
compound. I am confident that, with full implementation of
these upgrades along with the recommendations from the other
surveys included in the waiver package, there is a way
forward that could provide adequate levels of security.
¶29. (SBU) For the above reasons, I concur with this request
for SECCA/OSPB waivers and exceptions. Signed Roberto Powers,
Charge d' Affaires, U.S. Embassy Khartoum
------------------------------------
Regional Security Officer's Comments
------------------------------------
¶30. (SBU) Regional Security Officer's (RSO) Comments - I have
reviewed the attached request for SECCA setback waivers for
the Juba office facilities and the requests for exceptions
from a number of the OSPB physical security standards for USG
Office Buildings, sole occupant for this site.
¶31. (SBU) Upon lengthy consideration and given the totality
of the circumstances, I reluctantly cannot concur with the
proposal put forward in this waiver/exception package, and
will so advise my Chief of Mission.
¶32. (SBU) Background - In addition to my service as a
Regional Security Officer, I have also served as a regional
desk officer for the Project Coordination Branch of the DS
Physical Security Division. I have worked on, from the
Headquarters side, a large number of waiver/exception
packages of this nature. I fully understand, from both
perspectives, the risk inherent in approving occupancy of a
facility that doesn't meet current physical security
standards and requirements. Times, circumstances, and the
Department's assumption of increased risk in the name of
"Transformational Diplomacy" have changed.
¶33. (SBU) As this waiver/exception package affects both the
Consulate General Juba and the USAID Mission to Southern
Sudan, we need to consider the implications of seeking so
many OSPB security requirement exceptions. Both operations
are presently on the cutting edge of the Department's
development of new ways of conducting business. Operating
from a residential compound located about a quarter mile from
the office site, both ConGen and USAID Juba are conducting
their affairs in the Offices of the UN, various NGOs, and
from the front seats of their cars. Everyone hoped that this
was not a situation that would long continue. The ConGen
wishes sooner or later to begin performing American Citizen
Services, and is already deeply engaged in holding the "CPA,"
(the agreement that led to the cessation of 50 years of war
between northern and southern Sudan and the division of both
governmental authorities and oil revenues), together. To
have any realistic chance of success, the. ConGen staff is
going to have to increase, and they will need something
approaching proper office and communications available to
them. They can't do their jobs from their bedrooms forever,
and the increased tempo and volume of work by the CG staff
already is drawing more attention to the residential compound
than this RSO is completely sanguine about.
¶34. (SBU) USAID Juba faces the same challenges. For the CPA
to succeed, Southern Sudan must develop economically. There
exists in the southern half of Sudan at this moment, a
democratic, pro-American government, which is no friend of
the forms of belief-based terrorism that has cost America so
dearly in the last 25 years. The support of countries (or
even half-countries) that are democratic secular and
pro-American is the very core of the Department's
"Transformational Diplomacy" initiative. To help the
Southerners create a viable future for themselves, and to
continue to develop democratically, the mission of USAID Juba
will also have to grow. So ConGen and USAID Juba are for the
foreseeable future joined at the hip in their striving to
promote the Department's goals in Southern Sudan.
¶35. (SBU) An inconvenient truth: Is this a waiver/exception
package for an "existing office building" or for a "newly
acquired office building?" The USG properties in Southern
Sudan were evacuated for years, and during that period leased
to an INGO for a nominal annual fee. So there have been no
USG employees using this office space for 10 or more years.
It is fair for reasoned people to debate on how the site
should be defined. RSO will defer to DS/PSD/PCB on the
resolution of this particular issue.
¶36. (SBU) There's a new Consulate Compound (NCC) on the
boards, and due to start moving forward somewhere in the next
2 to 4 years, Recent events unfolding in Sudan cause me to
doubt that it will be built. There must/must be serious
consideration given to the reality on the ground in both
northern and Southern Sudan by the stakeholders in Washington
concerning this aspect of the waiver/exception request. If
there is even a reasonable doubt that, given the on-going
problems that Embassy Khartoum has had with the New Embassy
Compound (NEC), construction, that NCC Juba will be built,
then I am not willing to sign off on a substandard "interim"
facility that becomes the permanent one by default. If this
package eventually moves forward, it should only be with the
full understanding that if the NEC is not completed, or if
the security situation in Southern Sudan deteriorates any
further (and it has deteriorated steadily for the last 6
months), then the idea of expanding USG presence in the
South, and building the facilities to support that growth,
needs to be reconsidered.
¶37. (SBU) Since USAID (and then, the Department of State upon
the creation of The Consulate General), proposed this interim
office building project, circumstances have changed. The
security conditions in the South have altered for the worse.
I now have significant doubts about the reliability of the
SPLA to provide security for Juba and it's environs. The
command and control of the SPLA troops by the Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS) can even be called into question. The
area is becoming increasingly lawless, and there are other
larger issue. It is beginning to appear that the GOSS wishes
to renounce major portions of the CPA. Relations with the
Khartoum government are such that RSO Khartoum now questions
how much it will be able to support ConGen Juba. So it comes
to this.
¶38. (SBU) There are substantial risks involved in seeking to
occupy offices with this level of security requirement
exceptions. In this package USAID has done a reasonably good
job in mitigating as many of them as the available structures
and the funding available for them would allow. However, one
aspect of this waiver/exception package that I cannot support
is the lack of a proper safe haven and safe haven generator.
There is substantial lawlessness in the area adjacent to
Juba, and firearms abound. There are increasingly situations
involving unpaid troops raids and murders by the Lord's
Resistance Army and other armed groups (OAGs), there may even
have been a near-miss coup attempt of late, (reporting on
that is a little hazy). If this project is to go forward, it
must include a proper safe haven and the protected electrical
power to support one.
¶39. (SBU) I would be more sanguine if we were able to
re-visit the concept of embedding FE/BR trailers on the
existing residential compound, and concentrating our security
resources in one location rather than splitting them between
two compounds. However, what we are now hearing at Post is
that DoD and other USG elements are going to need that space
on the residential compound for additional housing units.
¶40. (SBU) I understand the importance of the USG policies
directed towards Sudan, both North and South. There are big
issues, issues of importance at stake here. But given the
current state of relations with the Khartoum government,
given the steady deterioration of the security situation in
Southern Sudan, I am deeply concerned about our ability to
reasonably and appropriately manage the risk of our employees
in the South. The increase in the number of employees that
this facility will inevitably enable, only increases the
level of my concerns.
¶41. (SBU) Given the current reality on the ground in Southern
Sudan, I can not support this waiver/exception package.
¶42. (SBU) If this waiver/exception package is approved, RSO
Khartoum commits to working with RSO Juba, the Consulate
General, and USAID to expedite the most effective security
procedures and enhancements that are possible under the
challenging conditions extant in Southern Sudan. Steven
Bernstein, Regional Security Officer, American Embassy
Khartoum.
POWERS