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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM693, Governance, Capacity and Infrastructure Challenges in

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM693 2007-05-02 13:09 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3232
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0693/01 1221309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021309Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7083
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF ECON EAID KDEM SU
SUBJECT: Governance, Capacity and Infrastructure Challenges in 
Southern Sudan Two years After CPA 
 
Ref: a.) Khartoum 613, b.) Khartoum 591 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  ConGen Juba staff visits to key Southern Sudan 
cities reveal weak but emerging local governments trying to fill the 
void of undelivered services from the central government.  Capacity 
is limited, with most decision-making concentrated in a few people 
trained in the Diaspora.  Infrastructure remains almost as limited 
as before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. 
Nevertheless, returnees keep coming back, but are increasingly 
frustrated and impatient with the state of the "peace dividends." 
Blame for the lack of development is shared between Khartoum's 
perceived efforts at destabilization of the South and the Government 
of Southern Sudan's (GOSS) mismanagement, financial limitations, and 
corruption.  The majority of people appear to support separation in 
the 2011 referendum.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) In a series of visits over the last few months to key cities 
in several states, specifically, Yei (Central Equatoria), Yambio 
(West Equatoria), Torit (East Equatoria), Maluol Kan (North Bahr el 
Ghazal,) Wau (West Bahr el Ghazal), Rumbek (Lakes), Malakal and Renk 
(Upper Nile), Bor (Jonglei) and Bentiu (Unity), ConGen staff have 
called on local leaders, NGO partners, UN officials, Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
representatives to assess the state of social, economic, security 
and political conditions.  The GOSS generally gets a failing grade 
on service delivery and local governments are struggling to provide 
the basic necessities without much support from the center. 
 
3. (U) Many state and local civil servants are not being paid 
regularly because of the lack of funds at those levels.  Local 
officials note that key GOSS ministries, including health, education 
and roads, failed to spend their fiscal year 2006 budgets, leaving 
the local governments holding the bag on salaries and service 
delivery.  Local governments are also spending beyond their budgets 
or taking out loans for their planned activities. 
 
4. (U) In addition, the GOSS Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning has reportedly failed to disburse funds to the states which 
were allocated under the Southern Sudan January 2007 budget.  GOSS 
Ministers assert that the now suspended former Minister of Finance, 
Arthur Akuien Chol, had refused to release their funds when 
requested.  Moreover, the 2007 budget provides for "block grants" in 
the areas of health, education and agriculture, with the same amount 
for each state regardless of size and population.  Consequently, 
even when the funds are released many states will still find 
themselves unable to provide critical services. 
 
Bloated Payrolls and Unskilled Workers 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) An additional issue is the inequity in employee salaries, 
when they are paid, and the levels of incompetence in the civil 
service, resulting from the merger of employment systems with 
different "ideologies," as one interlocutor described it.  Southern 
Sudan continues to carry pre-CPA employees from the Civil Authority 
of New Sudan (CANS) system, who work alongside the newly hired GOSS 
and local government employees, as well as staff originally employed 
by the government in Khartoum.  In some cases the GOSS and post-CPA 
employees, who tend to be better educated, are paid and the CANS 
workers are not.  The South's payrolls are swollen with redundant, 
aged, and ghost workers who are a holdover from the CANS system, 
many of whom remain on the rolls as SPLM/A loyalists.  The GOSS 
admits that seventy percent of its budget, almost USD 50 million a 
month, is used for salaries and state transfers and operating costs, 
leaving little for development.  The Yei Commissioner told ConGen 
staff that he has over 2,000 civil servants in Yei of whom about 450 
are from the GOSS.  The CANS employees, who generally do not get 
paid but receive an "incentive" only, lack a strong work ethic, the 
Commissioner asserted. 
 
6. (U) The GOSS Acting Minister of Finance Gabriel (Changson) Chang 
has publicly criticized the gap between revenue and spending at the 
central level and has proposed to establish a cash management 
committee to limit government spending.  Changson has also called 
for a hiring freeze and wants to substantially pare down the 
payrolls.  At the local level this is nearly impossible to do, 
according to the Chairperson of the Anti-Corruption Commission, who 
notes that local officials fear political retribution if they purge 
the rolls. 
 
Services Not Delivered 
---------------------- 
 
7. (U) There is generally little evidence of any public 
infrastructure "peace dividend" in the rural areas or major towns 
outside of Juba.  What projects there are have been provided by 
international donors, private organizations and religious groups. 
There are very few new health facilities, primary schools, or water 
sources established by the GOSS.  Donors are under enormous pressure 
to support the development plans of GOSS Ministries but face rising 
costs, challenging logistics and lack of upkeep of newly built 
 
KHARTOUM 00000693  002 OF 002 
 
 
facilities. 
 
8. (U) The schools that exist are primarily simple mud and thatch 
buildings with little or no furniture, minimal supplies, if any, and 
often containing over a hundred children to a class.  Local 
officials acknowledge that there is not much education going on in 
such settings, but stress that people want their children to be in 
some kind of school no matter how ill-equipped.  The Yei 
Commissioner complained that his county was overrun by parents 
seeking to enroll their children in his schools because they were 
perceived as better than the even more austere structures in the 
surrounding countryside.  Likewise, in Rumbek we witnessed dozens of 
people at a hospital despite an almost total lack of drugs or 
trained medical personnel. 
 
But Lights on in Yei 
-------------------- 
 
9. (U) A good news story ConGen staff observed is USG-funded 
electrification in Yei town provided by the National Rural 
Electrification Cooperative Association (NRECA).  NRECA is part of 
the Southern Sudan Rural Electrification Program funded by USAID to 
improve security and economic opportunities for local industry and 
commerce through the increased availability of electric power.  Yei 
is the first and only city in Southern Sudan to have consistent 
lights restored.  There is an impressive economic boom in Yei town 
evident in the pedestrian traffic at night and the new businesses 
that have sprung up and expanded.  NRECA is concerned, however, 
because the local authorities have not paid their bills for months, 
putting in jeopardy the sustainability of a commercial power system. 
 Local officials harped about not getting funds from the GOSS, but 
promised to enter into a dialogue with NRECA to address the arrears 
and keep the lights on. 
 
And Still they Come 
------------------- 
 
10. (U) Despite the harsh conditions and lack of services in many of 
the rural areas and small towns, the reports on numbers of returnees 
is impressive.  UNHCR continues to repatriate Sudanese from Uganda, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, the Central African Republic, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, assisting over 50,000 refugees 
since 2005.  Approximately 300,000 remain in neighboring countries 
and UNHCR plans to assist over 100,000 in 2007.  These returnees 
are, however, overwhelming the schools, hospitals and other services 
in some communities, particularly urban towns, and are an increasing 
source of land disputes.  Yei has reportedly grown from a little 
over 90,000 people last year to an estimated 212,000 this year. 
Nevertheless, while land disputes are a source of concern they have 
not reached alarming proportions, but raise issues which local 
authorities and some international organizations are working to 
manage. 
 
Who is to Blame? 
---------------- 
 
11. (SBU) There is growing anger that some in the GOSS are getting 
fat while the local communities go hungry.  One government official 
in Yei showed ConGen staff the well-built house of a former GOSS 
Finance Ministry official in the midst of extreme poverty.  Others 
openly criticize GOSS officials for neglecting the poor and for 
supplying themselves with cars, offices, frequent travel, as well as 
foreign schools and medical care for their families.  These critics 
are equally harsh in condemning what they describe as Khartoum's 
efforts to support militias and maintain Sudan Armed Forces in the 
South to destabilize the area.  The SPLA, as well as local and GOSS 
officials, continue to assert that Khartoum is supporting "Other 
Armed Groups" and the Lord's Resistance Army in the South 
(reftels). 
 
Separation the Goal 
------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) In response to questions on efforts in support of the 
census, 2009 elections and the subsequent referendum, local 
officials and average people speak little of the first two, but 
anxiously await a chance to "vote for separation."  These people 
acknowledge a disconnect between the rhetoric of their SPLM leaders 
who publicly espouse a unity strategy, but who say they will be 
guided by the people, and the sentiments of the people who at this 
moment want separation from the North.  There is little support 
among the average Southern Sudanese we meet for co-existence under a 
unified state.  The distrust of the North and the desire to be free 
of Khartoum's influence remains strong.  The apparent lack of more 
"peace dividends" is both the cause and effect of this sentiment in 
many Southerners' view. 
 
POWERS