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Viewing cable 07HAMBURG31, BREMEN STATE ELECTION - AN END TO 12 YEARS OF A GRAND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HAMBURG31 2007-05-11 15:29 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Hamburg
VZCZCXRO2653
RR RUEHDF RUEHLZ
DE RUEHAG #0031/01 1311529
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111529Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL HAMBURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0138
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0127
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 0157
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HAMBURG 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: BREMEN STATE ELECTION - AN END TO 12 YEARS OF A GRAND 
COALITION? 
 
HAMBURG 00000031  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The upcoming May 13 state elections in 
Bremen/Bremerhaven are Germany's only state election in 2007. 
With 40 percent in the polls, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
is likely to be in the comfortable position of being able to 
choose its coalition partner.  The only viable coalition options 
are a renewal of the SPD-led "grand coalition" with the 
Christian Democrats (CDU), which has governed Bremen since 1995, 
or the formation of a SPD-Greens or "red-green" coalition.  The 
right-wing extremist German Peoples Union (DVU) will almost 
certainly retain its one seat in the Bremen Parliament. 
Meanwhile, the Left Party (die Linke) has a realistic chance of 
joining a "western" state parliament for the first time, which 
will be a major psychological boost for the group.  Between May 
2 and 9, Hamburg's Pol/Econ Off spoke with SPD, CDU, Greens and 
Linke representatives about their perspectives on the upcoming 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- 
The SPD Has the Lead, But With Whom Will They Dance? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- 
 
2. (U)  The May 4 ZDF Politbarometer poll showed the SPD at 40 
percent (they received 42.3 in the 2003 elections), the CDU at 
28 percent (29,8 in 2003), the Greens at 14 percent (12.8 in 
2003), the Free Democrats (FDP) at 6.0 (4.2 in 2003), the Linke 
at 4.5 percent, and the far-right DVU at 4.0 (2.3 percent in 
2003).  While the city-state of Bremen/Bremerhaven has a five 
percent hurdle to enter the state parliament, parties only need 
to receive five percent of the vote in either Bremen or 
Bremerhaven.  According to the May 4 poll, the current SPD 
mayor, Jens Boehrnsen, enjoys a significantly higher personal 
popularity rating than CDU lead candidate Thomas Roewekamp (54 
versus 20 percent).  While Bremen voters have not always been 
pleased with the performance of the SPD-CDU grand coalition, 54 
percent favor its continuation, whereas only 37 percent prefer 
an SPD-Green (red-green) government (Infratest Dimap April 26 
poll). 
 
3. (SBU)  Boehrnsen and SPD candidates have been very tight 
lipped on which party they will choose as coalition partners. 
On May 9, CDU Caucus Leader Hartmut Perschau told Hamburg's 
Pol/Econ Off that he believes both Boehrnsen and majorities of 
the Bremen SPD board and caucus strongly prefer red-green. 
However, Perschau thinks that there is a fifty percent chance 
that the SPD will opt again for a grand coalition due to the 
greater likelihood of getting budgetary support from the federal 
government if the SPD-CDU coalition stays in place.  Perschau 
thought Boehrnsen might stand up to SPD party and caucus 
preferences for the good of the city, as did his predecessor 
Henning Scherf, but did question whether Boehrnsen had the 
boldness to do so. 
 
4. (SBU)  While not directly stating in which direction the SPD 
was leaning, SPD Parliamentary Manager Frank Pietrzok said that 
the SPD-CDU coalition increasingly lacks the programmatic and 
personal base for continuation.  He complained that 
policy-making within the grand coalition had increasingly turned 
into horse trading and debate over administrative matters. 
Pietzrok stated that the programmatic commonality on educational 
and social issues was higher between the SPD and the Greens than 
within the grand coalition.  However, he conceded that 
large-scale economic/industrial projects (e.g. dredging of the 
Weser river, construction of a coal power plant) would be more 
controversial between the SPD and the Greens.  However, Greens 
Parliamentary Manager Felix Holefleisch indicated that such 
differences were not insurmountable obstacles to the formation 
of a red-green government and that all issues were negotiable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
Linke Ambition to Gain Foothold in Western Parliaments 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
 
5. (SBU)  Linke Party Manager Andreas Hein pointed out that at 
the national and local level the Linke were eager to overcome 
the five percent hurdle in Bremen in order to enter a "western" 
German state parliament for the first time.  He said that the 
Bremen Linke has received personnel support from Linke party 
associations in other German states.  However, he stressed that 
despite this support, the party did not have enough activists 
for the campaign, especially to cover Bremerhaven.  According to 
Hein, the Bremen Linke has a 150,000 Euro campaign budget drawn 
from public campaign support, the national Linke campaign 
election fund, and party fees.  Party officials in Berlin have 
told Embassy representatives that success in Bremen would be a 
major boost for the party, improving its chances in big states 
 
HAMBURG 00000031  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
due to vote in early 2008.  While both Pietrzok and Holefleisch 
admitted that they may lose some of their voters to the Linke, 
the SPD and Greens have ignored the Linke in their campaigning. 
Both party officials stated that they have adopted this strategy 
in order to prevent lending the Linke legitimacy by recognizing 
their issues. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT:  In our conversations, not only did our SPD 
and Greens contacts indicate that Bremen's SPD is leaning 
towards a red-green coalition, but even the CDU leadership seems 
to think Mayor Boehrnsen and his party would prefer a new 
governing partner.  Bremen would then be the only state 
government in which the Greens are represented again. 
Nevertheless, federal considerations might prompt Boehrnsen to 
adopt a statesmanlike attitude and continue the grand coalition, 
as Bremen could be more likely in receiving urgent financial 
support from mostly CDU-led state governments and the national 
government.  Balancing this is the SPD's growing desire to 
demonstrate a strong and independent profile to voters; breaking 
up a grand coalition would send just that message.  The other 
potential national message will come from the success or failure 
of the Linke to enter parliament.  Success coupled with a strong 
SPD outcome in a city that tends to lean to the left could cause 
the SPD to look to its left in advance of next year's big state 
elections.  Independent of coalition outcomes, Bremen will 
continue to face the same challenges as in the past:  high 
unemployment (Note: Bremen's unemployment is at 13 percent and 
Bremerhaven's at 19 percent; both are high above the national 
average of 9.5 percent. End Note.), the highest per capita debt 
in Germany, and an unbalanced budget.  END COMMENT. 
 
7. (U)  This message has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
BUTCHER