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Viewing cable 07TOKYO1528, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/06/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO1528 2007-04-08 22:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO8024
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1528/01 0982254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 082254Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2423
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3028
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0571
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4098
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9893
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1506
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6480
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2557
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3839
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 001528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/06/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Government to establish expert panel this month, with aim of 
accelerating debate on allowing collective defense 
(2) Aegis data leak: SDF personnel have low awareness to protect 
secrets; Defense Ministry's measures still insufficient 
 
SIPDIS 
(3) A close look at Abe diplomacy -- Japan-US relations: Will 
"comfort women" issue make a soft landing? 
(4) Okinawa teachers concerned about setback from peace education, 
alarmed by Abe administration's "offensives" 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Government to establish expert panel this month, with aim of 
accelerating debate on allowing collective defense 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
April 6, 2007 
 
Full-fledged discussion will start soon on the possibility of 
allowing the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to use the right to 
collective self-defense. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has long insisted 
on the need for such discussion. An expert panel, headed by former 
Ambassador to the Unite States Shunji Yanai, will be set up by the 
end of this month to engage in specific case studies. By setting up 
the panel, the government aims to accelerate policy debate in the 
diplomatic and security areas, a matter of primary concern to the 
prime minister with his administration having seen six months since 
coming into office. It also seeks to enhance the Japan-US alliance, 
the need of which the prime minister intends to underscore during 
his first visit to the US in late April. 
 
Under the government's interpretation of the Constitution, Japan is 
vested with the right to collective self-defense under international 
law but is not allowed to use it. The prime minister was 
dissatisfied with the government's constitutional interpretation 
even before coming into office. He has instructed the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau to review the interpretation. 
 
Now that specific contentious points have been singled out in 
back-room discussions, observers see behind the decision to set up 
the study group a desire to "publicize and accelerate debate," a 
close aide to the prime minister said. One member of the expert 
panel also said: "The prime minister takes the view that it is 
strange for Japan to remain unable to use the collective 
self-defense right. It's only natural for the prime minister to have 
such a critical sense," adding: "The panel is expected to discuss 
points in question in specific case studies." 
 
The scenarios under which Japan could be allowed to exercise the 
right of collective self-defense include: (1) Japan intercepts a 
ballistic missile heading toward the US under the missile defense 
(MD) system; (2) SDF troops on a peacekeeping operations (PKO) 
mission rescue foreign troops; and (3) MSDF vessels escort foreign 
naval vessels acting in concert on international waters. On these 
scenarios, specific studies reportedly are already underway in the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau. 
 
When Abe meets with President Bush during his first US visit as 
prime minister on April 26-27, he is expected to reconfirm the need 
to strengthen the Japan-US alliance in the context of the world. As 
part of efforts to this end, the prime minister intends to take up 
the measure of accelerating debate on collective defense. 
 
TOKYO 00001528  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
Since the issue of collective self-defense is closely connected with 
constitutional debate, there are a host of tasks to clear. The New 
Komeito remains cautious, and even some Defense Ministry officials 
are calling for caution about letting idealism going out front. The 
prime minister has said his cabinet would work out a conclusion, but 
it is uncertain whether the studies will lead to a conclusion to 
allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. 
 
(2) Aegis data leak: SDF personnel have low awareness to protect 
secrets; Defense Ministry's measures still insufficient 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged) 
April 6, 2007 
 
The removal of highly confidential data on the Aegis system by a 
Maritime Self-Defense Force petty officer 2nd class, a crewmember of 
the destroyer Shirane of Escort Flotilla 1, has again exposed the 
Defense Ministry's lax information management. What kind of measures 
has the ministry taken to protect secrets? 
 
In February 2006, confidential MSDF information was leaked to the 
Internet via the Winny file-sharing program by a destroyer 
crewmember stationed at the MSDF Sasebo Base in Nagasaki Prefecture. 
This was followed by a string of similar incidents. Given the 
situation, the Defense Ministry has issued the following notice in 
the name of its administrative defense minister prohibiting: (1) 
bringing in personal computers to the workplace, (2) personal 
computers from having access to ministry data, (3) removing 
government-owned transportable memory media (floppy disks, CDs, USB 
memories, etc.) out of the workplace without authorization, and (4) 
using private transportable memory media in ministry computers. 
 
In order to practice the notice thoroughly, the ministry plans to 
conduct spot inspections. 
 
In late November last year, the ministry hastily procured 56,000 
computers with limited access to the outside. Affixed to the desks 
with wires, the computers cannot be taken out of the offices. But 
there still exist personal computers in the ministry, which is still 
in short of computers. 
 
In reality, the ministry's measures to prevent its personnel from 
taking work home without inspections or authorization are 
insufficient. A senior Defense Ministry official described the 
latest information leak as an "incident waiting to happen." The 
ministry is now faced with the fundamental question of to what 
extent an organization should trust individual workers. SDF Joint 
Staff Chief Takashi Saito in a press conference yesterday said: "The 
incident made me realize that the awareness of SDF personnel is 
still insufficient." 
 
Educating SDF personnel is vital. The ministry has begun reeducating 
its personnel on the handling of defense secrets. Former ASDF Lt. 
Gen. Mamoru Sato took this view: "Rank-and-file officers are 
slacking because the top brass are slacking. SDF personnel must be 
educated thoroughly." 
 
The MSDF Shore Police Command and police authorities are 
investigating the petty officer 2nd class on suspicion of leaking 
special defense secrets (tokubetsu bouei himitsu) in violation of 
the Secret Protection Law (which carries the maximum sentence of 10 
years in prison) under the Japan-US Mutual Defense Assistance 
 
TOKYO 00001528  003 OF 005 
 
 
Agreement. The law, however, does not apply to the leakage of 
operational and technical information. Tokyo and Washington intend 
to conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA) that includes operational information. However, the 
government has kept putting off steps to strengthen penalties, such 
as revising the SDF Law. 
 
Tightening the confidentiality protection legislation is also a 
point of contention in the government's efforts to study ways to 
strengthen intelligence functions. The debate has been stalled due 
party to the New Komeito's elusive stance. 
 
(3) A close look at Abe diplomacy -- Japan-US relations: Will 
"comfort women" issue make a soft landing? 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Slightly abridged) 
April 6, 2007 
 
On March 19, US Senator Daniel Inouye, a Democrat, was visited by 
former Agriculture Minister Tadamori Oshima of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in Washington. In discussing how to build a 
fresh framework for Japanese and US lawmakers to exchange views, 
Inouye lamented the declining number of pro-Japanese lawmakers in 
the United States: "Even in the Koizumi-Bush honeymoon days, the 
number of lawmakers in the US Congress who are willing to work hard 
for Japan-US relations was on the decline." 
 
Inouye expressed concern about a resolution denouncing Japan over 
the so-called wartime "comfort women" issue now being discussed in 
the US House of Representatives, telling Oshima: "It will cause 
US-Japan relations to go sour." Inouye already sent Tom Lantos, 
chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, a letter seeking 
not to adopt the resolution. 
 
Japanese lawmakers as well made a move to obstruct the adoption of 
the resolution replete with mistakes of facts and malicious intent. 
One of them was Special Advisor to the Prime Minister Hiroshige 
Seko. He called on US government officials and congressional members 
in Washington on Feb. 20-21. 
 
Counselor to the President Daniel Bartlett met with Seko and told 
him: "I was unaware of that. I'll gather information right away to 
cope with it." Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Katheryn Stevens 
said to Seko: "I understand the resolution does not reflect facts, 
but this is a delicate issue." Seko also met with senior members of 
the major media companies, but in the session, the resolution did 
not become even the topic of conversation. 
 
Concluding that Americans are not much interested in the 
resolution," Seko returned home and advised the government and the 
ruling parties to deal with the resolution case cool-headedly. 
 
However, Seko's visit to the US later brought about an opposite 
effect to what he had expected. A view that Japan is so upset that 
even an aide to the prime minister began making a move (to deal with 
the resolution) spread in the US. 
 
In March, Abe began making a rebuttal against "the former Imperial 
Japanese Army's coercion" in his Diet replies or on other occasions. 
This fueled the US media, which until then had appeared indifferent 
to the resolution. The brunt of criticism was directed at Abe's 
"sense of human rights" instead of his "historical views". 
 
 
TOKYO 00001528  004 OF 005 
 
 
Even so, Abe was going to rebut that criticism. On March 11, Abe was 
to appear live on an NHK TV program "Interview with the Prime 
Minister." 
 
Alarmed by this move, Michael Green, a US expert on Japan and former 
Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council 
(NSC), met with Foreign Minister Aso in Tokyo and told him: "Neither 
(former Deputy Secretary of State) Armitage nor I can defend Japan 
over this issue. To the United States, it is dozens times as 
destructive as the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine." 
 
Aso then advised Abe: "Your rebuttal to the US media would only make 
the matter worse. It's wise for you not to say anything other than 
'feel sorry for them.' If you were to review the Kono statement (a 
government statement issued in 1993 by then Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Kono), you should keep in mind the possibility that currently Lower 
House Speaker Kono may not ring the bell for the start of the 
plenary session of the Lower House." 
 
Appearing on the NHK TV program, Abe again stated he stands by the 
Kono statement and tried to calm down the uproar. Also, he meekly 
offered an apology, noting: "I offer a sincere apology and remorse 
to former comfort women for their pain and hardships they 
suffered." 
 
Meanwhile, in the US, Vice President Cheney, who was briefed by Abe 
about the "comfort women" issue when he visited Japan in February, 
acted to quiet down the situation. 
 
On April 3, Abe telephoned President Bush and explained his stance 
to him. Bush was positive to Abe's account, telling Abe: "I am well 
aware that present-day Japan is democratic and modernized and is 
different from the way it was." 
 
Unlike former Prime Minister Koizumi, who stuck to the "Japan-US 
alliance," Abe is broadening Japan's diplomatic spectrum, for 
instance, by strengthening ties with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and Australia. For this attitude of Abe, some in 
both Japan and the US are worried that "It is regrettable to see 
diplomatic strategy impaired owing to a mistaken response to the 
'comfort women' issue." 
 
In order to strengthen and maintain the alliance of the two 
countries, efforts are essential to build trust relationships at 
various levels, such as government-level, lawmaker-level, and 
private-sector-level. If an issue arises, political wisdom and 
efforts will be indispensable in order to minimize the impact. The 
Abe administration, in terms of that point, is being tested at 
present. 
 
(4) Okinawa teachers concerned about setback from peace education, 
alarmed by Abe administration's "offensives" 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 22) (Excerpts) 
March 31, 2007 
 
The Okinawa Teachers' Union (Okikyoso) and the Senior High School 
Teachers' Union (Kokyoso), taking the results of the Education 
Ministry's textbook screening seriously, plan to hold an emergency 
press briefing on April 2. Okikyoso Chairman Toshio Ohama said 
alarmingly, "The results indicate a setback from the realities 
accumulated so far by researchers in connection with the Battle of 
Okinawa. Following an amendment to the Basic Education Law, Prime 
 
TOKYO 00001528  005 OF 005 
 
 
Minister Abe has begun coming down on textbooks." "There's no change 
in our stance of pushing peace learning through the Battle of 
Okinawa. The way Okinawa pushes peace education is being tested," 
Ohama added. 
 
Analysis: Questionable rationale to overturn previously accepted 
views 
 
As a result of the screening of senior high school history 
textbooks, the passage "the former Japanese military forced 
civilians to commit mass suicides" relating to the Battle of Okinawa 
received a binding suggestion for change for the first time and it 
was modified. One researcher on the Battle of Okinawa is furiously 
opposed to that modification and contends: "It is a denial to all 
the research results obtained until now." 
 
Particularly questionable is that the binding suggestion cited 
depositions used in the case now in litigation as reference 
materials to overturn the commonly accepted views in the studies of 
the Battle of Okinawa. The Education Ministry takes the view that 
"with a change in conventional theories, various testimonies are 
found in depositions before the court." But Hirofumi Hayashi 
(professor at Kanto Gakuin University), a researcher on the Battle 
of Okinawa, claimed: "There are no new studies showing (the former 
Japanese military was not involved)." 
 
In recent years, many researchers have tended to replace the term 
"mass suicides" (shudan jiketsu) with "mass deaths" (shudanshi). 
Behind this trend is this way of thinking that it is not appropriate 
to use the former Japanese military's special term "suicides" 
(jiketsu) to describe civilians and that civilians' deaths are 
viewed as "civilians' voluntary deaths." 
 
The term "mass suicides" has been used since the Education Ministry 
gave a binding suggestion to use that term in 1983, noting: "Most 
cases are found to have been mass suicides. If the mass suicides are 
not mentioned, it's difficult to have an overall picture of the 
Battle of Okinawa." Masaaki Aniya (professor emeritus at Okinawa 
International University) gave this analysis: "Modifications made 
this time have some links to the textbook screenings carried out in 
the 1980s." Toshiaki Shinjo, a teacher at Ginowan Senior High 
School, asserted: "The intention (of the modifications this time) is 
to play down the former Japanese military's involvement and 
interpret the 'deaths' of civilians as an admirable story of 
patriots who willingly laid down their lives for Japan." 
 
There are moves to overturn the commonly accepted views in 
connection with the Battle of Okinawa, as evidenced by revisionist 
academics, the textbook screening, and the so-called "Iwanami 
lawsuit" over the former Japanese military's involvement in 
civilians' mass suicides. The results of the recent textbook 
screening are likely to force textbook publishers to tighten their 
voluntary restrictions even further. Whether to inherit the 
previously accepted stories of the Battle of Okinawa, which are 
based on statements by those who experienced the war and which are 
the results of studies of official and other documents, is again 
called into question now, 62 years after the end of World War II. 
 
SCHIEFFER