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Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD1699, ACTION REQUEST: U.S. WEAPONS RELEASE TO IRAQ

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BAGHDAD1699 2007-05-23 08:24 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO3630
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1699/01 1430824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230824Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1318
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER MARR PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: U.S. WEAPONS RELEASE TO IRAQ 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 15. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: We request the release of U.S. sensors and 
weapons (described in para 3-5) to the Government of Iraq 
(GOI) for incorporation onboard Iraqi Air Force (IAF) 
aircraft to advance the GOI's counter-terrorism capability 
and security self-sufficiency.  The aircraft and the 
equipment will remain under U.S. operational control until 
the GOI and IAF meet key milestones in security and training 
readiness.  The equipment will be procured primarily through 
a U.S. funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case.  The GOI and 
Coalition consider the equipment a force generation 
requirement.  It will take twelve to twenty months lead time 
to develop, build, test and deploy these systems.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Description of Technology for Release 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Three IAF Counter-Terrorism Cessna 208B Caravans, 
under U.S. operational control, would be equipped with the 
following sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or 
MTS-A Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor 
(space-stabilized EO/IR sensor with laser range finder, laser 
illuminator, and laser designator). 2. Weapon Systems: 1553 
NATO standard data bus, 2-4 hard points, and "Group A" wiring 
to support the laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire.  Finally, the 
ISR data link system included on the Caravans will be 
upgraded to allow the aircraft to perform 
aircraft-to-aircraft image transfer. 
 
4. (SBU) The IAF AT-6 or Super Tucano aircraft, under U.S. 
operational control, would be equipped with the following 
sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or MTS-A EO/IR 
sensor (space-stabilized EO /IR sensor with laser range 
finder, laser illuminator, and laser designator). 2. Weapon 
Systems: 1553 NATO standard data bus and 2-4 hard points to 
support laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire, 2.75-inch rockets, 
250-500 lb ballistic and laser-guided bombs, and the 
ALE/AAR-47 defensive system. 
 
5. (SBU) The IAF UH-1H Huey II CT platform, under U.S. 
operational control, would be equipped with the following 
sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or MTS-A EO/IR 
sensor (space-stabilized EO/IR sensor with laser range finder 
and laser illuminator but no laser designator). 2. Weapon 
systems: capability to support 2.75-inch rockets as well as a 
forward-firing gun not to exceed the caliber of guns already 
released to Iraqi ground forces.  In addition, the ALE/AAR-47 
defensive system currently installed on the original 16 UH-1H 
Huey II and C-130 aircraft is needed for aircraft 
survivability. 
 
Rationale for Technology Release 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) U.S. forces presently perform all airborne 
counter-terrorism missions; the GOI and IAF do not have 
adequate capability to find, track, target, and engage 
Anti-Iraq Forces (AIF).  To successfully transition security 
responsibilities to the GoI, the IAF must be capable of 
engaging time-sensitive targets.  U.S. Government purchase 
and release of technology described in para 2-4 for 
incorporation on U.S.-controlled Iraqi aircraft will enable 
the IAF to meet its need for organic airborne CT platforms. 
These systems are critical for support of Iraqi Special 
Operations Forces and other Iraqi CT forces, and both the 
Prime Minister and the Commanding General fully support such 
an increase in capability. 
 
Technology to Remain Under U.S. Operational Control 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7. (SBU) U.S. forces will rigorously track, maintain, and 
safeguard all sensitive munitions and technology released for 
deployment onboard the IAF aircraft. The GOI and IAF will 
only be permitted to retain a limited stock of sensitive 
weapons for their aircraft, and the US will provide 
just-in-time replacement of these weapons as they are needed 
for ongoing operations.  Furthermore, IAF aircrew will not 
have autonomous control and authority to use airborne 
counter-terrorism weapons until they and their leadership 
have demonstrated the capability and intent to use them in a 
manner consistent with US human rights standards and the 
international laws of armed conflict. 
 
8. (U) The GOI and IAF maturity will be measured by two key 
milestones: (1) the ability to properly secure and protect 
 
BAGHDAD 00001699  002 OF 002 
 
 
sensitive technology (through specific bilateral agreements 
as applicable) and (2) the ability to properly control, 
sustain, and operate sensitive technology (through ongoing 
Training Readiness Assessments).  If the GOI and IAF do not 
eventually conform to agreed upon standards in either area, 
the technology will not be transferred to the GOI and IAF. 
Since the technology will be procured with Iraqi Security 
Force Funds, the US may ultimately decide to remove it from 
the Iraqis and redirect it for other purposes consistent with 
US national security objectives. 
 
9. (U) We believe the IAF/GOI will continue to develop 
security protection skills before the arrival of these 
capabilities in early 2008.  Airborne weapon system operators 
and pilots will continue to mentor and train the IAF in the 
proper use, protection, and safeguarding of these 
technologies until they demonstrate this maturity and intent. 
 
Iraq Safeguarding Sensitive Technology 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (U) The GOI has demonstrated the intent and ability to 
protect sensitive, classified military technology through 
cooperation with U.S. and Coalition forces.  The GOI's 
implementation of an Article 505 agreement (signed July 24, 
2004) demonstrates Iraq's willingness and ability to protect 
grant defense articles and technology in a manner consistent 
with U.S. standards.  MNF-I intends to continue to mentor the 
GOI in the protection of sensitive USG technology. The 
Country Team and MNF-I will obtain necessary formal 
agreements with the GOI and perform real-time assessments of 
the stability of the GOI before transferring ownership of any 
sensitive equipment, technology, or weapons. Lastly, we will 
continue to carry out robust end-use monitoring through the 
GOLDEN SENTRY program. 
 
Anticipated Reaction From Neighboring Nations 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Release of this technology may evoke negative 
reactions from neighboring nations.  Iraq's Sunni Arab 
neighbors distrust the Shia-dominated GOI, fearing a "Shia 
crescent" running from Iran to Lebanon.  Although Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have received 
similar equipment, they are unlikely to see Iraqi possession 
as benign. 
 
Iraq's Political Importance to the Region 
----------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) A stable, democratically-elected Iraqi government, 
capable of protecting its people and sovereignty, and 
remaining at peace with its neighbors is one of the USG's 
highest priorities.  The release and employment of the 
sensors and weaponry described in paras 3-5 will facilitate 
progress toward this goal, advancing the Iraqi armed forces 
ability to defend Iraq's borders, target illicit activity, 
and improve air traffic safety. 
 
Source of Financing and Economic Impact 
--------------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) MNF-I intends to use U.S. funds appropriated for 
Iraq (Iraqi Security Force Funds or ISFF) to procure and 
equip Counter Terrorism aircraft for the IAF. The purchase 
will be done primarily through a Foreign Military Sales 
program.   We believe that the GOI will be able to 
financially support the operational and maintenance costs of 
these technologies for the foreseeable future. 
 
Relevant Human Rights Considerations 
------------------------------------ 
 
14. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations that 
should preclude the release of this technology to the Iraqi 
military. GOI stability will be assessed prior to 
transitioning direct US oversight and/or transferring 
ownership. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
15. (SBU) We request Washington approval for the release to 
the GOI of items and technology described in paras 3-5. 
CROCKER