Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07HANOI921, VIETNAMESE GO TO THE POLLS ON MAY 20

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HANOI921.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HANOI921 2007-05-18 10:27 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO9388
RR RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0921/01 1381027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181027Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5396
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 3046
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000921 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI PREL CH VM
 
SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE GO TO THE POLLS ON MAY 20 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) After an extensive vetting process, the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) approved 880 candidates to contest 500 seats in the 
May 20 National Assembly (NA) elections.  In spite of the Party 
touting early on that "many more" independent (non-Communist Party) 
candidates would run this time around, the ratio of independents is 
only slightly higher than that of the election in 2002, but the 
ratio of "self-nominated" candidates nearly doubled.  In a first for 
Vietnam -- and as part of the GVN's efforts to bolster its 
sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands -- constituents in 
recently established Spratly Islands voting districts cast ballots 
on May 13.  Several Politburo members will be on the ballots and are 
not expected to lose.  Furthermore, some relatively well-known and 
outspoken former and current GVN officials, on their own or with 
some encouragement, decided against running.  Although the election 
is highly scripted, the NA has become more assertive in its 
government oversight role, grilling ministers about their policies 
and failures in combating corruption.  The newly elected assembly, 
once seated, will likely continue this trend.  End Summary. 
 
And the Finalists Are... 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) After an extensive vetting process led by the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front (VFF) -- the Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) 
"civil society" umbrella organization -- the CPV allowed 880 
candidates to contest 500 seats in the May 20 National Assembly (NA) 
elections.  Of these candidates, 165 work at central Party 
organizations and GVN ministries; 291, or about 33 percent, are 
female; 169 belong to ethnic minority groups (19 percent); and, 154 
(17.5 percent) are "independents" (non-Party members who have 
nonetheless been deemed "safe" by the Party).  In the previous 
election in 2002, there were 759 candidates, of which 257 were 
females (close to 33 percent), 141 ethnic minorities (18.5 percent) 
and 121 independent (approximately 16 percent). 
 
3. (SBU) In addition, the Party approved 30 "self-nominated" 
candidates:  those who do not have the official backing of a GVN or 
Party entity, but who are virtually all Party members.  Most of 
these 30 are from major cities, such as Ho Chi Minh City (seven) and 
Hanoi (six).  The ratio of self-nominated candidates is nearly twice 
that of the previous election.  That said, these 30 self-nominated 
candidates represent a sharp decrease from the 238 announced by the 
GVN after the second of three rounds of "consultations." 
Furthermore, we are aware of at least a few cases in which Party 
officials pressured some self-nominated candidates to withdraw or 
found them ineligible to run. 
 
Stepping Into the Polling Booth 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Eligible Vietnamese voters will be able to vote between 
7:00 A.M. and 7:00 P.M. on May 20.  Traditionally, most voters cast 
their ballots in the morning before heading to the local market. 
Proxy voting is common, as a family member may cast votes for the 
whole family.  In some cases during the last NA election, local 
election council members "escorted" those who had not yet voted to 
their polling stations.  The overall turn-out rate for this election 
is likely to be over 99 percent (turnout was 99.73 percent in the 
2002 election). 
 
Voting on the Spratlys 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) In a first for Vietnam -- and as part of the GVN's efforts 
to bolster its sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands -- 
constituents in the newly established Truong Sa and Bach Long Vy 
Island districts (islands in the Spratly chain) in Khanh Hoa 
Province and Hai Phong City, respectively, cast votes on May 13.  In 
addition, voters in two communes in Truong Sa District cast ballots 
for candidates to local People's Councils. 
 
Fatherland Front Vets Candidates 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The extensive five-stage process of vetting candidates took 
months.  The process began with the National Assembly Standing 
Committee (NASC) deciding on how many representatives from the 
various social groupings (veterans, females, intellectuals, 
laborers, etc.) the NA should have.  After examining 
"qualifications," the VFF then whittled eligible candidates down to 
880. 
 
7. (SBU) A high-level contact in the Office of the National Assembly 
(ONA) told us that the Party's "screening process" prevented many 
potentially good candidates from running.  Himself, for example. 
This contact added that "100 percent" of the ONA staff supported his 
 
HANOI 00000921  002 OF 002 
 
 
possible candidacy during a formal conference.  He nonetheless was 
not allowed to run, for reasons that he would not make clear. 
 
8. (SBU) In spite of the Party touting early on that there would be 
"many more" independent candidates this time around, the ratio of 
independents is only slightly higher than that of the election in 
2002 (17.5 percent this time, compared with 16 percent in 2002).  In 
a May online discussion, National Assembly Vice Chairman Nguyen Van 
Yeu confirmed that some "independent" candidates are actually former 
ranking officials from CPV commissions that have been dissolved. 
 
GVN Power Brokers "Put Their Hats in the Ring" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9. (SBU) Several Politburo members are "contesting" seats in the NA 
election:  CPV General Secretary Nong Duc Manh in Thai Nguyen 
Province; President Nguyen Minh Triet in Ho Chi Minh City; Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung in Haiphong City; NA Chairman Nguyen Phu 
Trong in Hanoi; Public Security Minister Le Hong Anh in Can Tho 
City; and, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem 
in Danang City.  They all are expected to be re-elected. 
 
Tough to Self-Nominate 
---------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) During his May online discussion, NA Vice Chairman Yeu 
said self-nominated candidates, some of whom were former ranking GVN 
officials as well as popular scientists and teachers, withdraw their 
candidacies because of "voter preferences."  He confirmed, however, 
that, in some cases, Party committees had asked individual Party 
members not to run.  "As Party members, they are supposed to follow 
Party committee instructions," Yeu said. 
 
11. (SBU) Of the original list of self-nominated candidates, many 
either elected to withdraw or did not get through the Party vetting 
process.  Some relatively well-known -- and outspoken -- former and 
current GVN officials, including former Vice Minister of Natural 
Resources and Environment (MNRE) Dang Hung Vo, current Trade 
Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen and former Justice Minister Nguyen Dinh 
Loc have "chosen" not to run.  According to our NA contact, the CPV 
did not allow more self-nominated candidates to run because it 
feared an embarrassing scenario in which high-ranking GVN officials 
are defeated by possibly lower-ranking self-nominated candidates. 
 
 
12. (SBU) Former MNRE Vice Minister Vo announced his self-nomination 
in March, telling local press that Nguyen Lan Dzung, a popular local 
professor, convinced him to do so.  Professor Dzung had publicly 
appealed for individuals like Vo to run, saying "the NA needs 
delegates who are frank, devoted and knowledgeable."  After 
declaring his candidacy, Vo said he "would not mind taking on" his 
own former boss at the MNRE as an NA delegate.  In April, Vo decided 
to withdraw his candidacy, reportedly out of fear he would not 
survive the vetting process.  This followed former Party General 
Secretary Le Kha Phieu's public statement welcoming Vo's intention 
 
SIPDIS 
to run. 
 
13. (SBU) For his part, current Trade Minister Tuyen told local 
press in March that he had thought of applying to run for the 
elections as a self-nominated candidate, but later decided not to. 
Tuyen publicly said that one of two Party Politburo members he had 
talked to discouraged him from running, while the other had 
supported his possible candidacy.  (Note:  Party statutes say that 
Party members cannot run in the NA election unless the Party 
"assigns" them to run.  The Communist Party Secretariat screens 
government employees of the rank of vice minister or above, while 
the Politburo approves ministers and those of higher rank.  End 
Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) Although the election is highly scripted, the National 
Assembly itself has become more assertive in its government 
oversight role, grilling ministers about their policies and failures 
in combating corruption.  The newly elected assembly, once seated, 
will likely continue this trend.  End Comment. 
 
MARINE