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Viewing cable 07BRASILIA990, FEAR OF CHINA CONSTRAINS BRAZIL'S STANCE ON THE DOHA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BRASILIA990 2007-05-31 18:53 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1722
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0990/01 1511853
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311853Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9089
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1535
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 9996
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 4502
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 6736
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4795
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6103
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6908
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 6251
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3689
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0330
RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EEB/TPP/MTA/MST FOR AARON SCHEIBE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SUE CRONIN 
GENEVA FOR USTR 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/ ADRISCOLL/MCAMPOS 
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD/DRAMBO 
USDA FOR FAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD WTO BR
SUBJECT:  FEAR OF CHINA CONSTRAINS BRAZIL'S STANCE ON THE DOHA 
ROUND 
 
REF: A) Brasilia 958; B)  Brasilia 755; C) Brasilia 918; D) Sao 
 
Paulo 290 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Brazilian industry leaders and GOB officials have 
repeatedly underlined that concern about the impact of Chinese 
imports on domestic manufacturers is a root cause behind their 
unwillingness to agree to the non-agricultural tariff cuts proposed 
by both the USG and the EU.  Brazilian mining representatives have 
told us that they worry about China's desire to control South 
American mineral and other natural resources.  Meanwhile, the 
Brazilian media has prominently featured the threat posed by Chinese 
imports to domestic producers, including a projected record USD 100 
billion in imports from China this year - impelled by a stronger 
real - along with promises by the GOB to help ameliorate any 
financial harm caused by this competition.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Industry and Official Concern 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) A trade specialist at the National Confederation of 
Industries (CNI) told EmbOff in a May 7 meeting that Brazilian 
resistance to lowering the Swiss coefficient during the Doha round 
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) discussions is largely related 
to Brazilian industry's fear of being overwhelmed by low-cost 
Chinese imports.  The CNI representative felt that while there is 
room for negotiation on the coefficient, GOB negotiators will try to 
keep the coefficient as high as possible for this reason.  According 
to the trade specialist, the GOB believes that higher tariffs are a 
short term solution that will give Brazilian industries "breathing 
room" while the GOB addresses known competitive disadvantages such 
as a burdensome tax structure and infrastructure deficiencies. 
 
3.  (SBU) This echoes the concerns about the effect of Chinese 
imports on local industries openly expressed by GOB officials at a 
May 24 meeting with EconCouns (ref A) and during April 11-13 
meetings in Brazil with leaders of the National Association of 
Manufacturers (ref B).  One high-ranking GOB official went further 
in a closed meeting by expressing reservations about the wisdom of 
Brazil focusing on China as a trading partner as he believes that 
country does not have a true market economy.  In another recent 
meeting, Brazilian mining industry representatives voiced concern 
about Chinese desires to fuel their county's continued economic 
expansion by gaining preferential access to South American mineral 
and natural resources, a move seen as posing a direct threat to U.S. 
industry (ref C). 
 
-------------- 
Media Emphasis 
-------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The Brazilian media, for its part, has focused on the 
emerging Chinese trade threat.  One recent front page newspaper 
story noted that Brazilian imports are on track this year to surpass 
USD 100 billion for the first time in history and imports from China 
are growing explosively - up 46 percent in the first four months of 
2007 versus the same period in 2006.  This article pointed out that, 
due to the strengthening real, it is now less expensive for domestic 
sellers to import cheap Chinese goods and re-label them than produce 
them in Brazil - a trend the report said was especially pronounced 
in the appliance, apparel, and footwear markets.  Other media 
articles have keyed on Chinese competitive advantages in labor costs 
and currency exchange rates (reftel D) as well as promises by 
President Lula of GOB assistance to companies hurt by Chinese 
competition and by the appreciation of the real. 
 
5.  (U) The concerns we have heard are echoed in official trade 
statistics.  According to the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Trade, Brazil has gone from a 2003 trade surplus with China of USD 
2.4 billion to a deficit in the first four months of 2007 of over 
USD 363 million.  Brazilian exports to China have grown at a healthy 
 
BRASILIA 00000990  002 OF 002 
 
 
clip of 20 - 25 percent annually over that period, but imports from 
China have grown much faster at 73 percent in 2004, 44 percent in 
2005 and 49 percent in 2006.  That said, Brazil is still expected to 
run an overall global trade surplus of over USD 38 billion in 2007, 
despite the China results. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  Both the GOB and Brazilian industry already view 
competition from China as a serious threat to the domestic economy 
and fear any agreement to lower tariff rates will exacerbate this 
problem.  This may limit GOB willingness to agree to a Swiss 
coefficient figure at the level advocated by the USG and the EU. 
The GOB appears aware of its infrastructure and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and apparently regards maintaining a higher tariff 
ceiling as a short-term solution that will allow the country time to 
address these problems before facing intensive price competition 
from abroad.  End Comment. 
 
Sobel