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Viewing cable 07BANGKOK2790, THAIS INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF U.S.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BANGKOK2790 2007-05-17 11:38 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO8320
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #2790/01 1371138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171138Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7010
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7143
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1752
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4235
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9273
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3119
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 3570
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON EINV KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAIS INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. 
 
 
BANGKOK 00002790  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) America's image in Thailand has deteriorated in 
recent months.  Thais generally do not share the American 
concerns prompted by the RTG's issuance of compulsory 
licenses for prescription medicines.  Not only do they 
continue to believe that Thailand's placement on the USTR 
Special 301 Priority Watch List represents retaliation for 
the compulsory licenses, but they also suspect that a swath 
of the American political class has been co-opted by deposed 
Prime Minister Thaksin.  Thaksin's employment of American 
lobbyists and public relations specialists -- one of whom has 
links to a pharmaceutical firm hurt by the compulsory license 
decision -- has increased wariness of the USG.  The situation 
is exacerbated by Google Inc's slow decision to remove from 
its YouTube website video clips disrespectful of the Thai 
King, seemingly pitting Thai love for the monarch against 
America's broad protection of free speech.  The Ambassador 
has used the media, and most recently a May 16 appearance 
before a legislative committee, to try to dispel Thai 
suspicions, but we may remain an easy target against which 
the Thais can direct anxieties about their political and 
economic course.  End Summary. 
 
IT STARTED WITH THE COUP... 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) When the military launched its coup in September, 
ensuring Thaksin would not soon return from his overseas 
travels, many Thais expressed a sense of relief, feeling that 
the country had been saved from a dire predicament.  But many 
urban and cosmopolitan Thais recognized there was something 
distasteful about a military coup, even as they viewed it as 
preferable to Thaksin perpetuating his rule.  With defensive 
edginess, Thai opinion-makers sought to rebut implied and 
explicit foreign criticism, asserting that the coup was "a 
Thai solution to a Thai problem" and consistent with a 
distinctly Thai form of democracy that Westerners had trouble 
understanding.  Some Thais sounded an unhappy note when we 
suspended millions of dollars of military aid, comparing 
unfavorably our response with the more ingratiating approach 
of the Chinese.  Some Thais questioned whether we applied a 
double standard, since we had waived sanctions against 
Pakistan (albeit years after Musharraf's takeover, we pointed 
out). 
 
THE LOBBYISTS 
------------- 
 
3. (SBU) If sophisticated Thais worried about their country's 
international image in the wake of the coup (e.g., the 
possibility that Thailand would find itself lumped in with 
Burma, while neighboring Indonesia won praise for its 
transition to democracy), their anxiety was soon exacerbated 
by news that globe-trotting deposed PM Thaksin retained 
top-notch lobbying and public relations firms.  These firms' 
powerful, pin-striped images outclassed by an order of 
magnitude that of the assorted bureaucrats pulled out of 
retirement to populate the cabinet soon known collectively in 
the press as "old ginger."  Thais from throughout the 
political class repeatedly sought reassurance from their 
Embassy contacts that Thaksin's lobbyists would not skew U.S. 
foreign policy in his favor. 
 
COMPULSORY LICENSES 
------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Health Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla was one of the 
few cabinet members who appeared energized; unfortunately, 
one of the efforts to which he devoted himself was the 
issuance of compulsory licenses (CLs) to enable the RTG to 
produce or import generic medicines that violated the patents 
of large pharmaceutical firms.  In December and January, the 
RTG announced it had issued CLs for three medicines produced 
by Merck, Abbott Labs, and Sanofi-Aventis.  U.S.-based Abbott 
 
BANGKOK 00002790  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
retaliated by withdrawing its applications for registering 
new products in Thailand; activists denounced the move and 
held demonstrations outside Abbott's offices in Bangkok, and 
the Embassy. 
 
5. (SBU) Abbott also hired a public relations firm to focus 
attention on the RTG's actions.  This firm, connected to a 
prominent former USG official who is also associated with one 
of the U.S. companies hired by Thaksin, authored articles and 
bought advertisements to convey its views.  In emotionally 
charged terms, the firm condemned the CLs as "theft," and 
labeled Minister Mongkol's justifications for his actions as 
"deceit."  The firm did not limit its views narrowly to the 
CLs, however; it decried the military's overthrow of Thaksin 
and criticized a wide range of the RTG's economic and 
financial policies while labeling the country as part of an 
"axis of IP evil" for violating intellectual property rights. 
 This firm also threw in intellectually dishonest and 
misleading assertions for good measure, e.g., that Thailand 
is becoming another Burma, and that the interim government is 
responsible for deterioration in the South. 
 
USE OF THE INTERNET 
------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The aforementioned firm placed full-page ads, using 
more moderate but still highly contentious language, in Thai 
newspapers; it also established a website: thailies.com, 
which now directs one to a site labeled thaimyths.com.  In 
late April, the firm posted a video message on Google Inc's 
YouTube video-sharing site.  The choice of YouTube seemed 
designed to highlight the RTG's decision earlier that month 
to block access to the YouTube site, after clips 
disrespectful of revered King Bhumibol were posted there. 
The sense of outrage over the clips prompted public discourse 
over the limits of free speech.  While few Thais expressed 
qualms about blocking the negative depictions of the King, 
they did demonstrate awareness of differences in Thai and 
American values, with reverence for the King and respect for 
authority and politeness paramount in the former, and freedom 
of speech (even if offensive or insensitive) prominent in the 
latter.  Some commentators highlighted Google Inc's supposed 
willingness to adhere to Chinese government censorship 
standards in order to operate in the PRC, while they claimed 
the corporation failed to respond with appropriate speed and 
deference when Thai sensitivities were at stake.  Thais 
humbly acknowledged the difference in Google Inc's response 
likely stemmed from Thailand's relatively low level of 
international influence. 
 
7. (SBU) While the creators of the disrespectful clips remain 
unknown, the Thai press reported rumors of Thaksin's or his 
sympathizers' involvement.  It has long been suspected that 
Thaksin considered the King as his main rival for influence, 
and the monarchy as an institution that should be diminished 
in stature.  Some have previously claimed that Thaksin 
supported an anti-royalist website maintained in Europe, 
manusia.com -- although the preeminent pro-Thaksin site, 
hi-Thaksin.net, highlights Thai adoration for the King, even 
as it provides material to promote Thaksin's political 
agenda.  The Council for National Security (CNS) -- composed 
of the coup leaders -- recently set up its own website, to 
counter Thaksin's propaganda.  Clearly, though, in political 
terms the Internet provides the current regime with more 
nuisances (in the form of unwanted foreign intrusion) than 
benefits or opportunities. 
 
PRIORITY WATCH LIST 
------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) By May, Thais had demonstrated they were sensitive 
and insecure about their international standing; they worried 
that their wealthy deposed PM was buying influence in 
Washington; and both known and unknown figures were using the 
Internet and other means to get exposure for hostile views. 
In this context, our announcement of Thailand's placement on 
 
BANGKOK 00002790  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the Special 301 Priority Watch List (PWL) appeared to the 
conspiracy-minded as another in a series of foreign jabs.  It 
was easy for some to paint the PWL decision as retaliation 
for the compulsory licensing decision; an upcoming 
determination that certain Thai exports will no longer be 
eligible for preferential duty treatment under the 
Generalized System of Preferences will likely be seen in a 
similar light, characterized as another vindictive U.S. 
action placing the health of U.S. corporate profits above 
that of "poor Thais." 
 
GETTING OUR MESSAGE OUT 
----------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) We have generally avoided publicly addressing the 
suspicions surrounding Thaksin's hiring of U.S. lobbyists; 
any explanation, no matter how clear, would simply encourage 
further discourse on the topic and enable critics to smirk 
that we protest too much.  We have taken an active approach 
on PWL, however, arranging numerous interviews with the 
Ambassador so he could explain to the local media our 
standards and the importance of IPR protection.  On May 16, 
the Ambassador went to the parliament for a two-hour meeting 
with nine members of the National Legislative Assembly's 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to discuss these issues.  The 
legislators were predisposed to believe that the PWL 
determination was driven by resentment over the RTG's 
issuance of compulsory licenses.  However, they took on board 
the Ambassador's explanation that PWL determination was based 
principally on the widespread, open availability of 
counterfeit brand-name apparel and illegal copies of software 
and video and music discs.  The upcoming visit of EAP A/S 
Hill should provide another opportunity to clarify that our 
actions are driven by objective criteria, not political 
grudges. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) The post-coup government has made its fair share of 
political and economic blunders, and the Thais are the first 
to acknowledge (and criticize) their own failings.  This has 
created an environment of heightened sensitivities, however 
-- and these are exacerbated by an understanding that 
Thailand's beloved King is in ill health, and a traumatic 
succession process lies in the not-too-distant future.  As 
has happened here in the past, in times of national 
difficulty, an increased sense of nationalism is engendered 
and often encouraged.  Current RTG efforts to change laws on 
foreign investment are indicative of this mood.  We will 
continue working to preserve a friendly bilateral 
relationship, even as American entities and mechanisms 
outside of our control complicate U.S. Government efforts. 
BOYCE